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This dissertation is a study of political liberalism, both as that doctrine was 
developed by John Rawls and as it has come to be understood and modified by others. 
It is agreed that the search for moral common ground was at the heart of Rawls’s 
project, but the details of his preferred response to the “fact of reasonable pluralism” 
are widely disputed. I argue that the currently dominant views of these details are 
mistaken, and I offer new interpretations of Rawls’s political liberalism and of his 
reasons for developing it. I claim that Rawls’s theory is, contrary to most accounts, 
more concerned with justice than with legitimacy and less concerned with securing 
agreement between actually existing citizens than his most well-known formulations 
might suggest. But this resulting theory incorporates two fundamental yet conflicting 
strands, and the only way to render it consistent and plausible is to formulate an 
“orthodox political liberalism” that ends up looking much like the view painted by the 
(still) mistaken rival interpretations. This orthodox political liberalism derives its 
plausibility from the resemblance of its moral rationale to the rationale for the 
traditional liberal stance in favor of state neutrality on religion. It is next argued that 
orthodox political liberalism has difficultly sustaining the arguments needed to defend 
a sufficiently determinate egalitarian criterion of distributive justice. We therefore 
confront a tension between liberal egalitarianism and the moral underpinnings of 
liberal neutrality on religion. After setting out reasons for thinking that we should in 
fact question the traditional liberal stance on religion in political life, I attempt to 
 develop a framework of political justification that would reassert the traditional 
constraints on religious considerations, this time for more pragmatic reasons. 
Unfortunately, this initially attractive framework—which I call pragmatic 
contextualism—is in the final analysis unsatisfactory. I conclude that since the 
constraint on publicly acceptable reasons that is the hallmark of political liberalism 
and the bane of economic egalitarianism is not in fact a demand of justice, we should 
reject political liberalism and explore further the possibility of strongly egalitarian 
criteria of economic justice.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
 
This dissertation is a study of political liberalism, both as that doctrine was 
developed by its most well-known proponent, John Rawls, and as it has come to be 
understood by others. Political Liberalism, Rawls’s second book, was the result of 
several years’ reflection on what Rawls came to see as a significant flaw in the 
argument of his first book, A Theory of Justice. Specifically, Rawls believed that the 
earlier argument ignored the constraints on the terms of fully adequate political 
justification imposed by the fact of reasonable pluralism—that is, the fact that 
informed and conscientious moral reflection will lead reasonable persons to develop 
starkly different moral, religious, and philosophical worldviews. He took this fact to 
have profound implications for the content and structure of an acceptable conception 
of political justice for a free democratic society. 
It is indisputable that the search for moral common ground is at the heart of 
Rawlsian political liberalism, and many commentators believed that the specific moral 
duty to avoid moral controversy, set out in Liberalism, was inconsistent with the 
advocacy of the quite controversial egalitarian criterion of economic justice defended 
by Rawls in A Theory of Justice. Rawls, for his part, rejected this interpretation. But 
judging by the interpretations of the book’s most prominent reviewers, Rawls had 
failed to make this case. Bernard Williams, Susan Moller Okin, Brian Barry, Bruce 
Ackerman, and many others could not see how the demanding egalitarianism of A 
Theory of Justice could survive Rawls’s political liberal intention to “apply the 
principle of tolerance to philosophy itself,” as he put it. Since so many of our fellow 
citizens reject strongly egalitarian criteria of justice, why doesn’t “the principle of 
tolerance” underlying political liberalism enjoin Rawls’s special brand of theoretical 
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 tolerance of their conscientious refusal to permit government intervention in markets 
when inequalities emerge from the nexus of voluntary capitalist contracts? Can forcing 
those who prize government non-intervention to pursue self-betterment in a coercively 
imposed institutional scheme that constrains the emergence of market inequalities 
plausibly be seen as incorporating any meaningful kind of tolerance of their view at 
all?  
Two strategies for reaching a better understanding of the political liberal’s 
recommended response to the “fact of reasonable pluralism” have emerged in the 
literature. The first attempts to reconstruct the reflections that led Rawls to develop the 
view in the first place. If we can understand the concerns that generated the need to 
amend the arguments of A Theory of Justice, we will be in a good position to tell 
whether those concerns would force one to renounce that book’s egalitarian 
arguments. This tack has been taken up by two of the most prominent scholars and 
interpreters of Rawls. Although their accounts differ in important respects, Brian 
Barry and Samuel Freeman each holds that that Rawls came to abandon Theory’s 
“congruence” argument, which was designed to show that full commitment to his two 
principles of justice is not injurious to the rational good of all. Rawls thought this 
argument confirmed that his principles are sufficiently deferent to citizens’ diverse 
moral outlooks and sufficiently sensitive to their various claims on social resources. 
Barry and Freeman argue that the “main” or “primary” component of the congruence 
argument essentially depends on certain Kantian claims in order to show that the 
requirements of justice in fact match up perfectly with citizens’ best strategy for 
pursuing their own good. Each concludes that Rawls wished to abandon the Kantian 
component, and that the central theoretical devices of Liberalism are designed to fill 
the gap left by its removal. The main question for this first interpretive argument 
therefore becomes, Can the gap left by the Kantian component be filled in a way that 
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 preserves the relevance of the earlier arguments for egalitarianism, which were held to 
be valid even in societies where vast inequalities are tolerated? 
I analyze Barry’s and Freeman’s interpretive arguments in Chapter 2.  It is an 
implication of their shared interpretation highlighting the Kantian elements of the 
congruence argument that Rawls did seek to establish a perfect match between the 
demands of justice and the rational demands on each citizen generated by his or her 
conception of the good life. For while the original congruence argument was complex, 
drawing on many different considerations of the ways in which just institutions answer 
to citizens’ good, only the Kantian argument seeks to show that the desire to act justly 
and the desire to secure one’s rational good “turn out to specify what is practically 
speaking the same desire.”1 But if Rawls thought the Kantian argument was so crucial 
to what he hoped to establish that he worked out political liberalism to fill the gap left 
by its removal, then this would appear to spell trouble for his quite specific, and quite 
controversial egalitarian criterion of distributive justice. For Rawls is clear in A 
Theory of Justice that “the determination of rational plans is indeterminate in 
important ways…The more evident and easily applied principles of rational choice do 
not specify the best plan.” This suggests—although I have more to say about this in 
Chapter 2—the great difficulty, at least to Rawls’s mind, of deriving determinate and 
universally valid principles of justice from each of the diverse standpoints constituted 
by citizens’ conceptions of the good. Indeed, Rawls immediately notes “This 
indeterminacy [in the dictates of rational plans] is no difficulty for justice as fairness, 
since the details of plans do not affect in any way what is right or just.” My claim in 
Chapter 2 is that if we follow Barry and Freeman in seeing political liberalism as an 
attempt to plug the hole left by the removal of the Kantian congruence argument, it is 
then quite unclear how Rawls can present his two principles as a universally valid 
                                                 
1 Rawls (1999a), p. 501. 
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 criterion of justice. For those principles will not be uniquely supported by the rational 
plans of diverse citizens concerned to advance their good. And it is this sort of support 
that the Kantian argument is specially tailored to provide. I end the chapter by 
presenting what I think is a better account of the problem Rawls found in Theory, an 
account that does not have Rawls seeking the accommodation of citizens’ many and 
diverse conceptions of the good that would, I agree, jeopardize his egalitarian criterion 
of justice. 
The second tack for understanding political liberalism focuses more on the 
content of that doctrine that ultimately emerged from Rawls’s attempts to deal with 
the problem he claimed to find in A Theory of Justice. Although many commentators 
doubted that this doctrine could sustain his egalitarianism, Rawls was not without his 
defenders on this score. The most resourceful defender of the view that Rawls’s 
egalitarianism had survived the move to political liberalism is David Estlund, whose 
short paper on the issue continues to be extremely influential. Rawls himself later 
thanked Estlund in print for helping political liberalism combat its anti-egalitarian 
reputation. Estlund’s argument had two planks. First, he sought to explicate the notion 
of “reasonableness” that plays so central a role in Rawls’s theory. Since it is the 
implications of fact of reasonable pluralism that leads Rawls to amend the framework 
of Theory, Estlund attempts to explain in what way political liberalism constitutes the 
most reasonable response to reasonable pluralism. In the first half of Chapter 3 I 
identify a number of problems with Estlund’s account. These are not only problems 
with his interpretation of Rawls, but also with the distinctive version of political 
liberalism that emerges from his mistaken interpretation. Unfortunately, then, while 
Estlund’s account does leave political liberalism consistent with strongly egalitarian 
criteria of justice, it is nevertheless substantively unsatisfactory. Fortunately, there is 
another, more interpretively accurate way to save egalitarian political liberalism, and I 
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 also present this interpretation in Chapter 3. 
The second plank of Estlund’s argument holds that A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism “are not about the same subject.” The former, he claimed, is about 
justice, whereas the latter is about legitimacy. And while it is sometimes the case that 
a state cannot legitimately impose egalitarian laws or policies, the content of liberal 
justice isn’t variable in this way—it is not so profoundly influenced by the shape that 
conscientious citizens’ worldviews take at a certain time and place. While this line has 
been followed by many other commentators, it is mistaken. I agree that Political 
Liberalism has much to say on the topic of legitimacy—indeed Chapter 3 
distinguishes for the first time two different notions of legitimacy at work in the book. 
But it is false that political liberalism is not presented as a framework for deliberating 
about justice. Rawls cannot therefore so easily avoid the charge that his brand of 
accommodation to reasonable pluralism leaves egalitarianism without a strong, 
universally valid foundation. The issue is not just whether a morally superior 
conception of justice can be legitimately implemented here and now, but also whether 
that conception can be presented as morally superior, in light of the controversy 
among reasonable citizens it will draw for the foreseeable future. In setting out this 
account, I also take issue in Chapter 3 with a very recent essay by David Reidy which, 
because of its interpretive vigor, could fast become the canonical statement of how 
political liberalism is a theory of legitimacy, not justice, and how this affects the 
nature of the response to the fact of reasonable pluralism that constitutes the positive 
doctrine of political liberalism. The cogency of Reidy’s arguments makes it all the 
more necessary to show precisely where they fail. 
In Chapter 3 I argue that one of Estlund’s mistakes is to assume that a central 
plank in Rawls’s view is the principle that a reason or value is politically unjustifiable 
just in case it can be reasonably rejected. Since many philosophers have followed T. 
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 M. Scanlon in giving reasonable rejection momentous importance in their theories of 
moral or political justifiability, and since just as many reject moral and political 
contractualism because of its reliance on the vague notion of “reasonableness”, I 
pause, in Chapter 4, to address the worries about Scanlon’s view that emerge from the 
arguments against the “reasonable rejectibility” test set out in Chapter 3. I argue that 
forceful objections to Scanlon’s criterion of justifiability can be avoided only if he can 
avoid relying on a substantive notion of reasonableness. Some of Scanlon’s remarks 
support what I call the “purely formal” understanding of reasonableness or reasonable 
rejection. Others are in stark conflict with it. I argue that Scanlon should consciously 
embrace the purely formal route. If he does this, arguments against views like 
Estlund’s that do invoke a substantive conception of reasonableness will not be able to 
touch Scanlon’s theory. But nor can Scanlon’s “theory of reasonableness” be invoked 
to bolster a political liberalism so concerned properly to respond to the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, since a suitably modified Scanlonian contractualism will offer 
no such theory. 
In Chapter 5 I argue that the political liberal friendliness toward egalitarianism 
that emerges from the first two interpretive chapters cannot be sustained, due to 
serious defects in the plank of the theory needed to sustain it. Political liberalism’s 
central notion of stability, which Estlund’s account complete ignores, cannot bear the 
weight placed upon it by the sympathetic reconstruction I offer in Chapter 3. Although 
he never said so, Rawls may have come to appreciate this fact, as his last major 
presentation of political liberalism makes no mention of the notion of stability that 
played so central a role in Political Liberalism. Ironically, only in its most mature 
formulation does Rawlsian political liberalism closely resemble the portrait of the 
view that had been painted by most of its critics since its introduction in 1985.   
 In Chapter 6 I argue that the orthodox political liberalism that emerges from 
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 the first four chapters does in fact have difficultly sustaining the arguments needed to 
defend a coherent, determinate, and strongly egalitarianism criterion of distributive 
justice. Beginning with an argument against libertarian theories, this chapter seeks to 
show that well-motivated movements away from libertarianism will be difficult to 
achieve so long as we work within the framework of political justification imposed by 
orthodox political liberalism. Although citizens will be able legitimately to advocate, 
in public political justification, various interpretations of the egalitarian ideal, the 
strictures of political liberalism render unjustifiable the arguments needed to establish 
the correctness of the most plausible versions of that ideal. And without these 
resources, the choice to avoid egalitarianism in order to avoid its more implausible 
variants will seem quite sensible—even from an egalitarian’s point of view. I conclude 
that if egalitarians are to avoid the embarrassment of having so little to say in response 
to this kind of moderate libertarian backlash, they will have to reject the strictures on 
justification imposed by political liberalism. 
For many of us, egalitarianism is so attractive in its own right that this rejection 
of political liberalism, if indeed the choice between them is genuine, will be quite 
painless. But it is not costless. For in many of Rawls’s writings, as well as in the 
writings of other political liberals, political liberalism is presented as the natural 
extension of one of the most secure “fixed points” of the modern political outlook, viz. 
the propriety of a separation of church and state, which is in turn grounded in a 
principle of neutrality on religion. Our commitment to this principle seems to stem 
from our belief that it is wrong to restrict human freedom when the justification for 
that restriction essentially depends upon premises that others, fully informed and 
rational, might conscientiously reject. And since the fact of reasonable pluralism 
entails that it is possible to rationally reject aspects of even a fully secular moral 
outlook, political liberalism extends the tolerance we accord to the (ir)religious and 
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 applies it to “political philosophy itself.” This suggests that if egalitarian policies are 
in fact justifiable, and if they are in tension with the political liberal framework, then 
this is some reason to question the principle of neutrality on religion. For if we are 
entitled to appeal to controversial premises in order to disregard or discount the 
informed and rational complaints of our more libertarian-minded compatriots, what is 
to stop us from doing the same in the realm of religion? Of course, since the question 
is whether egalitarianism is justifiable, we should try to identify some independent 
principle, value, or ideal whose political justifiability seems as (or more) secure as the 
justifiability of the separation of church and state. Only then can we have good reason 
to raise real questions about the liberal commitment to neutrality on religion as a first 
step in strengthening the case for egalitarian policies. In Chapter 7 I identify what I 
take to be good candidates to play this independent role, and I conclude that there is 
good reason to at least call into question the traditional liberal stance on religious 
neutrality. In this I go further than most critics of political liberalism are willing to go. 
But I do not see how we can keep from going this far once we admit that the policies I 
invoke give us good reason to reject orthodox political liberalism. 
Since I remain rather uneasy in rejecting the traditional principle of neutrality 
on religion, I try, in Chapter Seven, to make room for it in the framework of political 
justifiability that emerges from Chapter 7. Drawing on some surprising strands in 
recent moral theory, I attempt to construct a position I call pragmatic contextualism. 
Pragmatic contextualism agrees with the standard “perfectionist” line in political 
philosophy that, in principle, all moral reasons are “fair game” for governmental 
action. It differs with standard perfectionism, however, in that responds to certain 
threats to the values that generate such reasons by removing from the realm of 
political morality those values whose public advocacy is likely to have serious 
counterproductive consequences and side-effects. By relying in part on facts about the 
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 enduring empirical realities of our imperfect world, the content of political morality is 
determined contextually, in order not to impede important moral progress. 
Although pragmatic contextualism has its attractions, the conclusion of 
Chapter Seven is that it is, in the final analysis, unsatisfactory. There are simply too 
many moral commitments whose membership in political morality appears lifelong, 
no matter how counterproductive their advocacy may be in some circumstances. Still, 
counterproductive consequences are surely relevant to the evaluation of conduct, both 
private and political. Thus, we can still embrace something like pragmatic 
contextualism as a partial framework of civic virtue, even if it is an unsatisfactory 
framework for political morality itself. 
 
* * * 
While the central argument of this work goes through many twists and turns,
 I hope readers will be able to keep the main points in mind. These are that Rawls 
worked out political liberalism in order to work out the best response to the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. This response entails, at the very least, that some controversies 
between citizens and political philosophers alike should be placed firmly to one side, 
in order to pave the way for fully respectful political cooperation. Since strongly 
egalitarian criteria of justice are, inevitably, controversial and rationally rejected by 
many who display a strong willingness to seek fair terms of social cooperation, 
political liberals take on a strong burden of proof when they insist on the superiority of 
the egalitarian approach. Whether or not political liberalism is in fact consistent with 
such an approach depends of course on the details of the view Rawls set out, and on 
that view’s prospects for overcoming strong objections to certain of these details. 
Given political liberalism’s close relation to the ideal of neutrality on religion, the 
former mustn’t be rejected hastily.  But if, in the final analysis, political liberalism is 
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 in fact inconsistent with egalitarianism, as I argue, then in choosing egalitarianism we 
may be choosing against neutrality on religion. This is a position few want to be in, 
and this is why I try carefully to consider the options I take to be generated by my 
discussion of political liberalism and its (in)consistency with egalitarianism. 
Rawls once wrote: “It is a great puzzle to me why political liberalism was not 
worked out much earlier [by writers of an earlier generation]: it seems such a natural 
way to present the idea of liberalism, given the fact of reasonable pluralism in political 
life. Does it have deep faults which preceding writers may have found in it which I 
have not seen and these led them to dismiss it?”2 I certainly agree with Rawls that 
political liberalism is the natural extension of some absolutely fundamental principles 
of traditional liberalism. And while I cannot speak for those earlier writers, I think it is 
safe to say that most of them would not have dismissed political liberalism so easily if 
they had believed that in doing so they were committing themselves to dismissing the 
basis for the traditional liberal principle of neutrality on religion. But if I am right, the 
rejection of political liberalism comes at this price. This also appears to be the price 
we must pay for strongly egalitarian principles of economic justice. Is this, in the end, 
a trade worth making? That is a question whose full answer must await further inquiry. 
                                                 
2 Rawls (1996), p. 374n. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM I: CONGRUENCE AND STABILITY 
 
 John Rawls claimed that his attempts to work out a “political” liberalism were 
not motivated by the myriad objections to A Theory of Justice3 that surfaced in the 
decade after its publication. They instead grew out of his own worry that there were 
problems with Theory's argument for the “stability” of justice as fairness. While many 
commentators are content to analyze Political Liberalism4 in light of what Rawls says 
there about the importance and nature of stability, at least two notable commentators 
have tried to dig deeper to discover what specifically Rawls found troubling in 
Theory's stability argument, and how the new holes in the argument are taken by 
Rawls to inform the character of the new answers. Although their interpretations differ 
in important respects, both Brian Barry and Samuel Freeman have offered 
impressively detailed arguments to show that Rawls came to reject the argument he 
offered in chapter 9 of Theory to establish the “congruence” of a commitment to 
justice with one’s interest in one’s own well-being or rational good.  
In this chapter I argue that this interpretation is wrong, that Rawls was not 
much concerned about whatever flaws he came to see in the argument for congruence, 
and that an alternative account is both better supported by attention to the congruence 
argument in Theory and a better fit with the nature and content of political liberalism. 
More specifically and merely as preface, I try to show that the most crucial content of 
the congruence argument is retained intact during the move to political liberalism; I 
then argue that Rawls’s main concern stems from what he later diagnosed as an 
implicit assumption in Theory’s argument, which while important explicitly to reject, 
                                                 
3 All reference to A Theory of Justice are to Rawls (1999a). I will sometimes refer to it as Theory, and in 
this chapter unadorned parenthetical citations are to this work. 
4 All references to Political Liberalism are from Rawls (1996). I will sometimes refer to it as 
Liberalism, and parenthetical citations signaled by “PL” in this chapter are to this work. 
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 can nevertheless be jettisoned without much damage to the main content of his 
arguments for his conception of justice. To be sure, this assumption—that there is 
nothing unrealistic about a society in which most share a commitment to the same 
fundamental moral doctrine—does force changes in the original theory. But these 
changes, according to Rawls, affect less the substantive arguments for his two 
principles of justice than the way in which the theory as a whole must be presented. 
These details will, I hope, emerge clearly throughout this chapter. The essential point 
is that since the standard accounts of his transition to political liberalism mistakenly 
ascribe to Rawls a thoroughly unrealistic concern to ensure that principles of justice 
are tailored to fit with the details of citizens’ quite diverse conceptions of the good 
life, my interpretive argument helps preserve the possibility that enduringly 
controversial egalitarian principles of economic justice can find a home within a 
broadly political liberal outlook. For even under the best foreseeable circumstances 
many will reject the claim that egalitarian institutions promote their good better than 
feasible alternatives. It is therefore important to explain how Rawls intends to 
incorporate a new, “more realistic” approach to the moral psychology of political 
loyalty while at the same time refusing to repudiate what he knows to be an extremely 
controversial conception of distributive justice. Whether Rawls makes good on this 
intention is another issue, one that I shall be concerned with throughout this 
dissertation. But it is unquestionably important to appreciate Rawls’s initial 
motivation, to set the stage for the detailed discussion of the resulting political 
liberalism presented in Chapter 3. 
 
 12
  
I. A Theory of Justice and the Role of Stability 
 
By now the main features of Rawls’s argument in Theory are fairly well 
known. Rawls begins his main argument by asking us to imagine that the main 
principles of justice are to be chosen in an “original position of equality.” The role of 
this “initial situation” is to embody conditions that are “fair between individuals as 
moral persons, that is, as rational beings with their own ends and capable…of a sense 
of justice” (11). By working out which principles would be chosen by persons so 
situated, we can determine what our various convictions about fairness and political 
morality come to. We must therefore work up what we take to be “the most 
philosophically favored interpretation of this initial choice situation,” and then 
determine what principles would be chosen there. These principles should be ones that 
weigh with us, since the hypothetical choice situation from which they are derived is 
one that incorporates—i.e., that has built into it, somehow—certain restrictions on 
moral arguments for which there is “broad measure of agreement” (16). These will be, 
he says, “widely accepted but weak premises.” 
 Now, since the original position is a tool to be used in a moral argument for the 
principles we real people are supposed to care about, its particular features become 
very important. One slight mistake in the forging of the tool may have grave 
consequences for the content of the principles we end up with. Rawls recognizes this, 
and offers a sort of method by which we theorists may deal with it. The first step is to 
enumerate those “widely accepted but weak premises.” Once these premises have 
been worked up into a particular conception of the original position, we run the 
thought-experiment and see what our imaginary contractors choose. But we do not 
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 stop there. For we are entitled, as theorists, to worry that we have left out important 
constraints from the construction of the original position, or else that we have 
misjudged the way in which a moral premise is best built into it. In order to correct for 
mistakes like these, we are entitled to compare the resulting principles with 
“considered convictions of justice…in which we have the greatest confidence” (17). In 
this way we allow ourselves, as Rawls puts it, to “work from both ends” in an attempt 
to come to rest at a point of “reflective equilibrium.” This requires that we test the 
resulting principles against “provisional fixed points” such as our conviction that 
religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust (17). It is hoped that “[b]y 
going back and forth…eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation 
that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our 
considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.” When this occurs, “everything is in 
order” (18). 
 One way to ensure that everything is in order, according to Rawls, is to 
determine whether the resulting conception of justice is appropriately realistic and 
“feasible in view of the circumstances of human life” (124). Rawls suggests that this 
determination can best be made by presenting the argument for the conception of 
justice in two stages. In the first stage we argue for principles of justice on the basis of 
an argument from the original position, but we do not worry about whether certain 
actual “circumstances of human life” threaten to engender attitudes that might 
undermine widespread acceptance of those principles. It is the job of the second stage 
to argue “that when the principles adopted are put into practice, they lead to social 
arrangements” that are, in Rawls’s vocabulary, stable (125). 
 When Rawls finally turns to the second-stage of the argument for justice as 
fairness and to the issue of stability, he explains that he conceives of the latter as a 
requirement entailed by his conception of a well-ordered society. The idea of a well-
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 ordered society requires that a society be both “designed to advance the good of its 
members” and “also effectively regulated by a public conception of justice” (4). Rawls 
explains that this second “publicity” criterion ensures that the principles of justice are 
“consented to in the light of true general beliefs about men and their place in society,” 
and that “the conception of justice adopted is acceptable on the basis of these facts” 
(398). Rawls believes that his provisional principles of justice satisfy this criterion, 
since they are derived from weak and widely accepted moral premises, as well as 
certain “general facts about human society” that we think persons choosing such 
principles should know (119). In light of the manner of their derivation, they meet the 
publicity condition better than any alternative set of principles. 
 The stability condition is entailed by the premise that a society should be 
“regulated” by its public conception of justice: that is, its members should “have a 
strong and normally effective desire to act as the principles of justice require.” A 
conception of justice is stable, then, when “those taking part in [already existing and 
just] arrangements acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their 
part in maintaining them” (398). Of course, when Rawls says that the conception of 
justice must ensure the sufficient acquisition of a sense of justice, he does not mean 
that it should sanction a state-sponsored hypnosis program. Such a campaign would 
clearly infringe upon the freedoms a contract doctrine is likely to defend. Rather, the 
acquisition of the relevant motivation must be of a certain, appropriate kind. Since the 
first-stage argument for the principles of justice has little to say about how the 
acquisition of a desire to do justice might come about in the right way, it is Rawls’s 
job, in the second-stage, to say more about how this might happen. 
 Rawls thus aims to set out an argument showing that the conception of justice 
arrived at in the first stage is stable, thereby showing that it can meet the criteria 
necessary for it to be the most appropriate conception of justice for a well-ordered 
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 society. His argument for the stability of justice as fairness is composed of two parts. 
The first attempts to show that citizens living in a society regulated by justice as 
fairness acquire the corresponding sense of justice, a desire to help maintain a just 
society. The second part argues for the claim that a desire to act justly and a desire to 
pursue one’s own good are, as Rawls puts it, congruent. Congruence holds, we are 
told, when the moral attitudes that make up one’s sense of justice “are desirable from 
the standpoint of rational persons who have them when they assess their situation 
independently from the constraints of justice” (350). If the design and maintenance of 
political arrangements are guided by a sound conception of justice that is likely to 
meet conditions concerning the acquisition of a sufficient sense of justice and the 
congruence of justice and goodness, then the result is “a well-ordered society [that] is 
as stable as one can hope for” (ibid.). 
 
II. The “Serious Internal Problem” with A Theory of Justice  
 
In the Introduction to Political Liberalism, Rawls says that he now believes the 
argument of Theory needs revision, and that in order to understand rationale for the 
necessary changes  
 
one must see them as arising from trying to resolve a serious problem 
internal to justice as fairness, namely from the fact that the account of 
stability in part III of Theory is not consistent with the view as a whole. 
I believe all differences are consequences of removing that 
inconsistency. (PL, xvii-xviii) 
 
He goes on to explain that “the serious problem I have in mind concerns the unrealistic 
idea of a well-ordered society as it appears in Theory” (PL, ibid.). A more exact 
statement of the problem requires Rawls to introduce some terminology that will be 
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 central to the argument of Liberalism: “An essential feature of a well-ordered society 
associated with justice as fairness is that all its citizens endorse this conception on the 
basis of what I now call a comprehensive philosophical doctrine…[T]he text regards 
justice as fairness and utilitarianism as comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, 
doctrines” (ibid.). The serious problem arises when we realize that a society regulated 
by justice as fairness—and thus ensuring all a basic scheme of liberties, including 
freedom of association, thought and conscience—will come to be come to be 
characterized by “a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines” (ibid.). “[T]he idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness is 
[therefore] unrealistic. This is because it is inconsistent with realizing its own 
principles under the best foreseeable conditions. The account of stability of a well-
ordered society in part III is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast” (PL, xix). 
 Two questions immediately arise: first, what is a comprehensive doctrine?; 
second, why does the “fact of reasonable pluralism”—if it is a fact—imply that 
changes must be made to Theory? 
As a rough first characterization, a comprehensive moral doctrine is a mode of 
making sense of the world that seeks to accommodate all moral and nonmoral facts 
that bear on the determination of all-things-considered judgments about what is of 
ultimate value and what one as a moral agent ought ultimately to do. For example, 
some forms of utilitarianism are comprehensive doctrines, since they attempt to 
explain all duties, rights, prerogatives, values, and ideals in terms of one ultimate and 
overarching moral principle, the principle of utility. Thus these utilitarianisms attempt 
to justify not only personal ideals of moral propriety and virtue, but also political 
ideals of justice in terms of the very same moral foundation.  
A political conception of justice, on the other hand, differs from a 
comprehensive moral doctrine inasmuch as the former is deliberately set out as a 
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 limited moral conception that refrains from addressing many of the issues and 
questions one hopes a comprehensive moral doctrine settles cogently. We are not now 
in a position better to understand the nature of a political conception of justice; a 
precise definition cannot be given before we fully understand the serious problem 
Rawls takes to motivate the avoidance (in certain contexts) of comprehensive 
doctrines in the first place. Because of this, we are also forced to define a “partially 
comprehensive doctrine” as a doctrine that does not (or cannot) embody a full picture 
of the moral landscape, but which is, nonetheless, too comprehensive to serve as a 
political conception of justice. Despite all of this initial murkiness, it is clear from the 
opening passages of Liberalism that Rawls’s concern is that Theory might reasonably 
be read as presenting justice as fairness as something other than a political conception 
of justice. 
 To answer the second question, let’s focus on Rawls’s claim that the “fact of 
reasonable pluralism” concerning comprehensive doctrines implies that “[t]he account 
of the stability of a well-ordered society in part III [of Theory] is…unrealistic and 
must be recast;” and that “…the account of stability in part III of Theory is not 
consistent with the view as a whole.” There is quite a bit of ambiguity here, and I 
believe the ambiguity of this statement is what opens the door to interpretations that 
wish to ascribe to Rawls a specific concern with Theory's congruence argument. As a 
step toward seeing why this might be so, consider three possible specifications of 
Rawls's claim: 
 
Reading 1: Rawls believes that it is unrealistic to demand that a theory of 
justice satisfy the well-orderedness and stability criteria. This amounts to the 
rejection of the claim that a just society must ensure that its citizens are likely 
to acquire a sense of justice (corresponding to the regulative conception of 
justice) and a recognition of the congruence between justice and goodness. 
 
Reading 2: Rawls continues to accept  the criteria of well-orderedness and 
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 stability, but now asserts that a conception of justice whose public justification 
includes the (as-yet-undescribed) content of Theory's stability argument will 
not in fact be stable or well-ordered. This would require a revision in at least 
some of Rawls’s arguments in part III for the conclusion that citizens in a well-
ordered society will develop a sense of justice and a recognition of the 
congruence between justice and goodness.  
 
Reading 3: As in Reading 2, Rawls continues to accept  the criteria of well-
orderedness and stability. But instead of identifying particular strands within 
the stability argument that are in fact too comprehensive to win stability, what 
must be fixed is Theory’s silence on the inevitability of reasonable pluralism. 
Changes therefore must be made, but these are changes in the way the doctrine 
of Theory is presented, not in the essential substantive content of its main 
arguments. 
 
 Which reading should we accept? In the early pages of Liberalism, Rawls 
reiterates that a well-ordered society is one in which everyone knows that everyone 
endorses the same principles of justice, and where this public knowledge generates 
widespread stabilizing allegiance to the public institutions enjoined by those 
principles, and claims that a conception of justice that cannot drum up this significant 
amount of support “is inadequate as a democratic conception” (PL, 35).  It is therefore 
clear that Rawls remains committed to the well-orderedness criteria, but thinks that a 
society regulated by Theory’s conception of justice as fairness will fail to be so 
ordered. We can, then, plausibly rule out Reading 1. 
 It is the choice between Reading 2 and Reading 3 that is at issue between me, 
on the one hand, and Barry and Freeman on the other. Reading 2 interprets Rawls’s 
diagnosis in a natural and straightforward way: if the flaw at issue is a conception's 
being (partially) comprehensive; and if Theory's conception is unrealistic for reasons 
connected to the relevant type of flaw; then it is reasonable to conclude the Rawls 
thought the main argument of Theory relied upon specific values, principles, or 
arguments that are too comprehensive to win stability. (I have not yet identified which 
values and principles might have been thought to be too comprehensive, but we shall 
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 encounter them soon.) Nevertheless, I shall argue that this interpretation is mistaken. I 
shall proceed in two stages. First, I briefly look back to the papers of the 1980s where 
Rawls first tries to articulate the rationale for political liberalism, and I show that there 
is no evidence to suggest he was concerned with any specific value or principle 
incorporated into Theory’s arguments; he therefore was not specially concerned with 
the congruence argument in particular. Instead, we should take Rawls seriously when 
he says in the Introduction of Liberalism that the additions to justice as fairness 
embodied by political liberalism allow us to remove “the ambiguity of Theory” and, 
for the first time, ensure that justice as fairness “is presented from the outset as a 
political conception of justice” (PL, xix; emphasis added). I then discuss a portion of 
the congruence argument that is not held to be the culprit. This helps to set the stage 
for the debate that follows. In the next section (VI), I argue directly against Barry's 
and Freeman's view that Rawls was primarily motivated by his belief that certain 
Kantian strands in Theory’s stability argument had to be ousted. While Barry and 
Freeman hold that the features of political liberalism are designed to recoup the 
stability lost by removing these Kantian elements, I argue that they ascribe far too 
much importance to these strands. They ignore Rawls’s own comments, in Theory, 
suggesting that the congruence argument would be fine without the Kantian elements. 
But if the argument does not crucially depend on these elements, it is unclear why 
Rawls would have to work out a whole new theory, political liberalism, to “fix” 
Theory’s congruence argument. He could simply advertise that those strands are 
unnecessary, that the role they are introduced to fill is sufficiently filled by elements of 
congruence argument that are not illicit by the lights of political liberalism.   
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 IV. Evidence from the 80s 
 
I start by noting that nowhere in his seminal article on political liberalism does 
Rawls explicitly focus on (problems with) Theory's argument for congruence. There 
is, however, a long footnote (taking up almost half a page) in which Rawls discusses 
the aims of, and problems with, part III of Theory.5 He writes: 
 
Among the faults of Part III, I now think,…[is the fact that] the account 
of the stability of justice as fairness was not extended, as it should have 
been, to the important case of overlapping consensus…; instead, this 
account was limited to the simplest case where the public conception of 
justice is affirmed as in itself sufficient to express values that normally 
outweigh, given the political context of a constitutional regime, 
whatever values might oppose them…In view of the discussion in [ch. 
4 of Theory] of liberty of conscience, the extension to the case of 
overlapping consensus is essential. 
 
Neither the content of this footnote about Part III of Theory, nor the text of this 
seminal article, provides evidence to believe that Rawls's specific concern was with 
the second part of the stability argument (congruence), rather than its first part (the 
appropriate development of a sense of justice). In this respect, it is just as ambiguous 
and unhelpful as the Introduction to Liberalism.6
                                                 
5 Rawls (1985), p. 414.  
6 I note here another footnote from the 80s that specifically discusses the argument of §86 of Theory, 
where the Kantian congruence argument is set out. The footnote appears in Rawls (1989), p. 487. It is 
attached to text that discusses how citizens come to “act willingly so as to give one another justice over 
time. Stability is secured by sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind under just institutions.” In the 
footnote, Rawls adds the qualification, “As stated in Theory of Justice, the question is whether the just 
and the good are congruent.” He goes on simply to state what the argument for congruence was 
attempting to do, which he says is to show that “a person who grows up in a society well-ordered by 
justice as fairness, and who has a rational plan of life, has sufficient reason, founded on that person’s 
good (and not on justice), to comply with just institutions. These institutions are stable because they are 
congruent” (p. 487). No indication is made in the footnote that Rawls now finds the argument 
problematic. I do not, however, conclude from this that he didn’t think it so. Instead, he might simply 
have wanted to say matter-of-factly what §86 was about. However, it would be strange if reflection on 
§86 had constituted the spur toward political liberalism, and yet Rawls didn’t judge this to be an 
appropriate occasion to apprise us of that fact. 
 There is, however, another complication: the text from Rawls (1989), p. 487 is incorporated 
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  Some positive evidence against Reading 2 is found in the 1989 paper, “The 
Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus,” in a section entitled 
“Comparison with A Theory of Justice”: 
 
Theory never discusses whether justice as fairness is meant as a 
comprehensive moral doctrine or as a political conception of justice. In 
one place it says that if justice as fairness succeeds reasonably well, a 
next step would be to study the more general view suggested by the 
name “rightness as fairness.”…There is, however, no mention of the 
distinction…The reader might reasonably conclude, then, that justice as 
fairness is set out as part of a comprehensive view that may be 
developed later were success to invite it. 
 
This conclusion is supported by the discussion of the well-ordered 
society of justice as fairness in Part III…There it is assumed that the 
members of any well-ordered society, whether it be a society of justice 
as fairness or some other view, accept the same conception of justice 
and also, it seems, the same comprehensive doctrine of which that 
conception is a part, or from which it is derived.7
 
Rawls seems to hold that the problem with Theory was that it did not comment at all 
on whether justice as fairness is to be regarded as (part of) some comprehensive 
doctrine or other. This is an important omission, in light of the pains Rawls takes to 
demonstrate that his conception of justice is stable. In failing to address the question 
of his conception’s comprehensiveness, Rawls leaves himself open to the charge that 
he is blind to the implications of his own principles of justice: once basic liberties are 
protected, citizens will arrive at different moral and religious worldviews. Hence 
                                                                                                                                            
virtually verbatim in  Liberalism, though there is a new footnote attached, one that seems to contradict 
the earlier footnote. Rather than preserving the claim from “Domain” that the question of stability 
concerns “whether the just and the good are congruent” (in the sense given by Theory, p. 347f., and esp. 
chapter 9: pp. 496-505 (§86)), the claim in Liberalism is that the relevant question of stability is 
discussed in chapter 8 of Theory (pp. 397-449), where Rawls's main focus is on the development of the 
sense of justice, not on congruence. While the 1989 implication that congruence is the main element in 
the argument for stability is evidence against my view, Rawls’s subsequent, well-motivated revision, as 
well as the passage in Rawls (1989), discussed below, should go some way toward vindicating my 
view. 
7 Rawls (1989), pp. 488-9; emphases added. 
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 justice as fairness will not be able to win stability if endorsing it entails endorsing a 
larger comprehensive doctrine of which it is a part. Thus, if Rawls’s own self-
assessment can be taken as something like a canonical statement of what he came to 
think was wrong with Theory,8 then that is evidence for Reading 3 and against 
Reading 2. For Rawls is not pointing to any specific premises or arguments of Theory 
that he thinks are too comprehensive to win stability in a world marked by reasonable 
pluralism. Rather, he is instead highlighting the need to be explicit about a political 
theory’s comprehensiveness. Since this was something that Theory failed to do, it 
must be amended. Since traditional political theorizing has not typically been 
concerned with the problem of stability or the fact of reasonable pluralism, the default 
position, Rawls believes, is to view a proffered political theory as essentially and 
unproblematically tied to a larger comprehensive moral or religious conception.9 So 
unless it is made explicit that Theory offers a consciously non-comprehensive 
argument, Rawls fears that the tenor of the “view as a whole” will be inconsistent with 
the criterion of stability. 
 I will not insist that these considerations are decisive. It is quite possible that 
Rawls never adequately expressed what bothered him about Theory's argument—after 
all, Liberalism is conspicuously unclear on the matter. Thus, we should investigate 
whether there is, in fact, good reason to think that Theory's account of congruence 
needs to be revised in light of the more general worries about comprehensiveness. 
Moreover, and most importantly, we must ask the further question, Would the removal 
of what Rawls took to be overly-comprehensive content force him to add something in 
its place? Ultimately, I will argue, in concurrence with Barry and Freeman, that the 
                                                 
8It is also the explanation given at pp. 186-7 of Rawls (2001a). 
9  Recall: “This conclusion is supported by the discussion of the well-ordered society of justice as 
fairness in Part III…There it is assumed that the members of any well-ordered society, whether it be a 
society of justice as fairness or some other view, accept the same conception of justice and also, it 
seems, the same comprehensive doctrine of which that conception is a part, or from which it is 
derived.” Rawls (1989), pp. 488-9. 
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 Kantian strands of Theory’s congruence must go. But it is my view that Rawls did not 
believe that the removal of these strands introduces the amount and sort of instability 
that would have motivated him to work out the wholly new framework of political 
justification embodied in political liberalism. 
 
V. A Benign Plank 
 
 It will be helpful, before looking at Barry's and Freeman's interpretations, to 
introduce some of the more specific features of the congruence argument by 
discussing a plank that is not at issue between me and Barry and Freeman. 
 As I have said, the goal of the congruence argument is to show that having and 
acting from one's sense of justice is also desirable from the standpoint of “rational 
persons who have them when they assess their situation independently from the 
constraints of justice.” Rawls takes this to be the problem of establishing the “good of 
justice,” or that a “match exists between the principles of justice that would be agreed 
to…and the principles of rational choice…” (451). The “principles of rational choice” 
are relevant here, according to Rawls, since “a person’s good is determined by what is 
for him the most rational plan of life given reasonably favorable circumstances” (347). 
In this context, rationality is stripped down to “bare essentials” since “in justice as 
fairness the concept of right is prior to that of good,” and thus the conception of 
goodness we employ in the arguments for the principles of justice must not be so 
strong that it “jeopardize[s] the prior place of the concept of right” (347-8). That is, if 
the derivation of the principles of justice relied upon a strong conception of goodness, 
we might have to conclude that principles of rightness and justice follow directly from 
that conception; but this would make it misleading to hold, as Rawls does, that 
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 principles right and justice “put limits on which satisfactions have value; they impose 
restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one’s good…[Persons’] desires and 
aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of justice which specify the 
boundaries that men’s systems of ends must respect” (27-8). This is why the argument 
for justice as fairness employs the concept of goodness “only in a rather thin sense” 
(347). 
 This “thin theory of the good” stems, then, from the idea of goodness as 
rationality by which “a person’s good is determined by the rational plan of life that he 
would choose with deliberative rationality from the maximal class of plans” (372). In 
turn, a rational plan is one that would be chosen with deliberative rationality such that 
the plan “would be decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection in which the 
agent reviewed…what it would be like to carry out these plans and thereby ascertained 
the course of action that would best realize his most fundamental desires” (366). The 
theory is kept thin since its limited resources generate, when combined with secure 
generalizations about human motivation, a sufficient set of rational preferences for the 
individuals in the original position, even though the preferences of real people are 
more determinate (347-350). Importantly, Rawls recognized that this account of 
goodness does not afford the resources rationally to criticize fundamental desires. So, 
if a person’s most fundamental, unshakeable aim is to count blades of grass all day 
long, “then surely a rational plan for him will center around this activity” (380). 
 Rawls does not believe, however, that justice as fairness must restrict itself, in 
the final analysis, to this thin theory of goodness. Rather, once the principles of justice 
are on hand it is possible to further develop a “full theory of the good” that uses those 
principles in order to construct other ideas that incorporate conceptions of goodness. 
For example, we can use “these principles in defining the other moral concepts” such 
as “the concept of moral worth and the good of the moral virtues,” as well as “the 
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 definition of beneficent and supererogatory acts” (349). Given the argument’s various 
uses of these two ideas of goodness and the relation of priority that exists between, 
“we must distinguish between the thin and the full theory, and always keep in mind 
which one we are relying upon” (349-350). 
 Rawls is very careful to point out that the congruence argument must employ 
only the thin theory of the good: “when we ask whether the sense of justice is a good, 
the important question clearly is that defined by the thin theory. We want to know 
whether having and maintaining a sense of justice is a good (in the thin sense) for 
persons who are members of a well-ordered society.” By pursuing congruence 
between justice and this thin conception of goodness, Rawls, again, hopes to show that 
the moral attitudes that constitute a sense of justice is “desirable from the standpoint of 
rational persons who have them when they assess their situation independently from 
the constraints of justice.” 
 Now, when arguing for congruence we must convince ourselves that real 
persons who grow up and live under the institutions of a well-ordered society will, 
when they assess their lives from the standpoint of goodness as rationality, find that it 
is indeed desirable to act as their sense of justice would direct them to act were that 
their only source of motivation. So whereas the thin theory of the good is invoked in 
the argument from the original position to determine which preferences would be 
relevant to decisions from that standpoint, the thin theory is now used, in the second 
stage of the argument, to show that actual citizens who have a sense of justice and 
“appl[y goodness as rationality] with full knowledge” will not discover that these two 
points of view are in significant tension (TJ, 451). 
 As Rawls sets it out, the argument for congruence has at least two salient sub-
components.10 The first component attempts to respond to the following desideratum 
                                                 
10As I read it, Theory does not mean for the discussion of autonomy and objectivity in §78 to be a part 
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 for a theory of justice: 
 
But the question remains whether the contract doctrine is a satisfactory 
framework for understanding the values of community and for 
choosing among social arrangements to realize them. It is natural to 
conjecture that the congruence of the right and the good depends in 
large part upon whether a well-ordered society achieves the good of 
community. (456) 
 
It is this desideratum that leads to Rawls’s argument that a well-ordered society is a 
“social union of social unions.” This argument depends largely upon Rawls’s thin 
theory of the good and his claim that goodness as rationality can be augmented, 
without constructing an unduly “full” theory of goodness, by relying upon a certain 
generalization about human psychology, viz. what he terms “the Aristotelian 
Principle” (§65). “The role of the Aristotelian Principle in the theory of the good 
[needed for the congruence argument] is that it states a deep psychological fact 
which…accounts for our considered judgments of value” (379). Roughly, the principle 
states that “other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized 
capacities…and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the 
greater its complexity” (374). 
 Since the argument for congruence must establish a harmony between a 
person’s good and action in accordance with the sense of justice, Rawls needs to 
explain why a person might decide to forgo the many opportunities to exercise his 
realized capacities he might have if he were tempted to abandon his commitment to 
justice when tensions between the two viewpoints arise. Rawls suggests that this task 
                                                                                                                                            
of the argument for congruence. That discussion is designed to explain why, when we are employing 
justice as fairness in our search for normative conclusions, we should not “doubt the soundness of our 
moral attitudes when we reflect upon their psychological origins” (451). That justice as fairness can 
serve as an account of autonomy and objectivity is not clearly a claim that justice as fairness conduces 
to our good. I say more about this issue below in connection with Freeman’s interpretation of the 
congruence argument. 
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 can be discharged by showing how one’s sense of justice can be buttressed by one’s 
finding goodness in the form of community likely to exist in a society of individuals 
who possess effective senses of justice corresponding to justice as fairness. 
 In setting out this argument, Rawls highlights two features he takes to follow 
from the Aristotelian Principle. The first he refers to as the “companion effect” to the 
principle: “As we witness the exercise of well-trained abilities by others, these 
displays are enjoyed by us and arouse a desire that we should be able to do the same 
thing ourselves;” one’s “fellow associates are likely to support his activities as 
promoting the common interest and also to take pleasure in them as displays of human 
excellence” (376). This means that my displays of human excellence are both good for 
me and good for others, since I get pleasure and esteem from exercising my abilities, 
and others get the satisfaction of viewing and appreciating these displays. The second 
feature is related to the first. It is postulated that humankind has a social nature which 
makes natural the development of “shared final ends” and attachments to “common 
institutions and activities as good in themselves. We need one another as partners in 
ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes and enjoyments 
of others are necessary for and complementary to our own good” (458). This principle 
of complementarity, as we might call it, invokes the fact that the “potentialities of each 
individual are greater than those he can hope to realize”; thus “[d]ifferent persons with 
similar or complementary capacities may cooperate so to speak in realizing their 
common or matching nature. When men are secure in the enjoyment of the exercise of 
their own powers, they are disposed to appreciate the perfections of others…” It is 
thus that “through a social union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its 
members that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets 
of others” (459). “It is as if others were bringing forth a part of ourselves that we have 
not been able to cultivate” (394). 
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  This conception of human nature11 gives Rawls hope that the limits to 
unimpeded self-interest built into the principles of justice can nevertheless be 
appropriately compatible with a conception of the human good derived from the thin 
theory.12 These ideas allow us to construct a notion of a well-ordered society as “itself 
a form of social union. Indeed, it is a social union of social unions” (462). The whole 
argument culminates in a rather surprising claim: 
 
Therefore the companion principle to the Aristotelian Principle implies 
that men appreciate and enjoy these attributes in one another as they are 
manifested in cooperating to affirm just institutions. It follows that the 
collective activity of justice is the preeminent form of human 
flourishing. For given favorable conditions, it is by maintaining these 
public arrangements that persons best express their nature and achieve 
the widest regulative excellences of which each is capable. (463; 
emphasis added). 
 
Justice and the human good are congruent, therefore, because the “collective 
intention” to deliver justice—an intention we can assume all have since all have an 
effective sense of justice—is judged from the point of view of the thin theory to be a 
preeminent form of the human good. “This desire is regulative…and when everyone 
acts justly, all find satisfaction in the same thing” (462): 
 
The collective activity of society, the many associations and the public 
life of the largest community that regulates them, sustains our efforts 
and elicits our contribution…The division of labor is overcome not by 
each becoming complete in himself, but by willing and meaningful 
                                                 
11 Importantly, the conception of nature that Rawls relies upon here is not the same that is defined by 
the Kantian Interpretation, to be discussed below. For it is clear that one’s nature in this context is 
constituted by the abilities and aims that are specific to each person. It is thus the same conception of 
nature that is relied upon when Rawls admits that “if we allow that [the grass blade-counter’s] nature is 
to enjoy this activity and not to enjoy any other, and that there is no feasible way to alter his condition, 
then surely a rational plan for him will center around this activity” (380), and when he says (505) that 
“our good depends upon the sorts of person we are, the kinds of wants and aspirations we have and are 
capable of.” See also Pogge (1989), p. 99n37. 
12 Rawls explicitly states at p. 381 that “the Aristotelian Principle, and the necessities of social 
interdependence” are features allowable into the thin theory of the good. At no point in their explication 
and defense do we appeal to the constraints of justice. 
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 work within a just social union of social unions in which all can freely 
participate as they so incline. (464) 
 
 This idea of a social union of social unions that is regulated by a public 
conception of justice each helps to realize is clearly offered as a (thin) theory of the 
good for an individual. This fact can be masked, however, by Rawls’s statement that 
the idea of a social union captures a sound conception of the “good of community.” 
Yet given the fuller discussion’s reliance upon all of the central features of the thin 
theory of the good for individuals, it is hard to see why it should not also be offered as 
a plausible conception of what is likely to comprise an individual’s good. If Rawls’s 
argument is sound, he has identified what will be for most persons a practical identity 
between the good for the individual and the good of community. The identity depends 
upon the premise that a person can fully realize herself—which, it is assumed, she 
wants to do—only if she forms attachments to others who are able to bring forth a part 
of her that she is not able to cultivate. Thus does concern for others constitute concern 
for herself, and vice versa. 
 
VI. Rival Interpretations 
 
 Perhaps surprisingly, none of this complex and clearly quite controversial 
argument is taken by commentators to constitute the illicit content that Rawls thought 
he needed to purge from justice as fairness. Why? Most likely because in Liberalism 
Rawls makes use of the Aristotelian Principle as an acceptable and reasonable 
principle of human moral psychology (PL, 203n), claims that a well-ordered society 
realizes “a shared final end, an end that requires the cooperation of many to achieve” 
(PL, 204), and retains the claim that a political society ordered by justice as fairness is 
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 intrinsically good since it is likely to be a “social union of social unions” (PL, 206-
207). Of course, since the main thrust of political liberalism is that a political theory 
must be wary of how controversial its argument is, it may well be the case that Rawls 
was wrong to carry these controversial elements intact into Liberalism. Still, our goal 
now is interpretive, and if Rawls saw nothing wrong with the Aristotelian Principle, 
the idea of a social union of social unions, and the like, then it is unlikely that these 
elements, controversial though they may be, were what drove Rawls to work out 
political liberalism. Thus, if commentators do not believe that this component of the 
congruence argument was what worried Rawls, what else might have done it? 
 It is at this point that Barry and Freeman point to the aspects of the congruence 
argument that  rely upon what Rawls calls the Kantian Interpretation of justice as 
fairness. Freeman says that the “ambitious [congruence] argument is made in A Theory 
of Justice primarily on the basis of the ‘Kantian Interpretation,’ of justice as 
fairness.”13 Barry interprets Rawls as concluding that congruence “can be guaranteed 
[only] via the 'Kantian Interpretation'.”14 Why do Barry and Freeman think that the 
strands of the congruence argument that rely upon the Kantian Interpretation are so 
important? And why would the unavailability of those portions require Rawls to make 
fundamental changes to his theory of justice?15
 
                                                 
13 Freeman (1994), p. 629. In Freeman (2003a), p. 290, Freeman claims that “Rawls’s main argument 
for the good of justice” depends upon elements from the Kantian Interpretation. 
14Barry (1995), p. 886. 
15 This account of what motivated Rawls to work out the framework of political liberalism is also 
offered by Cohen (1994); Mandle (2000), pp. 85-88; Scanlon (2003c), p. 159; and Christman (2003).  
For Cohen’s account, see especially the section entitled “The Internal Problem: Congruence and 
Stability,” pp. 1515-1521: “The case for the two principles, then, depends upon the case for stability; 
the case for stability depends in part upon the case for congruence; and the case for congruence depends 
upon an account of our ‘nature as free moral persons’ and the [Kantian] desire to express our nature as 
free.” “Under the best foreseeable conditions, a society that satisfies the two principles will be a society 
in which some citizens reject the conception of our nature used in Theory to underwrite…the account of 
congruence. ‘The account of the stability of a well-ordered society in Part III is therefore also 
unrealistic…’ ([PL,] xvii).” 
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 Barry and the Sense of Justice 
 
 I shall start with Barry's interpretation, since I believe he makes an important 
mistake that Freeman does not make. Although he thinks that it was in fact Rawls’s 
main concern, Barry finds it puzzling that Rawls would come to hold that the 
argument of Theory presupposed a (partially) comprehensive doctrine. According to 
Barry, “The whole point of A Theory of Justice was that it left people to form, revise, 
and pursue their own conceptions of the good.” Here he quotes Rawls: “In a well-
ordered society citizens hold the same principles of right and they try to reach the 
same judgment in particular cases...On the other hand, individuals find their good in 
different ways...[T]here is no urgency to reach a publicly accepted judgment as to 
what is the good of particular individuals.”16
 Still, Barry recognizes that Rawls in fact places great stress on the argument 
for congruence, and that this argument relies on some rather controversial Kantian 
premises. This is, therefore, a good place to look if one wishes to discover those 
features of Theory Rawls thought could not win sufficient stability. 
 On the basis of this diagnosis, Barry suggests that “Rawls's account of what 
was wrong with A Theory of Justice will not withstand scrutiny.”17 There is, Barry 
claims, strong reason to think Rawls could and should solve the problem  he found 
simply by dropping the congruence argument altogether. Here Barry notes that Rawls 
takes up the issue of congruence only in the context where citizens already have a 
sense of justice. As Rawls puts it, “I am not trying to show that in a well-ordered 
society an egoist would act from a sense of justice…Rather, we are concerned with the 
goodness of the settled desire to take up the standpoint of justice. I assume that the 
                                                 
16Ibid., quoting Rawls (1971), p. 393. 
17Barry (1995). 
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 members of a well-ordered society already have this desire” (498).  
 Now, in chapter 8 of Theory, Rawls offers a complex moral and psychological 
argument to show that if justice as fairness is properly implemented, the resulting 
basic institutional structure will “generate its own supportive moral attitudes” (350). 
These moral attitudes make up a citizens' sense of justice. As we have seen, this is “a 
strong and normally effective desire to act as the principles of justice require.” Barry's 
main contention is that Rawls's argument in chapter 8 serves well enough to establish 
the stability of justice as fairness—after all, if citizens have “a strong and normally 
effective desire” to act justly, and if the principles to which they are committed really 
are principles of justice, what more could one possible want by way of stability? 
 To answer this question we must say more about why Rawls is concerned with 
stability in the first place. There are, I think, at least two main reasons Rawls offers for 
taking the issue of stability so seriously. The first stems from a concern with threats to 
mutual trust generated by large numbers of citizens who find that “free-rider egoism 
would be still better” than doing one’s fair share in social cooperation. Here the 
problem of stability arises because of the possibility that “acting fairly is not in general 
each man’s best reply to the just conduct of his associates.” One way to avoid this is to 
follow Hobbes in supporting authoritarian “mechanisms” to ensure stable social 
cooperation (435). Another more benign method is to establish “relations of friendship 
and mutual trust” and the clear message that regulative principles of justice show an 
“unconditional caring for our good” (435-6). By connecting principles of justice 
firmly to citizens’ conceptions of their good, tendencies to instability, which it is 
rational for all to want removed, may be held in check more firmly than they would be 
in a regime that relied for stability on whatever patriotism members will develop after 
having grown up in their society. 
Although I think Rawls agrees with Barry that he’s shown, by the end of 
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 chapter 8, that citizens will develop more than just a blind patriotism, Barry is right 
that the need for a more sustained inquiry into the issue of congruence is not well-
motivated by this understanding of the importance of stability. For Rawls does not, in 
the final analysis, totally forswear the use of coercive penal institutions when some 
citizens find “that in their case just institutions do not fully answer to their nature” and 
the conception of the good that most befits that nature (504). If we were not entitled in 
some cases to say, as Rawls does, that “their nature is their misfortune,” then our only 
alternative would be to grant those who prefer “general egoism” veto power over the 
principles of justice. But if we are entitled to stabilize society through the use of 
institutions that penalize some for expressing what Rawls seems to agree is their 
“nature”, then it would seem we could solve the free-rider problem of stability by 
combining the developmental story about the acquisition of a sense of justice with a 
further theory of suitably stabilizing coercive institutions. It is not clear that any more 
detailed account of how a sense of justice “belongs to a person’s own good” is needed. 
This understanding of the problem of stability as essentially a free-rider 
problem is further supported by Rawls’s claim that what must be demonstrated is that 
justice as fairness is likely to be more stable than its main rivals. Since the parties to 
the original position are tasked with choosing from among these options, justice as 
fairness receives all the normative support it needs from a stability argument when it is 
“not so unstable that some other choice might be better” (441). If no other conception 
of justice can solve the free-rider problem better, then there is no reason to revise the 
parties’ initial choice of Rawls’s two principles of justice—even if part of the solution 
to this problem involves coercive mechanisms designed to keep in check those whose 
rational pursuits would upset social order. 
 This first understanding of the importance of stability falls in line with Barry’s 
claim that there is little left for Rawls’s congruence argument to establish: 
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The standard account of Rawls on motivation would, I think, run along 
some such lies as these: people (or at any rate well brought up people in 
a just society) have a “sense of justice,” which is a disposition to 
behave justly; and, since they accept a theory in which the right has 
ethical priority over the good, their sense of justice leads them to give 
the demands of justice priority over the pursuit of their good, when the 
two come into competition. This account draws on chapter 8...If we 
want to present Rawls's theory as an attractive one, there is much to be 
said for sticking to it.18  
  
But, of course, the stability argument does not end with the last word of chapter 8: 
“chapter 9,” Barry claims, “requires us to revise all the features of the standard 
account just given.”19
 Unhappy with Rawls’s claim that chapter 8 doesn’t do all the work Rawls 
needs, Barry seeks to reconstruct Rawls’s reasons for pressing on. He begins with 
Rawls's central claim in the setup for the congruence argument (a claim I'll discuss 
more below): 
 
The real problem of congruence is what happens if we imagine 
someone to give weight to his sense of justice only to the extent that it 
satisfies other descriptions which connect it with reasons specified by 
the thin theory of the good. We should not rely on the doctrine of the 
pure conscientious act. (499) 
 
What is meant by “the doctrine of the pure conscientious act”? Earlier in Theory (§72) 
Rawls claims that it is inappropriate and theoretically unfruitful simply to insist that 
the requirements of justice are authoritative because they are right: 
 
Ross holds that the sense of right is a desire for a distinct (and 
unanalyzable) object, since a specific (and unanalyzable) property 
characterizes actions that are our duty…But on this interpretation the 
                                                 
18Barry (1995), p. 883. 
19Ibid. 
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 sense of right lacks any apparent reason; it resembles a preference for 
tea rather than coffee. Although such a preference might exist, to make 
it regulative of…society is utterly capricious…(418). 
 
Barry interprets Rawls here as declaring “a gap to exist between accepting the 
principles of justice and being motivated to act on them.”20 He concludes that Rawls 
hereby “commits himself…to the ancient doctrine that no act can be regarded as 
rational [i.e., as supported by reasons that can motivate creatures with reason] unless it 
is for the good of the agent to perform it.”21 And since it's the goal of the congruence 
argument to show that there is a “match” between the demands of justice and demands 
of well-being or rational good for the agent, Rawls needs that argument in order to 
show how persons can be motivated to act precisely as the principles of justice require. 
It is this view that Barry is “inclined to think...is a travesty of the thoroughly 
commonsensical idea represented by saying that people can do their duty out of a 
sense of duty and not in order to achieve some independently definable end.”22 More 
importantly, it is this view that Barry believes requires Rawls to rely on the Kantian 
Interpretation. 
 But this criticism ignores the next paragraph in Theory which makes it clear 
that Rawls does not adopt the “ancient” view Barry ascribes to him. While Rawls is 
certainly claiming that “because it’s right” is not a sufficiently illuminating description 
of why a certain act is in fact right or just, he is not claiming, as Barry suggests he is, 
that a description is appropriate only if it is a nonmoral one: 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 885. 
21 Ibid. It is clear from the context that Barry uses “rational” to express what I’ve inserted inside the 
brackets. For it is not until the next paragraph that Barry introduces Rawls’s distinction between the 
reasonable and the rational, explaining that, on Rawls’s account, “the rationality of choosing the 
principles of justice in an appropriately constituted original position suggests that they form a 
reasonable basis for agreement among real people.” Thus Barry says Rawls’s position is that there is a 
metaphysical gap between accepting the principles of justice and possessing a sense of justice, on the 
one hand, and being motivated thereby, on the other. 
22Ibid., p. 884. 
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 But for one who understands and accepts the contract doctrine, the 
sentiment of justice is not a different desire from that to act on 
principles that rational individuals would consent to in an initial 
situation which gives everyone equal representation as a moral person. 
Nor is it different from wanting to act in accordance with principles that 
express men’s nature as free and equal rational beings. The principles 
of justice answer to these descriptions and this fact allows us to give an 
acceptable interpretation to the sense of justice. (418; emphases added) 
 
While Barry is correct that Rawls’s claims here concern moral motivation23, he has 
missed Rawls’s point. Rather than identifying a gap between accepting a reasonable 
(moral) judgment and being motivated by it, Rawls instead argues that a person may 
properly ask for a more morally insightful description of a required act than simply 
that “it is right.” But once a morally insightful description has been given and 
accepted, “the sentiment of justice is not a different desire from” the desire to act in 
the specified way—even if the more specific description is a moral one.24
 This suggests that the “real problem of congruence” does not arise because 
reasons of justice are not reasons for action. They are such reasons. Rather, the 
question is whether someone who already recognizes these reasons can be shown that 
acting on them over the course of a full life is connected in the right way to an 
individual’s concern for her own good. 
 Despite Barry’s misreading of Rawls on this point, he may still be right to 
wonder whether the “real problem of congruence” really needs to be answered, given 
what Rawls says about the connection between justice and goodness in chapter 8, and 
given that he is willing to employ “penal devices” when “the forces making for 
stability are weaker” (505). In fact, the real problem of congruence appears to be 
strongly motivated only in light of a second interest in the stability question that goes 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 884. 
24 Freeman discusses Barry’s objection at pp. 281-283 of Freeman (2003a), and indicates that he agrees 
with the response given here. 
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 beyond Rawls’s concern to avoid free-rider problems without totally deferring to 
Hobbesian mechanisms. This second understanding of the normative importance of 
stability conflicts, however, with Rawls’s claim that considerations concerning the 
stability of his conception of justice “are not intended as justifying reasons for the 
contract view. The main grounds for the principles of justice have already been 
presented. At this point we are simply checking whether the conception already 
adopted is a feasible one…” (441). This remark is simply out of line with what Rawls 
says in §29 of Theory, which is entitled “Some Main Grounds For the Two Principles 
of Justice.” There Rawls claims that it is only when we take up the question of 
whether the parties to the original position will be able to “honor” their choice in light 
of all possible “strains of commitment,” across the course of their entire lives, that 
“the concept of a contract has a definite role: it…sets limits upon what can be agreed 
to” (153). These limits are immediately connected to “the question of psychological 
stability:” it is a “strong point in favor of a conception of justice…that it generates its 
own support” (153). In explaining why this is so, Rawls claims that principles of 
justice that all can honor, stably and publicly, “manifest in the basic structure of 
society men’s desire to treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselves” 
(156). 
 It thus appears that, contrary to what Rawls said (441), considerations of 
stability are in fact among the “main grounds” of the principles of justice. This 
suggests that when he remarks, “To be sure, the criterion of stability is not decisive” 
(399), we should take him to refer to stability in the first, social-order sense, rather 
than the second, rational-commitment sense.  Insofar as they bear on the question of 
whether a given conception of justice can be publicly honored by those it is to govern, 
the importance of considerations of stability for determining the acceptability of 
theory of justice may be as decisive as any consideration Rawls adduces.  By 
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 connecting the question of stability to the issue of treating persons as ends in 
themselves, Rawls implies that he takes the issue of stability to have normative 
relevance beyond its bearing on free-rider problems. Perhaps, then, this additional 
concern with stability accounts for the need to address further the “real problem of 
congruence,” whose salience in Rawls’s theory would be misplaced if the issue of 
stability were just the problem of maintaining social order without having to rely on 
overly Hobbesian mechanisms. 
 In fact, if we look a bit more closely at Rawls's argument in chapter 8 for the 
development of the sense of justice and its relation to citizens’ good, it is easy to 
detect an interest in demonstrating that all can develop a strong, rational commitment 
to the principles of justice that could mitigate the need to employ penal mechanisms. 
Much of chapter 8 seeks to demonstrate that there is a special fit between free rational 
reflection and deliberation and Rawls’s principles of justice. 
 In the discussion of chapter 8, Rawls highlights two traditions of thought that 
have attempted to account for how the sense of justice arises in citizens. The first, 
“empiricist,” tradition sees the need to mold sentiments early in life, so that the “new” 
psychological impulses needed to act morally have sufficient time to mature. This 
view believes “a desire to conform to moral standards is normally aroused early in life 
before we achieve an adequate understanding of the reasons for these norms. Indeed 
some persons may never grasp the grounds for them” (401). The other, “rationalist,” 
tradition sees moral learning as “not so much a matter of supplying missing motives as 
one of the free development of our innate intellectual and emotional capacities 
according to their natural bent” (402). This conception of moral learning embodies the 
optimism that the correct conception of justice will come to be appreciated on the 
basis of increased understanding and emotional maturity. It is a “happier picture, since 
it holds that principles of right and justice spring from our nature and are not at odds 
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 with our good” (403). 
 Naturally, Rawls is drawn to the “happier” view, and he sets out to show that 
“the free development of our innate intellectual and emotional capacities” will indeed 
lead to something like the sense of justice specific to justice as fairness. The account 
that results describes how the sense of justice is developed through the stages of 
attachment to parents, broader associations, and then to specific principles that 
interpret and make sense of the attachments and beliefs that justly raised citizens will 
have. Rawls remarks that his account has “ties with what I have called the rationalistic 
view” since “the acquisition of the sense of justice takes place in stages connected 
with the growth of knowledge and understanding” (433). Since moral learning takes 
place in a “sequence of stages represent[ing] a progressive development and not 
simply a regular sequence…[e]thical norms are no longer experienced merely as 
constraints…[P]ersons understand their sense of justice as an extension of their natural 
attachments, and as a way of caring about the collective good” (434). The free 
institutions of the well-ordered society of justice as fairness give agents the room they 
need to develop inculcation-transcending attachments to the morality of principles; 
and the truth of justice as fairness means that if citizens develop an attachment to it, 
then it is the result of a virtuous combination between reasonable inculcation and free 
human reason. 
 Since any account of moral development taking the “rationalistic” route must 
be able to explain how “moral attitudes are part of our humanity,” it is the aim of the 
contract doctrine to demonstrate the “appropriateness of moral sentiments to our 
nature” by invoking “the principles that would be consented to in the original 
position” (TJ, 429). 
 This task is carried out by highlighting two features; one is a feature of justice 
as fairness as a normative theory, the other is a feature of the “laws of psychology” 
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 Rawls relies upon in the argument for the natural development of the sense of justice. 
First, Rawls reminds us that justice as fairness is a view grounded in a certain idea of 
mutual benefit and reciprocity. Roughly, the principles of justice are those that 
reasonable persons would choose in order to ensure that the claims they make on each 
other are fairly adjudicated. Since these claims are pressed within the larger 
framework of a society as a system of social cooperation, the goal is to find the most 
reasonable scheme of cooperation such that each member “can expect the willing 
cooperation of all” precisely because the scheme is reasonable (88). It is a distinctive 
feature of the contract doctrine that the only basis upon which the willing cooperation 
of all can reasonably be expected is one where no individual's good is sacrificed for 
greater benefits that might accrue to others, either because those others are naturally 
more talented, or else because allocating goods to those others is the most efficient 
way to maximize overall utility. It is simply unreasonable for the scheme of social 
cooperation not to dedicate itself to securing everyone's advantage. 
 The second feature that is relied upon in the argument for the development of 
the sense of justice is that the “three psychological laws” of moral development are 
“reciprocity principles” (397, 433, 437); that is, they orient humans toward 
attachments to moral principles “once we realize how social arrangements answering 
to them have promoted our good and that of those with whom we are affiliated. In due 
course we come to appreciate the ideal of just human cooperation” (415). 
 By relying on (1) the fact that the principles of justice as fairness ensure “a 
more unconditional caring for our good and a clearer refusal by others to take 
advantage of accident and happenstance (437), and (2) the fact that the psychological 
principles of moral motivation “assert that the active sentiments of love and 
friendship, and even the sense of justice, arise from the manifest intention of other 
persons to act for our good” (433), Rawls argues that citizens who grow up in a 
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 society well-ordered by the principles of justice as fairness will tend reliably to 
develop an “effective desire to apply and to act from the principles of justice and so 
from the point of view of justice” (497). Importantly, the final justification for this 
sense is not merely that acting from it will best ensure the social orderedness one 
needs effectively to pursue one’s conception of the good. Rather, it is the combination 
of the recognition that just arrangements answer to each agent’s rational advantage, as 
well as our commitment to principles that define reasonable and “agreed ways of 
advancing human aims” (417). Our sense of justice is not, then, the result of an 
“ancient” psychology that cannot connect irreducibly moral considerations to major 
sources of human motivation. This is why the sentiment of justice does not resemble a 
preference for tea rather than coffee. Rather, it constitutes the desire “to live with 
others on terms that everyone would recognize as fair from a perspective that all 
would accept as reasonable” (419). 
 We can now make sense of the claim that the “real problem of congruence” 
arises when citizens who’ve grown up under just institutions, and who’ve acquired a 
secure and reasoned sense of justice, come to ask, in the light of “full knowledge” 
about their future and the “circumstances of a well-ordered society” (450-451), 
whether they can retain the outlook that the principles of justice display an 
“unconditional caring for their good.” Although Barry is wrong to think that Rawls 
needs the congruence argument to produce any and all motivation required to render a 
conception of justice stable; and even though Rawls relies on considerations of justice 
and considerations of an agent’s rational advantage in the account of how citizens 
acquire a reasoned sense of justice, his suggestion that there are relevant issues that lie 
beyond the purview of chapter 8 seems plausible. While Barry is correct that further 
arguments are required to adequately demonstrate that citizens’ interests in their own 
well-being are not unreasonably thwarted by the demands of the conception of justice 
 42
 they come to endorse as a result of their upbringing, he is wrong to suggest that Rawls 
failed to recognize the possibility of pure moral motivation. Rawls simply worried that 
the question of stability cannot be satisfactorily answered without a deeper inquiry 
into the varieties of human good that citizens will encounter in a society implementing 
justice as fairness. If Rawls had avoided this task, he would have left himself open to 
the objection that those who fully honor the principles of justice can do so only 
through a self-abnegating dedication to an overly moralized point of view. 
  
Freeman on Congruence and Finality 
 
 Samuel Freeman is in a better position than Barry to give a plausible answer to 
our central question, since Freeman does not make the mistake of ascribing to Rawls 
the “ancient” view of moral motivation. Rather, Freeman sees the congruence 
argument as attempting to show that citizens have good reason to maintain and affirm 
their already developed senses of justice in light of the fact that a commitment to 
justice does not require them to abandon further important interests that reasonable 
and self-respecting persons will have. The worry seems to be that, over time, even 
those who are committed to the point of view of justice may become disenchanted 
with its ideals if those ideals cannot be seen from the individualized standpoint of 
deliberative rationality to be firmly connected to what in fact constitutes a person's 
good. According to Freeman, Rawls sets for the congruence argument the task of 
showing (1) that a consistent and life-long affirmation of one's sense of justice is 
indeed “within the reach of human capacities and...compatible with a human good that 
affirms our nature,” and (2) that giving considerations of justice the stringency and 
priority that justice as fairness requires will not lead to “a kind of psychological 
catastrophe for us, requiring abnegation of the self and its higher capacities and a 
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 renunciation of final human purposes.”25
 Freeman claims that in order to satisfy these criteria, a theory of justice needs 
to show: 
 
(1) that justice and exercise of a sense of justice do not have such self-
abnegating consequences; moreover, (2) there are intrinsic goods that 
can be realized only by acting for the sake of justice; and finally (3) 
justice, rather than being self-destructive, is self-affirming.26
 
He believes that these three tasks are what Rawls has in mind when he attempts to 
show with the congruence argument that we can speak of the “good of justice.” Now, 
Freeman admits that “Rawls advances these three claims by way of several different 
arguments”; but he adds that “[b]ecause of its bearing on Political Liberalism, my 
focus here will be upon that part of the argument that invokes the ‘Kantian 
Interpretation’ of justice as fairness.”27 Since my ultimate aim is to show that Freeman 
is wrong to see a special connection between Liberalism and the Kantian 
Interpretation, I must explain why I reject Freeman's view that the Kantian portion of 
the congruence argument is “Rawls's main argument for the good of justice.” 
 I shall first focus on Freeman's tasks (1) and (3). How, according to Freeman, 
does the Kantian Interpretation give Rawls the means for tackling them? Roughly, 
Freeman’s account is this. According to the Kantian Interpretation, “[h]uman beings 
have a desire to express their nature as free and equal moral persons” (462). We have 
this desire because we take ourselves to be “equal members of the intelligible realm” 
that can choose to act on the basis of nonarbitrary principles rather than on the basis of 
this or that contingent desire (225). Rawls then suggests that the original position 
defines a situation of choice that removes the effects of the very sort of desires that 
                                                 
25 Freeman (2003a), p.  288, 287. 
26 Ibid., p. 289. 
27Ibid. 
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 free and equal moral persons will want to keep from influencing the highest-order 
principles by which they will guide their entire lives: 
 
By acting from these principles [viz. the one’s chosen in the original 
position] persons express their nature as free and equal rational beings 
subject to the general conditions of human life. For to express one’s 
nature as a being of a particular kind is to act on the principles that 
would be chosen if this nature were the decisive determining 
element…[W]hen we knowingly act on the principles of justice in the 
ordinary course of events, we deliberately assume the limitations of the 
original position. One reason for doing this, for persons, who can do so 
and want to, is to give expression to one’s nature. (TJ, 222)  
 
Later in Theory, Rawls claims that acting on the principles of justice are not only the 
best way for humans to express their nature as free and equal moral persons, but that it 
is also a way for them to realize goodness in their lives: since the Aristotelian 
Principle says that humans enjoy the exercise of their more complex, realized 
capacities; and since humans have the capacity to express one's nature as free and 
equal by working out and acting from the principles that would be chosen in the 
original position; it follows that cultivating and acting from the sense of justice 
associated with justice as fairness is an intrinsic good for human beings.28
 Freeman is quite correct that variations on this Kantian theme find their way 
into almost every nook of Rawls's discussion of congruence. In §86, Rawls claims that 
the “desire to act justly and the desire to express our nature as free moral persons turns 
out to specify what is practically speaking the same desire”, and this is a “chief 
reason[]...which the thin theory of the good allows for maintaining one's sense of 
justice” (501). But, as Freeman also sees,  it is not offered as the only reason. It is 
therefore not obvious that its unavailability, which is owed to its overly-
                                                 
28The later claim is made at Rawls (1999a), p. 390, and is explicitly invoked by Freeman pp. 293-4 of 
Freeman (2003a).  
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 comprehensive nature, would leave Theory's congruence argument in the lurch. Just as 
Barry was wrong to impute to Rawls the view that a “gap...exist[s] between accepting 
the principles of justice and being motivated to act on them,” perhaps Freeman is 
wrong to suggest that Rawls wrote Liberalism in order “fill the gap left by the 
omission of [Kantian] congruence”—even if such a gap there be.29
 To see why the Kantian Interpretation should not be assumed to have the 
preeminent place in Rawls’s congruence argument that Freeman claims to detect, 
consider Rawls's argument in §78 that citizens who grow up in under well-ordered 
institutions will not come to think that “their moral judgments of justice [are] purely 
conventional, arbitrary, or grounded in illusion.”30 While it is true that Rawls invokes 
in that section the Kantian Interpretation to argue “that by acting from these principles 
persons are acting autonomously” (452), this is not the only consideration Rawls 
invokes to allay the concern about the possibility of false consciousness. Rather, he 
says that “of course to someone in a well-ordered society there are many things to say” 
(451). These things include 
 
point[ing] out to him the essential features of the development of the 
sentiment of justice and how eventually the morality of principles is to 
be understood. Moreover his moral education has been regulated by the 
principles of right and justice to which he would consent in an initial 
situation in which all have equal representation as moral persons...and 
therefore the psychological processes by which is moral sense has been 
acquired conform to principles that he himself would choose under 
conditions that he would concede are fair and undistorted by fortune 
and happenstance...Thus no one's moral convictions are the result of 
coercive indoctrination. Instruction is throughout as reasoned as the 
development of understanding permits. (451-2) 
 
It is only when we get to the discussion of the special concept of “autonomy” that 
                                                 
29 Freeman (1994), p. 638. 
30This is Freeman's characterization of the conclusion of §78, given at p. 228 of Freeman (2003a). 
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 Rawls invokes the Kantian Interpretation. But this does not appear to be offered as a 
consideration whose unavailability would undermine the weight of the considerations 
that are offered before it. Indeed, this would accord with the discussion of the 
progression through the three stages of moral development. At the end of that 
discussion it is suggested that, in a well-ordered society, “since arbitrary authority has 
disappeared, its members suffer much less from the burdens of oppressive conscience” 
(429). There is no indication that this conclusion relies upon the special Kantian 
Interpretation of justice as fairness in general, or of moral autonomy in particular. That 
is, part III gives us no reason to think that citizens who come to endorse justice as 
fairness on anything other than grounds of Kantian autonomy would thereby suffer 
from the burdens of oppressive conscience. The idea that the principles of justice as 
fairness would be chosen by people who “want to live with others on terms that 
everyone would recognize as fair from a perspective that all would accept as 
reasonable” seems to satisfy Rawls (419).31
 Let's now consider Freeman’s task (2), viz. the task of showing that “there are 
intrinsic goods that can be realized only by acting for the sake of justice.” Unlike the 
task of allaying worries about the possibility of oppressive conscience, this important 
task is variously defined by Rawls in ways that leave the reader confused as to what 
the task of the congruence argument is. Consider just some of the formulations he 
offers: 
 
We want to know whether having a sense of justice is a good (in the 
thin sense)...(350) 
                                                 
31 In Cohen (1994), Joshua Cohen suggests that Theory’s argument showing that citizens will acquire a 
sense of justice corresponding to justice as fairness faces the same problem that the congruence 
argument faces, viz. that it depends upon the Kantian Interpretation. See p. 1520n90. My goal has been 
to show that there are reasons to distinguish de facto reliance from essential dependence in this case. 
Given Rawls’s persistent failure to mention the congruence argument when discussing the motivations 
of Liberalism, pointing to his invocation of the Kantian Interpretation at various points is not sufficient 
to show that Theory would be lost without it. 
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The final chapter examines the question of congruence, that is, whether 
the sense of justice coheres with the conception of our good so that 
both work together to uphold a just scheme. (397) 
 
[S]hould it turn out that the desire to act justly is also regulative of  a 
rational plan of life, then acting justly is part of our good. In this event 
the conceptions of justice and goodness are compatible...(399) 
 
[Congruence involves showing] that given the circumstances of a well-
ordered society, a person's rational plan of life supports and affirms his 
sense of justice. (450) 
 
The question is whether the regulative sentiment [i.e., the sense of 
justice] is consistent with their good...(498)32
 
It is no wonder very few commentators spent time evaluating the congruence 
argument after Theory was published. Rawls himself later admitted that “[t]hroughout 
Part III too many connections are left for the reader to make, so that one may be left in 
doubt as to the point of much of Chs. 8 and 9.”33
 Some of the more specific characterizations of congruence might suggest a 
difficult target to hit; some seem to suggest that we have to show that it is uniquely 
rational—where x is rational just in case it is recommended from the standpoint of 
deliberative rationality—to want to regulate one’s life by the standards of justice. 
Surely this is no easy task. For while we might see our way to deriving the principles 
of justice from a standpoint of justice that is the same for all persons, it is hard to see 
how we might derive those same principles from the many and variegated standpoints 
that are constructed by each individual’s employment of deliberative rationality.34 If 
this is the task, then Barry’s conclusion seems right after all (even if not for exactly the 
                                                 
32 All emphases added; other formulations can be found at Rawls (1999a), pp. 350, 383, 438, 450, 450-
1, and 497. 
33 Rawls (1985), p. 414n. 
34 Rawls (1999a), p. 394: “But as we have seen, the determination of rational plans is indeterminate in 
important ways. The more evident and easily applied principles of rational choice do not specify the 
best plan; a great deal remains to be decided. This indeterminacy is no difficulty for justice as fairness, 
since the details of plans do not affect in any way what is right or just.” 
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 right reasons): “the requirement of ‘congruence’ is an extraordinarily demanding 
one…[that] can be met unconditionally by invoking the ‘Kantian Interpretation.’”35
 Freeman believes that the requirement of congruence is indeed specially 
demanding: 
 
Ultimately, the congruence argument, to succeed, must show that it is 
contrary to reason to weigh the sense of justice off against other ends 
‘in ordinary ways.’ What needs to be shown is that it is [deliberatively] 
rational to give the sense of justice a highest-order position in rational 
plans.”36
 
Again, if this is the task, it seems likely that something like the Kantian congruence 
argument, with its implication of a “practical identity” between the demands of justice 
and the conditions of an agent’s own well-being or rational good, is needed; and it 
would follow from this that the unavailability of the Kantian argument would indeed 
leave a large, problematic gap in Theory’s overall argument. 
 Despite this reading of what the congruence argument must show, I believe 
that an alternate reading is both truer to the text and intrinsically more plausible (and 
thus more charitable to Rawls). It also has the virtue of helping us see why Rawls 
might not have had a problem with the congruence argument even if its Kantian 
element were made unavailable. This would explain why Rawls never cites the 
Kantian elements of the congruence arguments as providing the impetus for 
developing the framework of political liberalism.  
 
                                                 
35 Barry (1995), p. 887. 
36 Freeman (2003a), p. 298. 
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VII. How to Read The Congruence Argument 
 
 Contrary to Barry’s and Freeman’s reading that the congruence argument must 
show a perfect match between the demands of justice and the conditions of an agent’s 
own rational good, I suggest that when Rawls enumerates the “chief reasons…which 
the thin account of the good allows for maintaining one’s sense of justice” (501), and 
then admits these reasons aren’t “decisive”—i.e., that it “can even happen that there 
are many who do not find a sense of justice for their good” (505)—we should not 
immediately assume that he was unhappy with the strength of the argument. There is, 
of course, good independent reason for Rawls not to reject justice as fairness when 
many claim that acting justly is not uniquely (deliberatively) rational: why should 
principles of justice be held hostage to the various thin-theory whims that might 
develop in citizens who grow up under just institutions? 
To see that Rawls is not concerned to hit the demanding target suggested by 
Freeman’s account of the congruence argument, note that earlier, in the initial 
discussion of the Aristotelian principle, Rawls suggests that the principle is 
appropriate to rely upon because it “accounts for our considered judgments of value” 
(379) and thus “in the design of social institutions a large place has to be made for it, 
otherwise human beings will find their culture and form of life dull and empty” (377). 
Later, when he considers the possibility that some will not find congruence in a just 
society, he concludes that once we grant “a reasonable interpretation of human 
sociability (provided by the account of how a sense of justice is acquired and by the 
idea of social union), justice as fairness appears to be a sufficiently stable conception” 
(505; emphasis added). But if my recounting of the various aspects of the stability 
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 argument has been accurate, the two elements that Rawls highlights in the final 
analysis to show that justice as fairness is sufficiently stable—i.e. the development of 
a sense of justice and the idea of a social union—are not essentially tied to the Kantian 
Interpretation. This is strong evidence to conclude that Rawls did not believe that the 
unavailability of the Kantian elements was a problem for his view. Viewed alongside 
the fact that in all his later remarks about part III of Theory Rawls never once said that 
political liberalism was a response to the removal of the Kantian congruence 
argument, we have good reason to look elsewhere to understand the rationale behind 
Rawls’s development of political liberalism. 
Admittedly, the Kantian Interpretation is mentioned in the discussions of both 
the development of the sense of justice and the idea of a social union; but it is always 
invoked as one consideration among others, and is never explicitly identified as the 
most important consideration. This is evidenced, first, by the fact that even Freeman 
and Barry believe that it is “only when we reach chapter 9 and the second stage of the 
argument for stability, from ‘congruence,’ that the deeper bases of the view in Kantian 
ethics becomes really apparent.”37 It would thus be strange to suggest that the Kantian 
Interpretation was at the center of chapter 8’s discussion of the development of a sense 
of justice. Second, once we move to the context of the discussion of the rational appeal 
of social union, it appears that the central idea is the “feature of human sociability that 
we are by ourselves but parts of what we might be” (464); yet this feature does not 
rely essentially upon the Kantian premise that our fundamental nature is as free and 
equal members of the intelligible realm with a freedom to choose our ends (225). 
Instead, it relies on the metaphysically more modest thesis that our nature, and hence 
our good, “depends upon the sorts of persons we are, the kinds of wants and 
                                                 
37 This is Barry citing and endorsing Freeman’s claim at Freeman (1994), p. 628. See Barry (1995), p. 
887n20. 
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 aspirations we have and are capable of” (505). If Rawls were ineluctably committed to 
a Kantian conception of human nature and the human good in which the desire to 
express one’s moral nature determines his good, he certainly would not believe that a 
person’s nature and good can be determined by his unshakable desire to count blades 
of grass all day long.38
At this point Freeman is likely to invoke Rawls’s criterion that a conception of 
justice exemplify finality.39 The hope is that members of a well-ordered society will 
give justice highest priority in their scheme of ends and that justice has the final say 
when it runs contrary to other competing motivations. I quoted Freeman as claiming 
that “to succeed, [the congruence argument] must show that it is rational [in the sense 
captured by goodness as rationality] to give the sense of justice a highest-order 
position in rational plans.” But the meaning of the phrase “rational to give” is not 
immediately obvious, and on one interpretation it introduces a requirement of 
congruence that Rawls doesn’t seem to endorse. He tells us earlier (§23) that every 
candidate conception of justice meets certain “formal conditions that it seems 
reasonable to impose” upon “all ethical principles and not only for those of justice” 
(112). So one cannot reasonably be committed to a specific conception of justice 
unless that conception satisfies these formal conditions. One of these conditions is that 
of finality, which requires that  
 
Conclusions from these principles also override considerations of 
prudence and self-interest. This does not mean that these principles 
insist upon self-sacrifice; for in drawing up the conception of right the 
parties take their interests into account as best they can. The claims of 
personal prudence are already given an appropriate weight within the 
full system of principles. (117) 
 
                                                 
38 See note 11, above. 
39 See Freeman (2003a), pp. 297-303. 
 52
 It follows from this that when we take up the question of congruence we are to assume 
that citizens are already committed, in some nontrivial sense, to the finality of the 
conception of justice that in part constitutes the sense of justice they’ve have 
developed in the course of their upbringing.40 But if this is so, it is misleading to 
suggest that Rawls views the task of the congruence argument to introduce the feature 
of finality into a given citizen’s overall normative standpoint. What that argument 
must do, it seems, is to convince us that our citizen will not be tempted by thin-theory 
reasons to abandon what she is already committed to. She must judge that her 
conception of justice really does give “appropriate weight” to considerations of her 
good—she must judge that justice “accords with,” “is consistent with,” “is compatible 
with,” “coheres with,” and “belongs to,” her good.41 She is already committed to 
justice, and wants to make sure that this commitment will not be broken by whatever 
strains may be introduced by her thin-theory reasons. The congruence argument, far 
from relying upon a Kantian ace in the hole, argues in a piecemeal fashion that 
tendencies to instability grounded in thin-theory forces will be sufficiently few, given 
the amount and kinds of rational goods that justly raised citizens, already possessed of 
a sense of justice, are likely to find available in the well-ordered society of justice as 
fairness. By assuming that citizens already have a sense of justice, at least some 
central preconditions for finality are also presumed. The job of congruence is not, 
then, to confer finality on a conception of justice, but to show that there are no morally 
important factors that might pervasively defeat what is already presumed. 
As a final piece of evidence against the claim that Rawls’s congruence 
argument is made primarily on the basis of the Kantian Interpretation, consider his 
answer to the question of whether preserving our sense of justice “may in the end 
                                                 
40 Recall: “I am not trying to show that in a well-ordered society an egoist would act from a sense of 
justice…Rather, we are concerned with the goodness of the settled desire to take up the standpoint of 
justice. I assume that the members of a well-ordered society already have this desire” (498). 
41Cf. note 32, above.  
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 [cause us to] suffer a very great loss or even be ruined by it” (502). Rawls answers the 
question by linking the desire to do justice with “the hazards of love”: “Friends and 
lovers take great chances to help each other…Their being so disposed belongs to their 
attachments as much as any other inclination…And the loves that hurt the least are not 
the best loves…If we are loving we do not regret our love” (ibid.). To be sure, “this 
conclusion”—i.e., that it can be rational to allow justice to exert finality even when it 
presents ruinous hazards—is “strengthen[ed],” Rawls says, by a “feature of the desire 
to express our [Kantian] nature as moral persons,” (503; emphasis added); but this 
augmenting Kantian reason is one among others, and without further argument we 
cannot conclude that he takes it to be essential in this context. 
 
VIII. Lessons for Reading Political Liberalism 
 
 I have tried to show that Rawls does not place the sort of emphasis on the 
Kantian congruence argument in Theory that would translate into a need to recoup the 
stability lost by its withdrawal due to its overly comprehensive nature. Moreover, I 
have suggested that Rawls’s reluctance to point to Kantian congruence in his later 
work makes it all the more important to question Barry’s and Freeman’s attempt to 
identify Theory’s internal problem by employing a strategy of comprehensiveness-
detection. Barry and Freeman are committed to the view that the Kantian elements of 
the congruence argument are so crucial to Theory’s argument that the framework of 
political liberalism must be a framework designed to do the job they were designed to 
do. Again, when this fact is viewed in light of Rawls’s refusal to blame the Kantian 
elements in his later writings, we have strong evidence to believe that it is not so 
important that the role fillable only by the Kantian congruence argument is left 
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 unfilled. 
 Both Barry and Freeman believe that the role and character of the Kantian 
congruence argument directly influences the character of the features of Liberalism 
that are designed to “replace” it. According to Barry, political liberalism is born when 
Rawls begins to rethink the legitimacy of the “Hobbesian” mechanisms he 
countenanced employing when there is instability because “many…do not find a sense 
of justice for their good.” Rawls’s appreciation that the absence of stability betokens 
the absence of justice accounts, Barry says, for the new accommodation to pluralism 
introduced into political liberalism by its ideal of overlapping consensus. He suggests 
that, whereas Theory wasn’t bothered by the possibility that citizens will not come to 
endorse justice as good for them given their particular wants and desires, Liberalism 
requires that it must be possible to discover an entailment of the principles justice 
from the many inconsistent yet reasonable individual perspectives characteristic of 
reasonable citizens in modern pluralistic societies. Unlike Theory, Liberalism holds 
that it is unjust to use Hobbesian mechanisms to ensure compliance when no such 
entailment is forthcoming. 
 In Chapter 3 I will argue that political liberalism may not require as much in 
the way of accommodation of disagreement by principles of justice as Barry suggests.  
For now, consider Barry’s claim that the mechanisms endorsed by Rawls to secure 
stability when it is not forthcoming are “Hobbesian.” What makes them so? Barry 
describes a method as Hobbesian when compliance with principles of justice is 
secured through the threat of force alone, rather than by gaining citizens’ “compliance 
for the right reasons” by drawing on their moral motivation to cooperate with others 
on terms all can regard as reasonable.42 But if this is what makes a method Hobbesian, 
Rawls’s tack in §86 of Theory is decidedly non-Hobbesian. Consider his reason for 
                                                 
42 Barry (1995), pp. 880-3. 
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 not kowtowing to complaints that justice does not accommodate all thin-theory 
reasons: 
 
Thus granting that adherence to whatever conception is acknowledged 
will be imperfect…[w]ould [parties in the original position] insist that a 
person can be required to do only what is to his advantage as defined by 
the thin theory? It seems clear, in light of the contract doctrine as a 
whole, that they would not. For this restriction amounts in effect to 
general egoism…(504). 
 
The clear implication is that the mechanisms needed to curb excessive thin-theory 
demands and to secure compliance are non-Hobbesian precisely because such 
demands are egoistic and unreasonable. 
 Compare Theory’s response to this problem with Liberalism’s concern to show 
that the standpoint of justice “contain[s] within itself sufficient space, as it were, for” 
ways of life “fully worthy of citizens’ devoted allegiance” (PL, 174): 
 
That optimistic view [i.e., the view that all worthy forms of human life 
will flourish under just arrangements] is mistaken. It may still be 
objected by those who affirm conceptions that cannot flourish that 
political liberalism does not allow sufficient space for them. But there 
is no criterion for what counts as sufficient space except that of a 
reasonable and defensible political conception of justice itself. The idea 
of sufficient space is metaphorical and has no meaning beyond that 
shown in the range of comprehensive doctrines which the principles of 
such a conception permit and which citizens can affirm as worthy of 
their full allegiance. (PL, 198n; emphasis added) 
 
Theory and Liberalism appear to be in lockstep on this point. Both books attempt to 
show that justice provides “sufficient space” for citizens’ reasonable pursuit of the 
good life, and that this helps show how a “sense of justice coheres with the conception 
of our good so that both work together to uphold a just scheme” (TJ, 397). All citizens 
are not to be convinced that the requirements of justice match up perfectly with the 
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 conditions of perfect well-being entailed by their justice-independent comprehensive 
conceptions of the good; such a requirement would be unreasonable.  Once again, a 
target that could only be hit by something like the Kantian congruence argument is 
revealed to be of little concern to Rawls in Theory, as well as in Liberalism. 
 Perhaps the strongest—though also the subtlest—argument against my claim 
that the notion of overlapping consensus is not designed to redress the instability 
caused by problems with the congruence argument comes in the form of a structural 
point. Recall that Theory presented the stability argument in two stages: the first 
concerns the development of the sense of justice, while the second concerns 
congruence. Now consider a claim made by Rawls in the chapter of Liberalism 
entitled “The Idea of Overlapping Consensus”: 
 
Stability involves two questions: the first is whether people who grow 
up under just institutions…acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice 
so that they generally comply with those institutions. The second 
question is whether in view of…the fact of reasonable pluralism, the 
political conception can be the focus of an overlapping consensus. (PL, 
141) 
 
Freeman points to precisely this passage to support the view that Liberalism attempts 
to recoup the stability lost through the withdrawal of Kantian congruence with the 
device of overlapping consensus.43 This may look like knock-down evidence against 
my view, but there is an equally strong reply. First, just as Theory placed the 
discussion of congruence in a separate chapter from the account of the development of 
the sense of justice, Liberalism’s specific discussion of agents’ rational advantage and 
justice’s ensuring sufficient space for good lives occurs in the chapter that follows the 
book’s discussion of overlapping consensus. Indeed, only the later chapter makes use 
of such congruence-related concepts as goodness as rationality, the Aristotelian 
                                                 
43 See Freeman (2003a), p. 309n9. 
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 Principle, and a just society as a social union of social unions. Moreover, Rawls 
explicitly claims that the ability of a conception of justice to gain the endorsement of 
an overlapping consensus shows how “a well-ordered democratic society meets a 
necessary (but certainly not sufficient) condition of realism and stability” (PL, 38). 
These considerations might suggest that congruence is now secured not by the second 
stage of Liberalism’s argument for stability, but by a third stage, set out in 
Liberalism’s discussion of “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good” and designed 
to show that considerations of rational advantage do not defeat conclusions about 
justice already arrived at. 
 Most importantly, this tripartite account of Liberalism’s discussion of stability 
seems to harmonize with I take to be Rawls’s own account of what was wrong with 
Theory. As I suggested in section II above, Rawls’s canonical descriptions of Theory’s 
flaw point to his concern that chapter 8 does not explicitly disavow the possibility of a 
stable society that is regulated by a comprehensive conception of justice. We should 
thus expect Rawls to revisit the arguments of the first stage of the original stability 
argument, since it must now be shown that citizens are likely to develop, as a result of 
their upbringing, a sense of justice informed by a non-comprehensive conception. One 
natural way of proceeding would be to show, first, that justly raised citizens will come 
provisionally to endorse society’s regulative political conception of justice, and, 
second, that the content of that conception will not be too much at odds with citizens’ 
beliefs about what justice requires, the concern with the fact of reasonable pluralism to 
one side. Such a strategy would round out the discussion of stability by addressing the 
question of whether long-term loyalty to the political conception of justice would be 
self-abnegating or unreasonably injurious to one’s good (even if it doesn’t perfectly 
promote one’s conception of the good).  This three-part strategy mirrors exactly the 
structure I just argued Liberalism’s argument takes. 
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IX. Conclusion 
 
As I said at the outset, I understand that there may be very few readers of 
Liberalism whose interpretation of that text is influenced by anything Theory has to 
say about stability. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think that Rawls’s view in 
Liberalism, qua solution to a problem he found in Theory, is shaped by his conception 
of that problem. If he thought that requirements of justice have to match up perfectly 
with the demands of well-being issued in by individuals’ employment of deliberative 
rationality, then that matters for the amount and sort of toleration and accommodation 
Liberalism should require of valid principles of justice. But if he continued to think 
that justice as fairness contained “sufficient space” for citizens to pursue their 
conceptions of the good—and thus may use various reasonable “mechanisms” to keep 
citizens on the path of justice—then that is at least one reason to pause before 
concluding that the controversial and potentially very demanding egalitarian duties 
defended in Theory cannot survive the revisions of justice as fairness embodied in 
Political Liberalism. For his part, Barry thinks44 that no principle of socioeconomic 
justice is likely to gain the endorsement of an overlapping consensus—so long as we 
think that an overlapping consensus is achieved only when each citizen believes that 
the demands of justice coincide exactly with the recommendations of deliberative 
rationality. My aim in this chapter has been to argue that nothing in Theory, and 
nothing Rawls wrote later about Theory, suggests that he had any interest in this idea 
of overlapping consensus. 
 
                                                 
44 Barry (1995), p. 913. 
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 CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL LIBERALISM II: STABILITY, LEGITIMACY, AND REASONABLE 
REJECTION 
 
In the last chapter I tried to tell the story of Rawls’s transition to political 
liberalism. I concluded that the possibility of a controversial egalitarian conception of 
justice does not appear to be ruled out by the reflections that drove Rawls to develop 
political liberalism.  Still, our picture of his later doctrine lacks important details that 
are crucial to a full understanding of Rawls’s post-Theory response to the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. In this chapter I seek to fill in these details. The account of 
political liberalism that I set out is distinctive for at least two important reasons. First, 
it highlights an important yet oft-ignored aspect of continuity with the line of thinking, 
recounted in Chapter 2, that led Rawls to modify his earlier view of political 
justifiability. Specifically, the theoretical prominence of Theory’s notion of stability is 
preserved in political liberalism, contrary to most accounts of Rawls’s later view. 
Second, although most accounts fail to see how the view relies on the old notion of 
stability, they do recognize that political liberalism appears to incorporate a new 
concern with legitimacy that seemed to play no significant role in Rawls’s earlier 
arguments for a particular theory of justice. I shall argue, however, that political 
liberalism’s concern with legitimacy is poorly understood by commentators. Seeing 
that this is so is absolutely crucial to understanding the point and structure of political 
liberalism, and to understanding how political liberalism might be perfectly hospitable 
to the controversial premises of most egalitarian conceptions of economic justice. 
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 I. Chauvinism or Indeterminacy? 
 
The most effective way to get into the details of Rawls’s political liberalism is 
by considering a powerful objection that has not been adequately addressed by those 
who count themselves among the proponents of the view. The objection claims that 
political liberals face a fatal dilemma: they must either accept a brand of moral 
indeterminacy that renders their view impotent to guide action, or else they must 
chauvinistically insist that anyone who questions their more specific moral 
conclusions is, for that reason, unreasonable.45 The dangers of moral indeterminacy 
are clear. After all, everyone believes that persons should be treated “as equals,” but 
what does that mean, exactly? A political theory should help us answer this question, 
not just raise it. Chauvinism, on the other hand, is a less obvious flaw. For at some 
point an advocate of a moral theory must be willing to say that others are simply 
wrong to reject it. But it is not mere conviction in the face of dissent that motivates the 
charge of chauvinism. Rather, it is political liberals’ apparent belief that anyone who 
rejects their specific view of morality is perforce unreasonable. Ordinary usage seems 
to associate unreasonableness more with being “beyond the pale” than with failing to 
endorse a correct conception of justice or political morality down to its last details. So 
if, rejecting the first horn of the dilemma, political liberals aspire to a sufficiently 
determinate framework of moral reasoning that can guide the daily choices of ordinary 
folk, they should also wish to avoid a chauvinistically parochial notion of 
reasonableness that will rightly discomfit prospective adherents. Yet according to the 
objection, political liberals can’t have it both ways.   
The charge of chauvinism is sure to sting in light of political liberalism’s 
                                                 
45 This specific use of “chauvinism” comes from Mark Timmons’s criticisms of T.M. Scanlon’s moral 
contractualism in Timmons (2003). I discuss Scanlon’s view further in Chapter 4. 
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 avowed respect for conscientious disagreement. After all, it appears to be a central 
plank of Rawls’s view that valid principles of justice must be able to win an 
“overlapping consensus” of reasonable persons who inevitably endorse widely 
divergent moral, religious, and philosophical worldviews.46 Clearly, then, adequate 
political principles must indeed meet some criterion of reasonableness, and it is fully 
expected that some normative truths will not pass political liberal muster. 
This focus on reasonable rejection or reasonable overlapping consensus, rather 
than on all-things-considered truth, does have its intuitive appeal. Its plausibility 
appears to be reflected, for example, in the widely held view that religion should have 
little or no bearing on state policies. Few believe this view commits one to atheism. 
Instead, they think it wrong to support coercively imposed state policies whose 
justification essentially draws upon premises that their conscientious compatriots 
could reasonably reject, even if what they reject is in fact true. 
But however noble the intent of political liberalism, its focus on reasonable 
rejection introduces the danger of chauvinism because conscientious persons are likely 
to disagree on whether this or that conception of morality or justice is reasonable. 
Hence Mark Timmons argues that in order for a specific conception of political 
morality to meet the “no reasonable rejection” criterion, reasonableness must be 
defined in terms of that theory’s controversial claims. Otherwise, those claims could 
be rejected by someone who exhibited a less parochial form of reasonableness, and 
this would force their removal from the political liberal’s stock of acceptable moral 
justifications.47
One might respond to this charge by seeking to employ a more modest and 
ecumenical notion of reasonableness. This appears to be Rawls’s tack. His political 
                                                 
46 See Rawls (1996). All unadorned parenthetical references in the this chapter are to this source. 
47 See Timmons (2003), esp. pp. 400-407. 
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 liberalism is motivated in the first instance by the view that there are “many hazards 
involved with the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and 
judgment,” and that these hazards—the burdens of judgment—will lead to a 
“reasonable pluralism” of comprehensive worldviews (55-56). Since the burdens of 
judgment are the ineliminable and foreseeable result of the free play of human reason 
under free institutions, they “limit the scope of what reasonable persons think can be 
justified to others” (59). According to Rawls, citizens are reasonable just in case they 
are (1) willing to propose fair terms of social cooperation and to abide by them 
provided others do, and (2) willing to “recognize” the burdens of judgment and their 
bearing on what can be justified to reasonable others (54). Since these conditions of 
reasonableness are put in terms of a person’s mere “willingness” to propose fair terms 
and recognize the burdens of judgment, they are not very demanding. Indeed, Rawls 
admits that they impose “deliberately loose” and “rather minimal” constraints on what 
makes for a reasonable worldview (59, 37). More importantly, he believes that it’s 
“inevitable and often desirable” that reasonable citizens will disagree about which 
specific principles of political justice are ultimately correct (227). 
It is at this point, however, that the threat of indeterminacy raises its head: if 
reasonable disagreement about comprehensive worldviews eliminates them from the 
stock of legitimate bases of political justification, why does it not also eliminate those 
specific conceptions of justice—including Rawls’s preferred conception—that he 
thinks will “inevitably” be rejected by at least some reasonable citizens? It seems that 
a conception of justice can satisfy political liberalism’s constraint on acceptable 
justifications only if it is beyond reasonable disagreement. So unless he’s willing to 
restrict the elements of political justification to those vague and abstract ideals that all 
ecumenically reasonable persons will accept, Rawls must jettison the ecumenical 
notion of reasonableness in favor of a chauvinistic notion on which it is not possible 
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 reasonably to disagree with the true conception of justice. Indeed, Jeremy Waldron 
rejects political liberalism precisely because it appears committed to adopting this 
“churlish” measure.48
Some political liberals see nothing wrong with this move. David Estlund, for 
example, accepts Waldron’s charge of churlishness, but believes it is a price well 
worth paying. Estlund even offers a formalized version of the fatal dilemma as an 
argument in favor of choosing the chauvinistic horn that Waldron rejects: 
 
(Deep Disagreement) No complete49 conception of justice is beyond 
reasonable objection.  
 
(No Reasonable Objection) A conception of justice is normatively licensed for 
advocacy to other reasonable citizens if and only if there exists no reasonable 
objection to it. 
 
(Philosophical Anarchism) Therefore, no complete conception of justice is 
normatively licensed for public advocacy.50
 
Since the moral indeterminacy that would accompany Philosophical 
Anarchism is so implausible, Estlund plausibly presents the argument as a reductio ad 
absurdum. Either (1) or (2) (or both) must be rejected. 
Although he recognizes that it carries serious costs, Estlund is reluctant to give 
up No Reasonable Rejection, and so he rejects Deep Disagreement. Since “non-crazy, 
non-vicious” objections can be formulated by conscientious citizens in response to any 
                                                 
48 See Waldron (1999), p. 151ff.  
49 This is weaker than Estlund’s own premise, which is “No position about what is required by fairness 
or justice or legitimacy is beyond reasonable disagreement.” The strength of Estlund’s premise makes it 
rather implausible on its face, since some views about what’s required by justice surely are beyond 
reasonable disagreement (e.g. women’s suffrage and the abolition of slavery).   The premise I have 
substituted is both more plausible and adequate to generate Estlund’s response to Waldron. For we can 
still get Philosophical Anarchism about complete conceptions of justice from the modified premise, and 
this conclusion is still one that Waldron should wish to avoid. It is also one that Rawls wants to avoid, 
since he holds that an adequate political conception of justice must be complete: It must “give a 
reasonable public answer to all, or to nearly all, questions involving the constitutional essentials and 
basic questions of justice” (225). 
50 See Estlund (2000), p. 113. 
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 complete conception of justice, an embrace of Deep Disagreement by a contractualist 
theory “leads straight to philosophical anarchism.” So even if it is “unseemly” to 
charge such compatriots with unreasonableness when they question the true 
conception of justice even just a little, contractualists have little choice.51 They must 
choose the unseemly and churlish over the anarchistic, strengthen the notion of 
reasonableness, and eliminate the possibility that a correct conception of justice could 
be rejected reasonably. Reasonable disagreement cannot, therefore, go as “deep” as 
Waldron wants, since endorsing the correct political conception of justice is 
constitutive of reasonableness.52 Indeed, Estlund believes that this is exactly the tack 
Rawlsian political liberalism takes. Preferring No Reasonable Objection to Deep 
Disagreement, it maintains that any disagreement over the correct conception of 
justice “is owed to unreasonableness.”53
Partisans of political liberalism have not adequately addressed the worry about 
chauvinism or Estlund’s account of political liberalism’s proper response to it. Joshua 
Cohen, for example, appears committed to a fatally inconsistent triad: he (1) forswears 
the parochial, constitutive interpretation of reasonableness, (2) holds that citizens 
should refrain from advocating “arrangements whose justification depends on aspects 
of their own view that others reasonably reject,”54 and (3) endorses a conception of 
justice containing aspects that he admits will be rejected by some reasonable persons, 
since the set of political values that all reasonable persons will agree to “is limited,” 
yielding no consensus on a “specific interpretation and balancing of the basic political 
values.” It is here, Cohen says, that political philosophy must take over, whipping 
those basic values up into their “optimal” articulation and combination.55 But if it is 
                                                 
51 Ibid., pp. 115-116. 
52 Ibid., p. 116. 
53 Ibid., p. 124. 
54 See Cohen (1994), p. 1528. For the rejection of the stringent interpretation of reasonableness, see p. 
1537. For other endorsements of No Reasonable Objection, see p. 1521, p. 1539. 
55 Ibid., p. 1533. 
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 wrong to advocate that which others reasonably reject, and if one can be reasonable 
while still rejecting the optimal interpretation of shared political values, then political 
philosophy can tell us nothing about responsible civic conduct. Citizens will be left to 
act on only vague political values that offer no definite solution to pressing problems.    
If the unseemly and chauvinistic Estlundian route is the right one out of 
Estlund’s and Timmons’s dilemmas, then the defense of political liberalism seems not 
worth the effort. Why fritter away the goodwill of one’s compatriots or one’s fellow 
moral agents by arguing that their moral outlooks reach the threshold of 
reasonableness only if they adopt (what one takes to be) the true view of morality or 
justice? Why not just adopt the more courteous ecumenical understanding, admit that 
reasonable people can disagree on matters of morality and justice, drop the “no 
reasonable objection” conception of justifiability, and spend one’s time arguing 
directly for the principles of political morality that seem most defensible in light of all 
relevant reasons? After all, the No Reasonable Objection constraint is idle in a theory 
that employs a constitutive understanding of reasonableness, for in that case the 
constraint can’t help guide reflection on proper justifications, since the content of its 
central concept is determined by the upshot of those very reflections. 
I believe that Rawls can evade the indeterminacy-or-chauvinism dilemma, and 
that he can do so in a way that counts some reasonably rejectible principles and values 
as fully legitimate materials of political justification. But the features of his view that 
enables this dodge are not widely appreciated; indeed, these features sometimes seem 
in tension with other, more well-known aspects of his view. Rawls’s political 
liberalism, pace Estlund’s interpretation of it, has the resources to embrace deep 
disagreement without embracing indeterminacy. If I am right, Rawls’s escape route 
leads to a picture of political liberalism that departs radically from standard accounts, 
including those most naturally suggested by many of his more well-known remarks. 
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II. Rawls’s Escape Route 
 
Rawls’s political liberalism can be saved from the indeterminacy-or-
chauvinism dilemma only by highlighting oft-ignored subtleties in the structure of the 
theory. The key lies in attending to his most careful accounts of political liberalism’s 
notions of overlapping consensus and stability. According to Estlund’s avowedly 
unseemly interpretation, political liberalism’s requirement that a conception of justice 
be able to win an overlapping consensus among reasonable citizens is just another way 
of saying that the conception must be one that cannot be reasonably rejected.56 So in 
order to avoid Philosophical Anarchism, political liberalism adopts a constitutive 
notion of reasonableness, thereby shielding the correct conception of justice from 
reasonable objections. On this understanding, it will of course be the case that just 
political institutions are stable and unlikely to be overturned when enough people are 
reasonable. But for Estlund, this is “necessarily true,” since a reasonable person is 
defined as someone who endorses the true conception of justice.57 This entails that it is 
also possible to have a non-stabilizing overlapping consensus when only a handful of 
citizens are (constitutively-) reasonable; in that case it will nevertheless be true that no 
objection to the conception of justice will come from a reasonable person. 
There is, however, a significant problem with this account of political 
liberalism. Rawls held that a well-ordered society is one in which everyone knows that 
everyone endorses the same principles of justice, and where this public knowledge 
generates widespread stabilizing allegiance to the public institutions enjoined by those 
                                                 
56 Estlund (2000), p. 124: the standard of “overlapping consensus…is no more than what is required to 
meet the No Reasonable Objection” requirement. 
57 Estlund (1999),  p. 823. 
 67
 principles. He acknowledges that the idea of a well-ordered society is a “highly 
idealized” notion (35), and seems satisfied with the weaker though still demanding 
requirement that a conception of justice be “willingly and freely” endorsed “by at least 
a substantial majority of its politically active citizens” (38). Nevertheless, a conception 
of justice that cannot drum up this significant amount of support “is inadequate as a 
democratic conception” (35).58
According to Rawls, there is only one way for a conception to win such wide 
support: it must be able to win an overlapping consensus among reasonable persons 
(36). Yet whether a conception can win an overlapping consensus “is a speculative 
question”: “One can reach [only] an educated conjecture” (15, xlviif.). But if Estlund’s 
account of reasonableness and overlapping consensus were correct, the proof that at 
least one conception can win an overlapping consensus would be obvious and a priori. 
(Here it is: (1) a conception wins an overlapping consensus just in case there exists no 
reasonable objection to it; (2) there is no reasonable objection to the conception of 
justice that defines the very content of (constitutive-) reasonableness; (3) Therefore, at 
least one conception of justice wins an overlapping consensus). This is strong 
evidence that Rawls did not in fact employ a constitutive notion of reasonableness. (Of 
course, there is also the fact that Rawls tells us that the demands of reasonableness are 
“rather minimal” and “deliberately loose,” as we’ve already seen.) We also see that the 
issues of institutional stability and overlapping consensus cannot be distinguished as 
sharply as Estlund suggests, since winning an overlapping consensus is the way in 
which a conception of justice comes to stabilize a society’s institutions by gaining 
                                                 
58 Rawls appears to relax the demands of well-orderedness even further in the Introduction to the 
Paperback Edition of Political Liberalism. See esp. Rawls (1996), pp. xlix-l. I shall ignore these later 
qualifications, focusing instead on the distinctive account of political liberalism that follows from 
Rawls’s presentation in the book’s text, which remains unchanged in the Paperback Edition. In any 
case, the later emendations do not touch what I in a moment describe as Rawls’s developmental 
qualifiers, and it is these that point in the direction of the understanding of political liberalism I want to 
identify and explore. 
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 widespread endorsement. 
So Rawls rejects the unseemly and constitutive understanding of 
reasonableness. But the widely held view that political liberalism requires citizens to 
tailor political justifications so they can win a broad and stabilizing consensus among 
one’s current reasonable compatriots does not seem correct either. For political 
liberalism is concerned with stability and consensus in very specific senses: it is stable 
just in case 
 
[1] people who grow up under just institutions (as the [candidate] political 
conception defines them) acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice so that 
they generally comply with those institutions…[And [2] ] the political 
conception can be the focus of an overlapping consensus…of reasonable 
doctrines likely to persist and gain adherents over time within a just basic 
structure (as the political conception defines it). (141; emphasis added) 
 
And an overlapping consensus 
 
consists of all the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of 
adherents in…a regime in which the criterion of justice is that [candidate] 
political conception itself” (15; emphasis added).59
 
Note that both of these definitions contain what we might call a developmental 
qualifier: a conception of justice is stable (in Rawls’s technical sense) and is able to 
win an overlapping consensus when its long-term institutionalization would generate 
allegiance among those who grow up in a society governed by it. (The idea of a 
developmental qualifier is of course familiar from the account of Rawls’s transition to 
political liberalism that I gave in Chapter 2.)  It therefore seems wrong to judge the 
                                                 
59 At Rawls (1996), p. 10n9 Rawls confirms that this is indeed intended to be a definition. Other 
statements of this understanding of an overlapping consensus can be found at Rawls (1996), pp. 10, 
141; Rawls (2001b), pp. 390, 410, 414, 421, 430, 479 and 487; and Rawls (2001a), pp. 181, 184, 185, 
193 and 194. 
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 adequacy of a conception of justice by reference to whether its advocacy or 
implementation would enhance stability and consensus here and now among citizens 
who have not grown up under the institutions enjoined by the candidate conception of 
justice. 
The importance to Rawls of testing a conception’s capacity to win an 
overlapping consensus by analyzing the effects of its institutionalization is evident 
throughout his later works. For instance, consider his response to the worry that the 
idea of an overlapping consensus on a sufficiently determinate theory of justice is 
unduly utopian because there are not now “sufficient political, social, or psychological 
forces” to secure consensus. He suggests that we should understand the question of 
whether a conception can win an overlapping consensus as the question of how “over 
generations the initial acquiescence in a liberal conception of justice as a modus 
vivendi develops into a stable and enduring overlapping consensus.”60 A modus 
vivendi obtains when citizens are willing to use political power in ways that others 
reject should they acquire that power, but refrain from doing this out of fear of 
recriminations once the political tables have turned. So when Rawls says that we can 
get to an overlapping consensus via the long-term imposition of a stable liberal 
conception of justice upon reluctant others, this confirms that his main concern is not, 
as is widely believed, the establishment of political consensus here and now. Rather, 
he is interested in a conception’s long-term prospects for “shap[ing]…toward itself,” 
through the political institutions it enjoins, the already reasonable views of those who 
do not now accept it (389). (Note that Rawls is not saying that a conception of justice 
is valid only for those who have had the right upbringing, or only within those 
societies that have had the benefit of being shaped by just institutions. His view seems 
                                                 
60 See Rawls (2001b), pp. 440-1 (emphasis added). See also Rawls (2001a), pp. 37, 192-3; and Rawls 
(1996), pp. 158-68. 
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 to be that a conception has validity (for all democratic societies) just in case it 
possesses the dispositional property of tending to generate its own support in societies 
it regulates over generations.) 
This picture will appear wrongheaded to those who know that Rawlsian 
political liberalism’s ideal of public justification holds that when constructing political 
justifications, citizens “are to appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs” (224) 
and “fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture” (13). Read in 
light of the stress on “stability” and “consensus”, these claims reasonably lead many to 
the view that political liberalism’s main aim is consensus and political stability here 
and now. But given Rawls’s most careful definitions of stability and overlapping 
consensus, and given his claim that it was a concern with stability so defined that led 
him to work out political liberalism in the first place (xvii-xviii, 140ff.), we may prefer 
to say either that Rawls misunderstood the implication of his central concern, or 
perhaps that there are simply two distinct and conflicting concerns at work here. This 
internal tension is evident in Rawls’s first sketch of political liberalism, where he 
claimed both (1) that the ideal of overlapping consensus enjoins us to look for 
rationales that constitute a “public basis of political agreement”, and (2) that the 
question of whether a conception can win an overlapping consensus is “highly 
speculative” since “we are forced to consider at some point the effects of the social 
conditions required by a conception of political justice on [citizens’] acceptance of 
that conception itself.”61 Statements along the lines of (1) contribute to the popular 
view that Rawls tied a conception’s validity to its prospects for engendering present 
stability, whereas statements along the lines of (2) support the view that validity is 
determined through future-oriented reflection on a conception’s developmental 
tendencies. 
                                                 
61 See Rawls (2001b), pp. 394, 414. 
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 Indeed, a strong case can be made that the future-oriented concern is the 
Rawlsian political liberal concern. After all, it is the developmental notion of stability 
that is relied upon in A Theory of Justice  to test the ultimate adequacy of  the theory 
of justice Rawls developed there, and we are told in the Introduction to Political 
Liberalism, that “all differences” between the account of justice given in Theory and 
the account given in Liberalism result from fixing the problems that the earlier 
account of justice had meeting this criterion of stability (xvii-xviii). More importantly, 
in an earlier essay that Liberalism partly incorporates, Rawls stipulates that a 
conception of justice is stable just in case it satisfies the developmental criterion, and 
then asks “Now what more general features of a political conception of justice does 
this definition of stability suggest?” Without giving an argument he claims that one 
such feature is that “a political conception of justice is formulated so far as possible in 
terms of certain fundamental intuitive ideas viewed as implicit in the public culture of 
a democratic society.”62 It is surely Rawls’s stress on this feature, combined with their 
failure to appreciate the special sense in which Rawls is concerned with stability, that 
has led commentators to the widespread belief that political liberalism’s ultimate goal 
is enhancing stability here and now. Yet to my knowledge, no one has ever questioned 
the validity of this derivation or has suggested that this feature is in fact out of step 
with the element that Rawls consistently put at the foundations of the theory, viz. 
stability. 
As it turns out, a developmental or future-oriented political liberalism permits 
reliance on a non-constitutive understanding of reasonableness. For a conception’s 
adequacy does not depend on whether it can be reasonably rejected simpliciter. 
Rather, it is judged by whether it would be endorsed by a substantial majority of 
reasonable persons who have grown up in a society governed by the institutions 
                                                 
62 Ibid., pp. 479-81. 
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 enjoined by that candidate conception of justice itself. This enables political liberalism 
to endorse Deep Disagreement without having to accept Philosophical Anarchism, 
since widespread agreement among hypothetical and specially situated reasonable 
citizens is its focus, not agreement among reasonable citizens as such. Thus, on one 
textually well-motivated account of Rawls’s political liberalism, it can avoid the 
churlish and unseemly measure adopted by Estlund and criticized by Waldron and 
Timmons. For it is able to recognize a gap between the conditions of reasonableness 
and the conditions for being a reliable detector of all truths about justice. It is only the 
latter conditions that require one to know whether one’s preferred conception of 
justice would generate widespread support among the set of ecumenically reasonable 
persons who grow up under institutions enjoined by that very conception. Still, it is 
indisputable that many of Rawls’s own remarks and emphases (especially those 
concerning his idea of public justification) mask the view’s potential to serve as a 
distinctive conception of contractualist justifiability that seeks to employ a modest 
notion of reasonableness. 
Finally, I must confront an important objection to my account of the role of 
reasonableness in Rawls’s political liberalism. The objection points out that Rawls 
refers both to positions that are “reasonable” and to those that are (or claim to be) 
“most reasonable.” He himself claims that justice as fairness is “the most reasonable 
[conception of justice] (even though many reasonable people seem to disagree with 
me)…” (xlix). While passages such as this are sufficient to prove that Rawls does not 
accept the No Reasonable Objection criterion of justifiability, they are also problems 
for my claim that Rawls avoids chauvinism by employing what I have called a non-
constitutive notion of reasonableness. For it may now appear that Rawls recognizes 
various kinds of reasonableness, including one kind that is exemplified only by those 
who endorse justice as fairness. 
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 I have already set out what I take to be Rawls’s main notion of reasonableness: 
citizens are reasonable just in case they are (1) willing to propose fair terms of social 
cooperation and to abide by them provided others do, and (2) willing to “recognize” 
the burdens of judgment and their bearing on what can be justified to others (54). As I 
also noted, since these conditions of reasonableness are put in terms of a person’s 
mere “willingness” to propose fair terms and recognize the burdens of judgment, they 
are intended to be undemanding. Now, I have argued that there are two central themes 
in Rawls’s political liberalism that are in some tension. There is concern to satisfy the 
developmental criterion of stability, and there is the concern to uncover a public basis 
of political agreement that can serve as a shared basis of political justification here and 
now. Regardless of whether these two approaches are to be reconciled, or whether one 
is to be abandoned altogether, the thing that remains the same is that the favored 
approach is held to define the content of public reason. This content is “the principles, 
ideals, and standards that may be appealed to” in political justification (liii). Rawls 
insists that “It is crucial that public reason is not specified by any one political 
conception of justice, certainly not by justice as fairness alone” (lii-liii). In a theory of 
political justification guided by the concern with present stability, the content of 
public reason will those “fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political 
culture of a democratic society” (13). In a theory hewing to the developmental line, 
other ideas should be admissible (although it is not clear Rawls agrees). Either way, 
once we have clear grasp on the admissible values, our job is to work out their “most 
reasonable” interpretation: 
 
The third point of view—that of you and me—is that form which 
justice as fairness, and indeed any other political conception, is to be 
assessed. Here the test is that of reflective equilibrium: how well the 
view as a whole articulates our more firm considered convictions of 
justice, at all levels of generality, after due examination, once all 
adjustments and revisions that seem compelling have been made. A 
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 conception of justice that meets this criterion is the conception that, so 
far as we can now ascertain, is the one most reasonable for us. 
 
Most-reasonableness is not, then, offered as a value unto itself in the way that 
reasonableness itself is. It is simply a way of describing the goal at which all political 
liberal theories aim: the construction of a sound conception of justice derived from 
materials—values, principles, ideals—held to be relevant to political justice. Thus, if 
there are reasons to avoid even the impression that political liberalism relies on a 
constitutive notion of reasonableness, there is reason to find another way to talk about 
the goal of political liberal inquiry that doesn’t mention reasonableness at all. Since 
I’m about to introduce a number of new terms in my discussion of political 
liberalism’s concern with legitimacy, I’ll leave the task of coining a replacement for 
“most-reasonableness” for another time.63  
IV. Justice and Legitimacy 
 
I want now to consider an objection to the account I have been setting out.  It 
claims that I have gravely misrepresented the problem Rawls’s political liberalism is 
designed to address, and that when the problem is conceived aright, Rawls’s answer to 
it is, after all, undermined by a version of the chauvinism-or-indeterminacy dilemma 
that cannot be evaded by invoking the developmental conception of stability. As we 
shall see, answering this objection leads us to reject yet another common belief about 
Rawls’s view. 
Most citizens of contemporary democracies have a fairly secure grasp on a 
distinction that sets these different tasks for political philosophy. On the one hand, 
                                                 
63 This account of what it is for a political conception to be “most reasonable” closely mirrors my 
account, in Chapter 4, of what, for Scanlon, it is for a contractualist moral theory to be “beyond 
reasonable rejection.” 
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 they know that people have all sorts of views about which institutions ought ideally to 
be implemented in order to make their society fully just. On the other, they know that 
vigorous disagreement on these issues is inevitable; they therefore recognize the need 
for democratic procedures and legislative institutions that can issue in and render 
legally binding policies that may well be out of place in any citizen’s vision for a fully 
just society. Let’s say, following common parlance, that the first set of issues are those 
of justice, while the second set are issues of legitimacy. 
 Sometimes political philosophers are not as careful with this distinction as they 
ought to be. Consider Jeremy Waldron, who, in a highly influential essay on the 
foundations of liberalism, claims to be concerned with the question of what makes 
“the enforcement of maintenance of a social and political order…morally 
legitimate.”64 This is a question of legitimacy, then, not justice. His answer to the 
essay’s central question is that a political order is legitimate when it is based on the 
consent of all those against whom the society’s major institutions are enforced. This 
answer is problematic, he tells us, because the history of liberal thought reveals at least 
two possible ways to understand that requirement. First, “consent” can mean actual 
consent, which yields a standard of legitimacy that permits enforcement of a political 
institution against only those who actually agree with the arrangement. But this is a 
demanding standard, and in response we might think “consent” should mean 
hypothetical consent, which allows a political arrangement to be legitimately enforced 
when those subject to it (or when some other relevant set of agents) would give their 
explicit consent under certain morally relevant hypothetical conditions. As an example 
of a hypothetical consent view, Waldron quotes Kant: 
 
[I]f a public law is so constituted that a whole people could not possibly give 
its consent to it…it is unjust; but if it is only possible that a people could agree 
                                                 
64 Waldron (1993), p. 50. 
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 to it, it is a duty to consider the law just, even if the people is at present in such 
a situation or frame of mind that, if consulted about it, it would probably refuse 
its consent.65
 
According to Waldron, Rawls’s A Theory of Justice follows this “Kantian 
approach”. Insofar as Rawls evaluates a society’s political and social institutions by 
reference to principles of ideal justice that would emerge from a hypothetical choice-
situation (the “original position”), Rawls agrees with Kant that a social order is 
legitimate not when those subject to it “have [in fact] agreed to its terms,” but when 
those terms “can be represented as the object of an agreement between them.”66
 There is surely something quite worrying about a political theory that takes the 
conditions of justice and the conditions of legitimacy to be by and large identical. 
Even granting the truth of the disputed conception of justice, the Kantian approach is 
more a recipe for benign tyranny than democratic legitimacy. But did Rawls really 
make the mistake of conflating the two? This seems unlikely. The upshot of Rawls’s 
hypothetical choice situation is meant to serve, not as a recipe for immediate political 
revolution, but as a conception of what a fully just liberal democracy would look like; 
the question of how or whether such an institutional arrangement could come to be 
legitimately enforced against any set of actual human beings is a separate question. Its 
answer will undoubtedly involve some story about how the messy stuff of politics and 
social movements leads over decades to the widespread endorsement of the conception 
of justice that emerges so effortlessly from the frictionless terrain of Rawls’s original 
position. Rawls’s theorizing about justice and legitimacy is not, then, so clearly 
Kantian. 
 Neither, it seems, is Kant’s. For in later work stressing the importance of 
                                                 
65 Kant (1996) p. 297 (AK 8:297). All emphasis Kant’s. This passage is quoted, from a different 
translation,  in Waldron (1993), p. 52. 
66 Ibid., p. 52-53; Waldron’s emphasis.  
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 distinguishing clearly between issues of justice and issues of legitimacy, Waldron 
himself argues that Kant was acutely aware that disagreement about justice is a 
problem to which positive law—humanly imposed “law accepted as authoritative 
without regard to the justice of its content”—is the only solution.67 This solution will 
not appeal to those who are drawn to what Waldron had earlier termed the Kantian 
approach, as no adjudicative procedure whose upshot is legitimate positive law can be 
expected to issue in the set of political arrangements that would emerge from a 
Kantian hypothetical choice situation. But this is of course not troubling, given the 
implausibility of the Kantian approach.68
So Kant is off the hook. Where, then, does this leave Rawls? Did he follow 
Kant in developing an independent conception of legitimacy that could adjudicate 
disputes about the nature of justice and issue in morally binding positive laws? Many 
believe that this is precisely the role that Rawls’s doctrine of political liberalism seeks 
to fill. After all, Rawls himself stressed that at the heart his political liberalism lies 
what he calls “the liberal principle of legitimacy” (LPL):  
 
[P]olitical power is always coercive power backed by the government’s use of 
sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its 
laws…[Therefore]: our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it 
is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all 
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.69
 
Rawls’s defense of this principle has led commentators to say that he now 
                                                 
67 See Waldron (1996), p. 1536; Waldron’s emphasis. 
68 Ibid., p. 1566. In the later essay, Waldron associates the passage quoted in Waldron (1993) with 
Kant’s “‘normative’ enterprise of discussing what the law ought to be” (i.e. justice), and insists that the 
this enterprise is distinct from, albeit complementary to, that of working out a positivist jurisprudence 
(i.e. legitimacy). See p. 1542 and his footnote 20. He does not mention the implications this has for his 
earlier account of the Kantian approach to legitimacy. 
69 See Rawls (1996), pp. 136-137.  
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 believes (1) that “legitimacy does not require justice”;70 (2) that legitimacy permits a 
certain “latitude” in the range of legal arrangements can be morally binding on a 
populace;71 (3) that the conditions of legitimacy and the conditions of justice “are, at 
least in principle, independent from one another”;72 and (4) that what a liberal 
constitutional democracy “really [has] to worry about is how, when a law is 
appropriately passed, it is binding on all citizens, even on those citizens who 
reasonably can differ with it.”73 Rawls himself expressed concurrence with these 
accounts, writing that when citizens’ political power is exercised in accordance with 
LPL, each should accept “as legitimate (even when not just)” the legislative upshot. 
Legitimacy so understood “allows a certain leeway” that justice itself does not.74
Now, in setting out my account of political liberalism’s point, I have not 
presented it as so centrally concerned with legitimacy. Rather, my arguments have 
suggested that the framework of political liberalism is designed for use in the 
construction of ideal or “most reasonable” conceptions of justice, conceptions which, 
again, “present[] how things might be, taking people as a just and well-ordered society 
would encourage them to be…” Such conceptions identify normatively adequate 
arrangements that describe “what is possible and can be, yet may never be” (213). 
While political liberalism, as I’ve presented it, does not seek to establish the 
determinate content of a complete ideal of political justice, its goal is to enumerate and 
defend conditions that any adequate democratic conception of justice must satisfy 
(35), and it helps us to identify a conception of justice that is properly viewed as the 
                                                 
70 David Estlund (1996), p. 73. 
71 Leif Wenar (2004), p. 269. 
72 Harry Brighouse (1998), p. 721. 
73 Burton Dreben (2003), pp. 326-7. 
74 “Reply to Habermas,” which is included as Lecture IX in Rawls (1996) but which was originally 
published in 1995. The first quotation is from p. 393, the second from p. 427. At 429n77 Rawls claims 
that it was this leeway conception of legitimacy that is “used in this text [i.e. Political Liberalism], 
especially [Lectures] IV-VI.” 
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 “long-term goal of political endeavor”75, the ultimate aim of our efforts to reform and 
improve our existing social institutions.76 When we come to see that some attractive 
conception of justice can satisfy the criteria of adequacy imposed by political 
liberalism, this “reconciles us to our social world and human nature by showing us 
that [a just] society can exist somewhere and at some time, but not that it must be, or 
will be.”77 Unlike a political liberalism, a liberalism grounded in a comprehensive 
doctrine could exist in our world only through the oppressive use of state power (37). 
Clearly, then, I am in disagreement with David Reidy, who holds that “it 
would not be misleading to say that ‘political liberalism’ refers to Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy,” where by “legitimacy” Reidy means a property that a state exemplifies 
when it is disposed coercively to enforce laws only when they have been “properly 
enacted or otherwise made law”—i.e. only when they have the right real-world 
pedigree involving the right sorts of collective decision-making procedures.78 In his 
exegetically sensitive and highly persuasive recent article on political liberalism and 
Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy, Reidy deploys something like the chauvinism-
or-indeterminacy dilemma to reject political liberalism on the ground that it either 
legitimates too little (with the consequence that political philosophy is impotent to 
guide responsible civic action, since the responsible use of state power is impossible), 
or else legitimates too much (by adopting something like the “Kantian approach” 
criticized by Waldron). Without any middle way between this dilemma, LPL, and the 
doctrine of political liberalism grounded in it, is either “ruthless or toothless”, and 
must, Reidy argues, be rejected.79
Reidy clearly sees that political liberalism’s main point is to show how 
                                                 
75 Rawls (1999b), p. 128. 
76 Rawls (2001b), p. 490. 
77 Rawls (1999b), p. 127. 
78 Reidy (2007), p. 248, 246. 
79 Ibid., p. 273. 
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 mutually respectful citizens can respond in the right way to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. Such citizens will seek “reciprocity in justification,” which “requires 
persons, when interacting with others, to limit the principles from and in accord with 
which they act to principles they are prepared in good faith to justify to others from a 
shared and appropriate moral point of view.”80 Now, when it comes to the 
justification of the use of “coercive power backed by the government’s use of 
sanctions” (136), citizens show each other due reciprocity when they support the use 
of such power only when it would be deployed in accordance with a system of 
institutions “the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common 
human reason,” as LPL says (137). The obvious question, then, is: What principles 
can we reasonably expect others to endorse? And it is this question, Reidy argues, that 
cannot be answered by the doctrine of political liberalism without rendering it either 
chauvinistic or indeterminate. 
Political liberalism will be chauvinistic if it identifies principles that we can 
reasonably expect others to endorse with principles that others can reasonably 
accept.81 For if we assume, as Rawls does, that many comprehensive doctrines can be 
endorsed reasonably by citizens committed to reciprocity in justification, then even if 
“many citizens in fact reasonably rejected the constitutional order of their body 
politic…that would be beside the point, at least insofar as legitimacy was concerned. 
So long as that order could reasonably be affirmed”—a possibility confirmed by the 
fact that some citizens do reasonably affirm it—“state action might satisfy the liberal 
principle of legitimacy.”82 This conception of legitimacy is, of course, unpalatable, for 
the same reason the “Kantian approach” to legitimacy was. It leaves LPL unacceptably 
                                                 
80 Ibid., p. 249; Reidy’s emphasis. 
81 Ibid., p. 266. 
82 Ibid., p. 267. 
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 “toothless” (to use Reidy’s term), since that principle rules out far too few exercises of 
state political power as illegitimate. And while Reidy does not use the term, the “could 
reasonably accept” interpretation of LPL is chauvinistic, insofar as it licenses anyone 
to insist that state action on the basis of his or her preferred reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine is legitimate. It licenses, that is, the chauvinistic insistence that reciprocity in 
the justification of coercive exercises of state power requires no more than the 
continued intolerant affirmation of one’s parochial (if not unreasonable) 
comprehensive doctrine. 
Recognizing that Rawls’s concern properly to respond to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism is too morally astute to square with the “could reasonably accept” 
interpretation of LPL, Reidy considers an alternative reading: 
 
Surely, reciprocity must demand more than that we act toward our fellow 
citizens in political life in accord with and from principles they could 
reasonably accept…The “more” that reciprocity must demand, it may seem, is 
that we act toward our fellow citizens in political life in accord with and from 
principles they could reasonably affirm and could not reasonably reject…83
 
Yet for reasons similar to those given by Waldron and Timmons and the others 
who sought to press the chauvinism-or-indeterminacy dilemma on political liberalism, 
the “could reasonably reject” interpretation of LPL seems to rule out too much, 
leaving no basis upon which responsible citizens can support coercively enforced 
laws. As Reidy puts it, the “could reasonably reject” reading of LPL renders it “wildly 
utopian”—i.e. it makes the possibility of legitimate government a utopian fantasy—
“since citizens can and do reasonably disagree over” so much.84 If LPL requires that a 
state’s “constitution and its essentials pass some test of reciprocity in judgment and 
thereby qualify as immune to reasonable dissent,” then LPL is unacceptably “ruthless” 
                                                 
83 Ibid., p. 268. 
84 Ibid., p. 271. 
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 in its test of legitimacy, leaving us saddled with a sort of indeterminacy or 
philosophical anarchism. No rationale for social choice that is determinate enough to 
guide the construction of specific laws or institutions may be relied upon in 
circumstances marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
 Reidy concludes that “Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy cannot be saved 
so long as it is understood to embody the demands of reciprocity in judgment under 
the conditions of reasonable pluralism.”85 And if Reidy is correct that the apparatus of 
political liberalism generally, and LPL in particular, is intended as a framework of 
moral reasoning about legitimacy, he may well be right. In any case, I don’t want to 
take issue here with Reidy’s arguments against the theory of legitimate enforcement of 
laws that he claims to find in Political Liberalism. Certainly the stability-centered 
middle-way I relied upon to navigate around the earlier chauvinism-or-indeterminacy 
dilemma will not do as a response to Reidy’s worries. For a rationale that a sizable 
majority of citizens would have accepted had they grown up under the institutions it 
enjoins is surely no more acceptable a basis for legitimate government than a rationale 
they merely could reasonably affirm. Instead, what I would like to argue now is that 
those who view political liberalism as primarily a theory of legitimacy (of a state or a 
law) mischaracterize political liberalism in a manner as serious as Waldron’s apparent 
initial mischaracterization of Kant. Specifically, they have ignored a crucial ambiguity 
in political liberalism’s concern with legitimacy. To see how this might happen, note 
that Waldron’s earlier mistake of classifying the Kantian and Rawlsian approach to 
justice under the heading of legitimacy can be remedied if we recognize that 
“legitimacy” is used in different contexts to express quite different properties. 
Although the term always expresses some criterion of adequacy or other, different 
tasks impose different standards of legitimacy and adequacy. The criteria one must 
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 83
 meet to be the legitimate heavyweight champion of the world are different from those 
whose satisfaction makes one a legitimate Boy Scout troop leader, as opposed to a 
Dad who merely teaches whittling after donning drab raiment. Similarly, the 
conditions that a state, as a set of coercive institutions, must satisfy in order 
legitimately to enforce public policies on all—including those who think them unwise 
or unjust—will differ from those that a conception of justice should satisfy before it is 
fully morally licensed for advocacy in the public forum. To mark this distinction, if in 
a somewhat cumbersome manner, let us refer to the former sort of legitimacy as state-
legitimacy, and the latter as advocacy-legitimacy. A set of justifications underlying a 
proposed institutional arrangement might, then, be state-legitimate without being 
advocacy-legitimate, and vice versa. Once we distinguish these two domains of 
political justification, we can agree with commonsense that both the hypothetical 
“could reasonably accept” approach and the developmental stability-informed 
approach are inadequate approaches to state-legitimacy, and yet still ask whether they 
can yield adequate criteria of advocacy-legitimacy.86
 I want now to show that Rawlsian political liberalism contains both a principle 
of state-legitimacy and a principle of advocacy-legitimacy, and in fact that LPL is 
invoked by Rawls, at different points, to play each of these distinct roles. If this is 
correct, then Rawls’s own claim that “legitimacy”, as it is used in political liberalism, 
refers only to state-legitimacy is false.87 It will also not be true that that A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism “are not about the same subject,”88 or that, for Rawls, 
the conditions of legitimacy and the conditions of justice “are, at least in principle, 
independent from each other.”89 For if by legitimacy Rawls sometimes means 
                                                 
86 With this language in hand, we can say that Waldron’s early mistake may have been only that he 
failed to alert the reader to a shift in his subject matter from the former to the latter. Indeed, I think this 
is exactly the right diagnosis of Waldron’s important essay. 
87 See note 74, above. 
88 David Estlund (1996), p. 68. 
89 Harry Brighouse (1998), p. 721. 
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 advocacy-legitimacy, then the conditions of legitimacy so understood will be partially 
constitutive of the conditions of justice: advocacy-legitimacy will have as much to do 
with the subject of justice as the condition of stability did in A Theory of Justice, 
where Rawls spent hundreds of pages trying to show that his theory was fully 
adequate qua conception of justice in part because it was more (developmentally) 
stable than its competitors. 
Many readers do find it natural to view political liberalism as primarily an 
attempt to work out a conception of what I have termed advocacy-legitimacy. As we 
have seen, political liberalism is motivated in the first instance by the fact of 
reasonable pluralism and insists that the proper response to this fact is a sort of 
principled restraint on attempts at political justification—citizens should rely upon 
only that which is acceptable to their common human reason, as LPL enjoins. When 
citizens are guided by “public reason and its principle of legitimacy” (225, 226, 241) 
in the principled search for the most reasonable political conception of justice, they 
must invoke some criterion specifying which principles other citizens “may 
reasonably be expected to endorse.”90
This does not, however, mean that citizens can invoke only that which others 
can be predicted to endorse: 
 
[E]ach of us must have, and be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles 
and guidelines we think other citizens…may reasonably be expected to endorse 
along with us…Of course, we may find that actually others fail to endorse the 
principles and guidelines our criterion selects. That is to be expected…It is 
inevitable and often desirable that citizens have different views as to the most 
appropriate political conception. (226-227) 
 
Given the inevitable disagreement whose existence underlies our prediction 
                                                 
90 Since Rawls never pauses to distinguish public reason’s principle of legitimacy from LPL, the natural 
implication is that it just is LPL, which, after all, was presented as the (sole) liberal principle of 
legitimacy. 
 85
 that many others will in fact reject the principles of justice we offer them in public 
justification, we will need a conception of state-legitimacy to help us adjudicate the 
moral differences that remain even when citizens heed political liberalism’s 
requirements. Rawls therefore offers a political-liberalized version of a familiar 
democratic procedure: when all citizens sincerely offer what they take to be the most 
reasonable political conception of justice, “the legal enactment expressing the opinion 
of the majority is legitimate law.”91
Thus, the normative ideals and constraints imposed by political liberalism and 
embodied in the idea of “public reason and its principle of legitimacy” appear more at 
home in a theory of advocacy-legitimacy than state-legitimacy. The constraints of 
public reason should govern “citizens when they engage in political advocacy in the 
public forum,” and when they “vote in elections” (215). According to Rawls, we can 
“make the case that there are adequate reasons for diverse reasonable people” to 
endorse our specific conception of justice—i.e. make the case that others can 
reasonably be expected to endorse our conception, even if they in fact reject it—when 
we can show that “stability…is at least possible” for our conception. When we do so, 
we show that 
 
there are sufficient [public] reasons for proposing [that conception, and we 
thereby demonstrate that] the conditions for [our] legitimately exercising 
coercive political power over one another…are satisfied…Despite the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, the conditions for democratic legitimacy are fulfilled. 
(390; emphasis added; see also 143f.). 
 
It is absolutely crucial here to note that if what Rawls says elsewhere is right, 
that is, if “political power is always coercive power backed by the government’s use of 
sanctions” (136), then his statements about legitimacy just quoted seem to commit him 
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 after all to the unsavory hypothetical “Kantian approach” to state-legitimacy. For in 
that case the moral standards that morally license the mere proposal of a conception of 
justice are identical to those that legitimate exercises of the state’s coercive political 
power.92
The key to saving Rawls from this unacceptable conclusion lies in his claim 
that citizens exercise “political power over one another…by voting, if in no other 
way” (390). If I exercise political power by my vote, surely I do so in only a very 
qualified sense: my vote helps determine coercively enforced public policy only if 
enough others vote the same way. We should therefore distinguish between state 
political power, which is collectively wielded and always backed by the government’s 
use of coercive sanctions, and what we might call personal political power, which is 
most saliently associated with voting, and which is never itself backed by state 
coercion. This distinction permits the application of distinct moral criteria to the 
evaluation of responsible exercises of the two forms of political power. So while I 
might be licensed by political liberalism to exercise personal political power on the 
basis of a (developmentally) stable conception of justice that no one else in fact 
accepts, the exercise of state political power should never be permitted on such a 
basis.  
This strongly suggests that we should view what Rawls calls “public reason’s 
principle of legitimacy” (225, 226, 241)—the one that sets developmental stability as a 
criterion of legitimacy in the proposal of reasons in the public forum (143f., 390)—as 
a principle of advocacy-legitimacy, potentially independent from and prior to the 
majoritarian conception of state-legitimacy Rawls explicitly says is expressed by LPL. 
                                                 
92 A. John Simmons rejects political liberalism on this basis. See Simmons (1999): “[T]he Rawlsian 
argument that shows a type of state to be justified [as an ideal of justice] also shows all tokens of that 
type to be legitimate[ly enforceable at any time]…[L]egitimacy is now grounded not in what [citizens] 
actually accept or do…but in what it is reasonable to expect them to accept—that is, in their 
hypothetical endorsement.” 
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 It is, after all, a possibility that ideal conceptions of justice rendered advocacy-
legitimate by political liberalism’s strictures sometimes permit or even morally require 
civil or uncivil disobedience to democratically chosen laws when they depart (too 
much) from the demands of justice. One might therefore accept the political liberal 
view of advocacy-legitimacy without accepting the majoritarian conception of state-
legitimacy. (The converse does not hold, however, since political liberalism’s 
conception of state-legitimacy entails that a law is binding on all only if it is the result 
of a majoritarian legislative process whose participants sincerely advocate and vote on 
the basis of what they take to be the most reasonable political conception of justice.93 
So state-legitimacy includes, as a component, the independent theory of advocacy-
legitimacy.) Each theory of legitimacy is offered as a view of the legitimate use of 
political power, and Rawls’s remarks suggest that each is captured by the same liberal 
principle of legitimacy, LPL. But there are really two principles operating here, since 
both “legitimacy” and “political power” have turned out to be significantly 
ambiguous. This suggests that the extension of LPL’s constituent referring phrase, 
“what others may reasonably be expected to endorse,” also changes, depending on 
which sort of political power and legitimacy is at issue. (For example, we may follow 
Rawls [390, 226-7, 143] in holding that we may reasonably expect others to endorse a 
conception justice when we can reasonably insist that there are adequate reasons for 
doing so, and where adequate reasons are ones that would be endorsed in the 
conditions envisioned by the stability test; in contrast, we may wish to say that we can 
reasonably expect others to endorse the coercive enforcement of a law only if we can 
reasonable predict that all ecumenically reasonable citizens will actually endorse the 
general reasons [even if not the specific interpretations thereof] that motivated the 
majority’s decision.)  In light of all this, we should conclude that LPL, which is 
                                                 
93 Cf. note 91, above. 
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 invariably presented by Rawls and his commentators as the liberal principle of 
legitimacy, and whose canonical formulation refers only to state power backed by 
coercive sanctions, is a poor guide to political liberalism’s point and content. 
We can now see why Reidy is wrong to think that his version of the 
chauvinism-or-indeterminacy dilemma sinks LPL. For even if we were to concede that 
Reidy’s arguments force us to reject Rawls’s liberal principle of state-legitimacy, his 
liberal principle of advocacy-legitimacy—which I can now admit is more naturally 
referred to as a liberal principle of political justifiability—remains untouched. Indeed, 
given the centrality to political liberalism of the concepts of stability, overlapping 
consensus, and public reason, and given the role that these ideas play in Rawls’s 
sophisticated conception of liberal justifiability, it is now demonstrably inapt to say 
that “the most important” of political liberalism’s ideas “is Rawls’s liberal principle of 
[state-]legitimacy.”94 Thus, even if it is true that Rawls cannot invoke the 
developmental conception of stability to evade Reidy’s objections to the liberal 
principle of state-legitimacy, this move may still hold some promise in defenses 
against objections, such as Timmons’s and Waldron’s, that really go to the heart of 
Rawls’s political liberalism. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
According to Rawls, political philosophy should begin by noting two 
indisputably important features of modern democratic societies and citizens’ 
relationships within them: first, democratic citizenship is a relationship of persons 
within an institutional context that is generally entered only by birth and exited only 
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 by death; second, coercive state power is “ultimately the power of the public, the 
power of free and equal citizens as a collective body” (135-6). On the basis of this 
picture, political philosophy’s main purpose is to determine the terms of cooperation 
and compliance most appropriate for a group of free and equal persons engaged in a 
project of coercive self-governance. Since this project relies for its feasibility upon the 
enactment of far-reaching coercive policies that profoundly determine the shape of 
citizens’ lives, it generates a distinctive duty to ensure that the cooperation and loyalty 
of one’s compatriots can be adequately secured. Adequate rationales will hold that 
citizens are “self-authenticating sources of valid claims” who “show a lack of self-
respect and weakness of character” (77) when their compliance with political 
arrangements must be underwritten by something other than the sound belief that their 
society’s coercive framework respects the equal importance of all the lives it shapes 
and controls. This idea constitutes a common thread running through both Theory’s 
and Liberalism’s discussions of stability. Given that the free play of human reason 
under the free institutions will lead normal and conscientious citizens to different 
comprehensive worldviews, the distinctive features of the political relationship make 
it unlikely that a rationale for publicly sanctioned coercion is adequate when it is 
endorsable for the right reasons only if one has mastered the complete art of the good 
life (to use Raz’s telling, comprehensive-liberal phrase).95 Just as you would be utterly 
foolish to place your family home on the line in a bet with me that you can go a year 
without breaking a promise for a bad reason, so too does it betray a lack of self-respect 
for you to permit me to shape and control your life on the basis of reasons that could 
win the reasoned loyalty of only moral experts. In each case the costs associated with 
failing to be a moral saint are too grave to take on self-respectfully.96 It is apparently 
                                                 
95 See Raz (1986), p. 397. 
96 Estlund seems to agree that the political virtue associated with this thought largely underwrites 
political liberalism’s point and substance. See his discussion of why responsible citizens will endorse a 
“No Sticklers” conception of political justifiability in Estlund (1998), p. 263. 
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 for this reason that Rawls endorses limits on the sorts of reasons that a reasonable 
person will rely upon to justify her political choices to her compatriots. 
But as we have seen, he is also reluctant at crucial points to hand out 
theoretical vetoes to all (ecumenically) reasonable persons, and this is surely because 
he agrees with Timmons and Estlund that doing so would unduly limit the stock of 
arguments available for use in political justification. (Recall here my response, in 
Chapter 2, to Barry’s claim that controversial political institutions are, by Rawls’s own 
estimation, “Hobbesian.”) I have argued that Rawls’s political liberalism appears to 
possess distinctive resources for avoiding both indeterminacy and chauvinism, and in 
particular that his escape route highlights important strands of his view that are 
virtually never stressed. The political liberal conception of justifiability that has 
emerged, and which we have distinguished from the political liberal conception of 
(state-)legitimacy, seems capable of allowing into political justification values and 
principles that are, currently, quite controversial, and which may remain quite 
controversial for the indefinite future. To the extent that this is so, we have yet to 
encounter a reason to doubt that political liberalism can justify rather controversial and 
demanding egalitarian principles of economic justice. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
THE ROLE OF REASONABLE REJECTION IN SCANLON’S 
CONTRACTUALISM 
 
In the last chapter I attempted to explain how Rawls’s political liberalism 
could avoid the indeterminacy-or-chauvinism dilemma that some have thought fatal to 
any theory of justifiability that privileges argumentative resources that are beyond 
“reasonable rejection.” I argued that Rawls was wise to reject the view that a value or 
principle is justifiable just in case it cannot be reasonably rejected.  Now, many have 
held that political liberalism is basically the political version of T. M. Scanlon’s moral 
contractualism, which holds that valid principles of right and wrong—of “what we 
owe to each other”—are those that could not be reasonably rejected by anyone 
motivated to search for principles that no one could reasonably reject. There is no 
doubt that the two theories are motivated by similar concerns. For example, Scanlon 
seems to hold that there are some true and important moral reasons for objecting to a 
principle that could nonetheless be reasonably rejected by persons with the proper 
motivation, and therefore that while these are “moral reason[s] in the broadest sense,” 
they are irrelevant to the interpersonal morality of right and wrong, and irrelevant 
because reasonable persons can disagree about their truth and importance.97 Indeed, 
Timmons had Scanlon’s view in his sights when he levied the chauvinism charge 
against contractualist theories of justifiability, arguing that in order for a specific 
moral theory to meet the “no reasonable rejection” criterion, reasonableness must be 
defined in terms of that moral theory’s controversial claims.98
In this chapter I offer a brief account of the role of “reasonable rejection” in 
                                                 
97 See Scanlon (1998), p. 220ff.  
98 See Timmons (2003), esp. pp. 400-407. 
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 Scanlon’s contractualism. I have two main reasons for taking on this task in a 
dissertation more centrally concerned with Rawls’s view. First, I believe that these 
details of Scanlon’s view are not well understood. Indeed, like Rawls’s, Scanlon’s 
view appears to have internal tensions that may be seen by some as a good basis for 
rejecting the whole idea of contractualist theorizing. Second, some of those who have 
interpreted political liberalism as the political arm of Scanlonian contractualism 
believe that Scanlon’s conception of moral justifiability is precisely what Rawls needs 
in order adequately to ground his political liberalism. Yet if Scanlon’s view remains 
open to Timmons’s objections, this claim will have to be abandoned. I hope to show, 
first, that there two ways in which Scanlon can evade Timmons’s objections. The first 
way, while initially quite plausible, must, I think, be rejected. The second is fully 
successful, although it requires giving the notion of reasonableness a much lower 
profile in Scanlon’s theory than he and others seem willing to accept. Nevertheless, 
this second move would require very few changes to Scanlon’s view, and it would 
probably be viewed by most of his detractors as a marked improvement.  But the 
“reasonable rejectibility” requirement that emerges cannot be used to bolster the case 
for political liberalism, since that test imposes no substantive demands on a candidate 
theory; it cannot be said that political liberalism meets those demands better than any 
competitor. If Rawls’s political liberalism is more plausible than other theories of 
political justifiability, it is not because it passes some distinctively robust test of 
Reasonable Rejection that Scanlon’s theory helps to vindicate. Like any other outlook, 
including Scanlon’s, political liberalism stands or falls on the basis of its own ground-
level merits, merits that must be identifiable without reliance on a vague and disputed 
notion of reasonableness. 
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 I. Scanlon’s Escape Route: First Try 
  
Scanlon’s contractualist maxim holds that  
 
an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that 
no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general 
agreement.99
 
In response to this formulation, Timmons argued that if the parties to this 
agreement are held to exhibit “thin” or non-constitutive reasonableness (which permits 
reasonable rejection of the correct moral theory), then the upshot of the imagined 
agreement will not be a sufficiently determinate moral theory, but a limited set of 
“vague and indeterminate moral principles” that are inadequate guides to responsible 
conduct. However, if the parties are held to exhibit “thick” or constitutive-
reasonableness (which requires endorsement of the correct moral theory), then the 
view is objectionably chauvinistic.100 In his published reply to Timmons’s objections, 
Scanlon stressed that the notion of (hypothetical) agreement is not basic to his view, 
since claims about what people do or would agree to are not normative claims. 
Instead, contractualism is concerned first and foremost with the “straightforwardly 
normative” question of what people could reasonably reject, regardless of whether 
they in fact do so.101 Scanlon admits that a view of this sort, which clearly relies upon 
substantive moral premises, gives rise to important objections. Surprisingly, neither of 
the objections he considers is centrally concerned with the charge chauvinism. Yet 
surely this charge is even more pertinent to a “substantive” theory of reasonableness 
than it is to one whose use of reasonableness is but one part of a larger argument from 
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 hypothetical agreement. Scanlon cannot escape answering worries about his central 
concept simply by recasting the way his theory is concerned with agreement. 
Scanlon’s failure even to address the objection is likely to contribute to the 
impression that it cannot be met. Still, there is an often overlooked feature of his view 
that he could have invoked by way of rebuttal. In Scanlon’s first statement of the 
contractualist approach to morality, the objects of reasonable or unreasonable rejection 
were presented as “rules for the general regulation of behavior.”102 That first 
discussion was very abstract and only a few candidate rules were discussed. These 
included the duty of fidelity to agreements (keeping one’s promises), the duty of 
mutual aid, the duty to avoid killing for the pleasure of doing so, and Rawls’s two 
principles of justice.103 So on that first presentation, if quite determinate and 
controversial principles of justice and morality (such as Rawls’s two principles) are 
not ruled out from the start, then the theory seems compelled to employ a strong, 
constitutive notion of reasonableness. Otherwise, no determinate principle would 
satisfy the “no reasonable rejection” test, since it could be rejected by someone 
exhibiting the weaker, non-constitutive form of reasonableness. 
Scanlon’s later, more comprehensive presentation avoids this chauvinistic 
implication by making what he calls moral principles, rather than determinate rules of 
interpersonal conduct, the proper objects of reasonable rejection. This is more than a 
rhetorical shift. According to the later view, moral principles “are general conclusions 
about the status of various kinds of reasons for action;” they are not determinate rules 
for action in this or that specific set of circumstances. So while true principles “may 
rule out some actions by ruling out the [sorts of] reasons on which they would be 
based…they also leave wide room for interpretation and judgment.”104  
                                                 
102 See Scanlon (1982), p. 189. 
103 See Ibid., pp. 191, 197, 125f.  
104 Scanlon (1998), pp. 198-199; see also p. 246, 211. 
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 This development opens up a gap between the conditions of reasonableness—
viz. recognizing the validity of this or that kind of reason for general moral 
argument—and the conditions for being a reliable detector of all truths about “what we 
owe to each other”. For example, I would not be reasonable if I thought that trivial 
inconveniences generate reasons in favor of breaking a promise, but I can accept this 
without possessing fully reliable capacities for interpreting and weighing all the 
various reasons that are admitted into moral argument by principles (in Scanlon’s 
technical sense) that cannot be reasonably rejected. 
This is precisely the sort of gap between reasonableness and moral perfection 
that Scanlon needs to avoid the charge of chauvinism. It allows him to constrain 
arguments for rules of right and wrong using a modest, “ordinary language”105 notion 
of reasonableness which, even if somewhat controversial, is far more likely usefully to 
figure into interpersonal moral deliberations than is a chauvinistically parochial 
notion. 
Even though this development in Scanlon’s view saves him from Timmons’s 
objection, he still sometimes flirts with the old, problematic formulation. For example, 
the canonical statement of his contractualist maxim refers to “principles for the 
general regulation of behavior,” and this can give the impression that a principle is a 
specific rule of conduct, rather than a general conclusion about the status of a certain 
kind of reason.106 Furthermore, Scanlon at one point writes that a 
 
claim about what it is reasonable for a person to do presupposes 
a…certain range of reasons which are taken to be relevant, and then 
goes on to make a claim about what these reasons, properly 
                                                 
105 Ibid., 192. 
106 See ibid., pp. 4 and 153; emphasis added. See also p. 195, which refers to “principles governing how 
one may act in [certain] situations.” In formulating his political version of Scanlonian contractualism, 
Thomas Nagel also seems to employ the more fine-grained understanding of the objects of reasonable 
rejection when he speaks of “rules” permitting or forbidding specific “course[s] of action.” See Nagel 
(1991), p. 37ff.  
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 understood, in fact support.107
 
If I have been on the right track, Scanlon should hold that claims about what 
reasonableness requires do not extend beyond the question of which types or ranges of 
reasons are relevant to the interpersonal morality of right and wrong, whereas more 
comprehensive and determinate claims about what these relevant reasons “properly 
understood, in fact support” are claims about what is required by the true theory of 
right and wrong. Given that he failed to address Timmons’s objection, and given that 
he flirts with the old way of putting things, I am not sure that Scanlon fully appreciates 
how important the later introduction of the category of principles is. But there do seem 
to be resources for avoiding the charge of chauvinism are nonetheless, and it may be 
that no moral contractualist can afford to ignore them. 
 
II. Scanlon’s Escape Route: Second Try 
 
In the end, I do not think this route out of Timmons’s dilemma can succeed. If 
principles are general conclusions about the admissibility of certain kinds of reasons 
into moral argument, then it is surely illicit, when judging the validity of a principle, to 
rely on the sorts of reasons whose admissibility is in question. Consider one of 
Scanlon’s own examples: 
 
Consider, for example, moral principles concerning the taking of 
human life. It might seem that this is a simple rule, forbidding a certain 
class of actions…But what about self-defense, suicide, and certain acts 
of killing by police officers and by soldiers in wartime? And is 
euthanasia always strictly forbidden? The parts of this principle that are 
the clearest are better put in terms of reasons: the fact that a course of 
action can be foreseen to lead to someone’s death is normally a 
                                                 
107 Scanlon (1998), p. 192; emphasis added. 
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 conclusive reason against it…but one may use deadly force when this 
seems the only defense against a person who threatens one’s life; and 
so on…So even the most familiar moral principles are not rules which 
can be easily applied without appeals to judgment. Their succinct 
verbal formulations turn out on closer examination to be mere labels 
for much more complex ideas.108  
 
Here Scanlon argues that a principle (or unified set of principles) concerning 
the taking of human life is actually a set of “complex ideas.” But he also makes it clear 
that the kinds of ideas and reasons that are naturally relied upon to judge the 
reasonableness of a principle (or set of principles) are precisely the kinds of reasons 
whose very admissibility into moral argument must await the prior determination of 
that principle’s reasonableness. In response Scanlon may wish to invoke the “holism 
about moral justification” that he claims his contractualism incorporates: “in assessing 
one principle we must hold many others fixed. This does not mean that these other 
principles are beyond question, but just that they are not being questioned at the 
moment.”109 But it is clear from Scanlon’s own discussion that at least some, if not 
most, of the reasons bearing on a principle’s reasonableness just are the reasons whose 
admissibility is in question. We therefore clearly cannot hold these reasons fixed while 
we assess their admissibility. 
 So this route out of Timmons’s dilemma fails. Even if we could allay our 
worries about the use of a chauvinistic conception of reasonableness by articulating a 
substantive yet ecumenical notion, it is no longer clear how such a notion could be 
employed to fill so fundamental a role in a theory to warrant the judgment that 
contractualism is distinctive precisely because it plays this role. These worries about 
reasonableness echo the objections marshaled by those who charge Scanlon’s theory 
with redundancy. The objection goes like this: when we ask whether a principle or rule 
                                                 
108 Scanlon (1998), p. 199 
109 Ibid., p. 214. 
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 or whatever is reasonably rejectible, we must look for reasons that seem sufficient to 
reject or accept that principle. But when we have found such reasons, and have 
determined that a principle is either acceptable or not, the justifiability of acceptable 
principles seems wholly determined by the strengths of these underlying reasons for 
rejection or acceptance. The fact that a principle is reasonably rejectible does no work 
in determining the validity of principles, for when we have said that a principle is 
ruled invalid by the underlying reasons we have said all that needs saying. Moral 
wrongness, then, is to be identified with being ruled out by any system of principles 
for the general regulation of behavior that is best supported by valid reasons. Since 
valid reasons must exist prior to any conclusion about any principle’s acceptability or 
unacceptability, they determine all facts about wrongness. There is, then, nothing left 
for the idea of reasonable rejection to do. This redundancy objection appears all the 
more fatal in light of problems encountered by the first route out of Timmons’s 
dilemma I have sketched Scanlon’s behalf. 
 
III. The Purely Formal Notion of Reasonableness  
 
Earlier I said that Scanlon view risked being chauvinistic insofar as it holds 
that a judgment about reasonableness is a judgment about what a set of relevant 
reasons “properly understood, in fact support.” The second, and I think, successful 
route out of  Timmons’s dilemma depends on being able to resist this conclusion. As 
we have seen, the first route problematically relied upon the idea of reasonableness to 
determine the makeup of the set of reasons admissible into moral argument. Viewed in 
light of the considerable force of the redundancy objection, the problems with the first 
route strongly suggest that the set of relevant reasons must be determined at a stage of 
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 moral reasoning prior to the stage in which reasonableness plays its role. But once 
reasons are admitted as relevant, it would appear that the only remaining stage of 
moral reasoning is the stage at which we work out what those reasons, properly 
understood, in fact support. This in turn suggests that in Scanlon’s contractualism, the 
idea of being beyond reasonable rejection is the purely formal idea of being beyond 
successful objection. On this interpretation, if there is anything distinctive about 
Scanlon’s contractualism, it is not the use to which it puts a substantive notion of 
reasonableness (whether ecumenical or chauvinistic), but rather the nature of the 
reasons that are presupposed when, at the second level of moral theorizing, we ask 
what those reasons, properly understood, in fact support. 
 In an article published after What We Owe to Each Other in which Scanlon 
seeks to clarify the idea of reasonableness he employs in the book, he reiterates that 
“A claim about what it is reasonable to do, or believe, presupposes a certain 
contextually specified body of information and a certain range of reasons, and makes a 
claim about these considerations taken together in fact support.”110 In conformity with 
my objections to the first route laid out above, Scanlon then stresses that it is not the 
idea of reasonableness that determines the range of relevant reasons. Rather, this role 
is filled by the “motivational condition” of wanting to find principles that are mutually 
justifiable to all moral agents. This is the “normative basis” of the view, and its nature 
and appeal is reflected in a normal person’s recognition that “Human beings are 
capable of assessing reasons and justifications, and proper respect for their distinctive 
value involves treating them only in way that they could, by proper exercise of this 
capacity, recognize as justifiable.”111 This recognition alone is not, however, sufficient 
to underwrite a distinctively contractualist outlook. For a contractualist can admit that 
                                                 
110Scanlon (2002), p. 519. 
111 Scanlon (1998), p. 169. 
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 persons’ distinctive value cannot be wholly separated from the capacity that, if 
properly exercised, would give them insight into all of morality (including morality in 
the broad sense). Thus, in order to carve out an important contractualist niche within 
morality broadly construed, Scanlon supplements his rationale by stressing the great 
“positive value of a way of living with others,” of avoiding “estrangement” from 
them.112 In claiming that there is a sphere of interpersonal morality whose terms stop 
short of invoking the special values revealed by suitable insight into broad morality, 
Scanlon seems to be suggesting that what we owe to each other is in part determined 
by what we can expect from each other. Since we cannot expect everyone to be fully 
insightful with respect to morality broadly construed, and since there is great appeal in 
the positive value of living “in unity with our fellow creatures” (as Mill put it), we 
have strong reason to tailor our moral categories in ways that can be widely shared.113 
Articulating and fulfilling this aim with adequate specificity is, to be sure, no easy 
task. But it is the central task of What We Owe To Each Other, the one associated with 
specifying an authoritative “ideal of justifiability to others” that cannot be reduced to 
the ideal of discovering all valid moral reasons, contractualist or not. 
 If this story is right, Scanlon’s contractualism begins by identifying certain 
very important substantive values, and then seeks to work out what those and other, 
supplementary values, properly understood, in fact support. His view is that when the 
value of persons as rational beings is set alongside the positive value of living in unity 
with them, we arrive at a picture of interpersonal justifiability on which it is okay to 
disregard the special importance of some moral values since insistence upon them 
would place undue strains on that unity.  But on this picture of Scanlon’s project, 
neither the determination of initially relevant reasons nor the route to ultimate 
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 principles or maxims is influenced by a substantive notion of reasonableness. 
Contractualism is distinctive, if it is, because of its distinctive understanding of the 
values it sees as specially important for moral thinking and because of its distinctive 
account of how those values interact with other values to reveal the distinctive 
importance of certain moral categories. If reasons are ever ruled out of moral 
argument, it is because their inclusion is ruled out by the values argued to be central to 
moral thinking. For example, the “positive value of [the] way of living with others” 
recommended by Scanlon’s contractualism rules out, he thinks, insistence in 
interpersonal moral deliberations on the special value of genuine friendship,114 
parental love,115 or nature.116 It is not that friendship, parenthood, or nature cannot be 
recommended as goods within contractualism; it is just these values cannot alone 
underwrite contractualist obligations: they do so only by being among those things 
that contractualist moral agents are in fact (likely to be) concerned with. Whatever the 
merits of this view (and I take no stand on that important issue here), the important 
point is that these special values are not ruled as direct bases of obligation because 
they do not meet a fundamental, ground-level standard of reasonableness. They are 
ruled out because ruling them out is what the fundamental contractualist values, 
especially those of personhood and interpersonal unity, properly understood, in fact 
support. 
In the end, the redundancy objection is, strictly speaking, wrong. In what 
emerges as Scanlon’s considered view, a principle’s or rule’s being reasonably 
rejectible is as fundamental to moral thinking as its failing to be supported by all 
relevant reasons. This is because these two properties are identical. Since the 
proponent of the redundancy objection doesn’t think that being supported by relevant 
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 reasons is a morally redundant property, she should not think this about being 
reasonably rejectible, either. 
 
IV. Non-Formal Reasonableness and “Upward” Contractualism 
  Some remarks of Scanlon’s suggest one other way out of Timmons’ dilemma.  
Scanlon distinguishes between two directions a contractualist argument might take. A 
“downward” argument proceeds first by ensuring that “the notion of reasonableness 
[is] sufficiently well defined to enable us to reach a decision about whether a given 
principle could or could not be reasonably rejected simply by reasoning in a purely 
technical way.”117 This would correspond with what I have been calling chauvinism. 
Scanlon admits that this is not the direction his contractualist arguments take. Instead, 
he has employed what he calls the “upward” form of argument. Arguments proceed 
upward when they rely upon intuitive judgments about which principles can be 
reasonably rejected in certain clear cases and then proceed “to inquire how the 
grounds for this rejection should be best understood.”118 It is clear that Scanlon prefers 
upward arguments not because they can avoid chauvinism—he doesn’t consider this 
issue—but because he does not think it possible to specify the conception of 
reasonableness required for downward arguments without the reliance on the very sort 
of intuitive judgments about local cases that is the hallmark of upward arguments. He 
cites Rawls’s argument from the original position to make his case. While some might 
view the original position as a technical procedure from which principles of justice are 
to be derived without reliance on our intuitions, this picture is “made possible by 
building into the design of the Original Position features that themselves reflect 
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 substantive judgments about the subject to which it is addressed.”119
 Can Scanlon evade the charge of chauvinism by opting for upward arguments 
instead of downward ones? It is true that upward arguments do not start with a 
controversial substantive conception of reasonableness, and they are, I think, 
preferable to downward arguments for this reason. But in drawing the contrast 
between downward and upward arguments by noting the one view does not, while the 
other does, “appeal[] to intuitions about reasonableness,” Scanlon confirms that one 
aim of upward arguments is to make progress toward a substantive theory of 
reasonableness of significant importance to moral theory.120 And it is the very idea of 
such a conception of reasonableness that triggers the problems we began with. Why 
think there is any such value from which so many diverse moral conclusions can be 
derived? And even if this value did exist, why call it reasonableness which, again, 
evokes not the idea of the full content of a moral theory, but a baseline of moral 
competence? 
 Since the substantive foundations underlying Scanlon’s view can be described 
without referring to reasonableness at all; since there are good reasons not to take the 
point of contractualist moral theory as that of uncovering the content of a complex 
substantive conception of reasonableness; and since virtually all of Scanlon’s 
theoretical moves can usefully be described as seeking to uncover the substantive 
moral theory best supported by the reasons made relevant by the “greatly 
important”121 values of personhood and interpersonal moral unity (the “normative 
basis), I conclude that Scanlon has nothing to lose, and at least something to gain, in 
refusing to present his arguments as upward moves toward a better understanding of 
reasonableness. 
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120 Ibid., p. 242. 
121 Ibid., p. 166. 
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V Conclusion 
 
There is no doubt that there would be some sloganeering-related costs if 
Scanlon were to accept the amendments to his contractualism that I’ve defended in 
this chapter. Scanlon’s two-decade-plus branding campaign has led to the view that his 
contractualism is distinctive precisely because of the role it gives to the substantive 
notion of reasonableness (whether that be as a baseline from which downward 
arguments are made, or as a telos at which upward arguments aim). I have argued that 
if Scanlon’s contractualism is a distinctive moral theory, this is due to an underlying 
conception of morally relevant values and their ultimate significance, a conception 
that can be described and reasoned about without postulating a substantive notion of 
reasonableness. It will come as no surprise that I see this as a salutary exegetic 
development. Its acceptance may require a hardly achievable shift in the way we think 
about contractualism; but in light of the problems, noted in this and the previous 
chapter, associated with moral and political theories that centrally incorporate a 
substantive notion reasonableness, working to effect this shift will be worth the effort. 
 In any case, I hope to have shown that Rawlsian political liberalism should not 
look to a Scanlonian theory of reasonableness for a model of how to construct a non-
comprehensive conception of political morality. If there are reasons to refrain from 
invoking one’s full moral view in politics, we cannot expect others to see this by 
leading them through an exploration of the logic of reasonableness, contrary to what 
many who are sympathetic to political liberalism seem to think.122 Rather, we will 
                                                 
122 See, e.g., Mandel (1999). 
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 have to explore the values we believe to be fundamental to political morality, and try 
to show that these values themselves, properly understood, impose limits on what can 
be justified to others. Although the last three chapters have left the door open for an 
affirmative answer, we must now confront directly the question of whether a fully 
articulated political liberalism will rule out the sorts of reasons that could justify 
egalitarian principles of economic justice. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
TOWARD AN ORTHODOX POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
 
I. The Reconciliation of Perfectionism and Political Liberalism 
 
Even though they did not direct their objections toward the developmental 
interpretation of political liberalism that I have reconstructed on Rawls’s behalf, many 
critics of political liberalism have offered general objections to the idea of a “purely 
political” or morally truncated conception of political justifiability. They find it 
puzzling to think that we ought to prescind from relying on what we take to be sound 
moral ideas when defending a conception of justice whose institutions will control our 
lives and determine our prospects for living good ones. Some charged Rawls with 
expressing an unprincipled asymmetry in his attitudes to ideas of goodness and ideas 
of rightness or justice.123 They said Rawls wrongly thought that ideas of justice were 
objective in ways that conceptions of the good life could not be, and that this is why 
he went on to defend a determinate and controversial theory of justice while at the 
same time insisting that there exists a reasonable pluralism of “conceptions of the 
good.”124  
 The charge that political liberalism is hypocritical in its defense of asymmetry 
is, however, unfounded. It is unfounded because no asymmetry is assumed. Although 
the early attempts to set out political liberalism made reference to a reasonable 
pluralism of “conceptions of the good,” once we get to Political Liberalism, the salient 
fact is that there is a reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines (see PL, xviff., 
                                                 
123 This charge is central to Joseph Chan’s argument in Chan (2000); to George Sher’s argument in Sher 
(1997); and to Richard Arneson’s argument in Arneson (2003). 
124 See Rawls (2001b), 425. 
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 4, 36f.), where a “doctrine” is any sort of comprehensive view, not just a view about 
the good.125 So comprehensive doctrines of rightness are also ruled out by Rawls’s 
conception of justifiability, which requires theories of justice to rely upon only 
“political ideas,” or ideas that could play a role in a reasonable political conception of 
justice. But this also means that political ideas of the good are ruled in. Indeed, Rawls 
admits that when it comes to the right and the good “no conception of justice can draw 
entirely upon one or the other, but must combine both in a definite way…A political 
conception of justice must contain within itself sufficient space, as it were, for such 
ways of life [i.e. ways of life fully worthy of citizens’ devoted allegiance]” (173-174). 
This motivates a change in the old theory (found in A Theory of Justice) that 
commentators on the new, political liberal theory often overlook: the priority of the 
right over the good now “means (in its general meaning) that the ideas of the good 
used must be political ideas” (209).126
 I take it, then, that a developmental stability-centered political liberalism can 
embrace what Joseph Raz, Joseph Chan and others assert as the “natural view”: that 
states should promote and protect valuable conceptions of the good life for humans. 
This “perfectionist” thesis seems natural and obvious. States exist to serve the interests 
of their citizens. Among citizens’ interests are their interests in leading a good life, as 
opposed to a life they merely find good. As Chan puts it, the natural view is that “the 
state should assist citizens by promoting valuable conceptions of the good life, just as 
it should assist the lives of citizens by promoting the economy, offering education and 
health services, and protecting rights and justice.”127 I hope the argument to this point 
                                                 
125 Rawls (2001b), p. 573. 
126 The “particular” meaning is the one familiar from A Theory of Justice, “that the principles of justice 
set limits to permissible ways of life: the claims that citizens make to pursue ends transgressing those 
limits have no weight” Rawls (1999a), p. 209. Yet there is now no hint of the earlier suggestion that the 
particularized requirement of the priority of right entails that principles of justice must be “arrived at 
independently” from essentially indeterminate considerations of goodness (Ibid.), pp. 394-395. 
127 Chan (2000), p. 6. 
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 makes it at least plausible to think that a political liberal, of at least the developmental 
stripe, can agree. For she is likely to think that citizens are justified in controlling and 
shaping each other’s lives only if they show adequate concern for others’ interests, and 
this surely should include their interests in living good lives. This concern need not, 
however, shake her belief in the naturalness of what she takes to be a complementary, 
rather than competing, idea: that political morality nevertheless differs in nature and 
scope from private morality. As we have seen, the hypothesis that motivates this latter 
idea posits that some normative truths—including many of those belonging to what 
Raz called “the complete art of the good life”128—lack the compellingness to normal, 
conscientiously employed human reason required to ensure that widespread loyalty 
may be underwritten by cogent conviction, not just hazy agreement or reluctant 
acquiescence. The political liberal believes that theories of justice are rationales for 
licensing and directing citizens’ pervasive and profound control of each other’s lives, 
and she believes that responsible exercises of that control will avoid dependence on 
rationales endorsable for the right reasons by others only if they are artists of the good 
life.129
 
                                                 
128 Raz (1986), p. 397. 
129 The possibility of a perfectionist political liberalism becomes all the more tantalizing in light of two 
instances in the literature in which hypothetical developmental considerations are invoked to help 
legitimate a current reliance upon currently controversial perfectionist ideals in political justification: 
see Timothy Hinton (2001b), and David McCabe (2000). In responding (p. 86) to the objection that a 
guaranteed basic income might lead “people who are unwilling to work…to take [unfair] advantage of 
the social minimum,” Hinton replies that “we need to be leery about using the economic choices and 
decision people make here and now to predict the conduct of people under conditions of 
equality…[T]he prevailing ethos of such a society will, I imagine, emphasize other-regarding motives 
for labor over the self-regarding motives that are currently predominant.” (For a statement of Hinton’s 
perfectionist sympathies, see his (2001a).) Invoking similar developmental considerations, McCabe 
seeks to rebut political liberalism’s standard antiperfectionist line by noting that perfectionists “may 
well see the inability of some citizens to identify important human goods more as a product of 
antiperfectionism than as a reason in its favor—as the predictable result of living in a political 
association hostile to the collective efforts needed to cultivate the capacities necessary for making 
sound judgment” (p. 337). 
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 II. Problems for the Reconciliation 
 
 There are, however, significant problems with this proposed reconciliation of 
political liberalism with perfectionism. Two problems in particular are worth 
discussing here. The first concerns the internal coherence of Rawls’s theory. The 
second concerns the cogency of the only coherent conception of justifiability that 
presents itself as largely consistent with perfectionism. 
 
First Problem: Internal Coherence 
 
Few commentators on Rawls’s political liberalism took the time to discuss the 
details of and role played by the developmental conception of stability. And indeed no 
one, so far as I know, challenged the coherence of the conception of liberal 
justifiability that emerges when that strand is given the emphasis that it is given in 
Political Liberalism. Among the few to underscore the developmental character of the 
stability test is Scanlon himself, who sees that “there is a question of how Rawls 
derives a norm of political conduct”—i.e. the requirement to rely on only currently 
accepted ideas—“from a claim about how democratic institutions could, ideally, be 
stable in the right way.” Yet Scanlon does not critically question the derivation. 
Instead, he argues that the idea of public reason requires questions of constitutional 
essentials and basic justice to be settled by appeal to currently shared political values 
that everyone seeking fair terms of social cooperation and willing to recognize the 
burdens of judgment can endorse. He says that such reasonable persons will restrict 
themselves to shared political values in public justification because “justifications that 
appeal to [values not found in the public political culture] will be ones that some 
citizens…have no reason to accept.” Such justifications will be “reasonably resented” 
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 by many reasonable others who do not share the values on which they are based; 
proposing them in the political forum “will therefore not only be destabilizing [with 
respect to current arrangements] but also fail to show proper respect for these citizens, 
who are owed reasons that they could reasonably accept.”130 Even if Scanlon is right 
that currently unpopular justifications will be reasonably resented by our fellow 
citizens, his reconstruction places emphasis only on current destabilization and 
therefore does not explain Rawls’s persistent reliance on the developmental criterion 
of stability. Scanlon’s account seems ill-equipped to reconcile the “populist” 
conception of public reason with Rawls’s own claim that, as an ideal of democratic 
citizenship, the moral duty stemming from public reason “presents how things might 
be, taking people as a just and well-ordered society would encourage them to be. It 
describes what is possible and can be, yet may never be, though no less fundamental 
for that” (213; emphasis added).131
Scanlon is, of course, correct that the one constant running through Rawls’s 
later work is the intuitive idea that the fact of reasonable disagreement has some 
important bearing on the acceptability of a conception of justice. Conscientious and 
informed disagreement somehow sets limits to the sorts of considerations that are fully 
justifiable to our fellow citizens and therefore licensed for advocacy in the public 
sphere. As Rawls and others have stressed, the idea that there have to be some such 
limits is strongly supported by what we believe to be a secure component of political 
morality: the separation of church and state. Extending the intuitions highlighted by 
the case of state neutrality on religion, Rawls, in his populist moods, sought to 
articulate a purely political liberalism that no more needs to rely on highly 
controversial value judgments than it does on highly controversial outlooks on 
                                                 
130 See Scanlon (2003c), p. 161. 
131 The label “populist” comes Gerald Gaus who objects that Rawls’s “populist theory of public 
reason[]…can generate arguments that are widely accepted but are not justificatory.” See Gaus (1996), 
pp. 135-136. 
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 religion. 
If Rawls’s attempt to extend these intuitions is any indication, the prospects of 
political liberalism are dim. We glimpsed the disarray his theory is led into in Chapter 
3, in the discussion of the dual readings of Rawls’s Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, as 
well as Rawls’s dual concerns with, first, democratic legitimacy here and now, and 
second with the long-term political prospects a conception of justice would have in a 
society it itself regulates. But nowhere are the internal tensions of political liberal 
theory of concern to Rawls more glaring than in the early pages of Justice as Fairness: 
A Restatement. Here Rawls sets out four roles for political philosophy, roles he claims 
his conception of justice is designed to fill. First, there is the  “practical role arising 
from divisive political conflict and the need to settle the problem of order.”132 Political 
philosophy’s job here is to help reasonable citizens of goodwill find a way to settle 
their actual differences amicably so that social cooperation can continue on a footing 
of mutual respect. Next, there is the role of helping us understand the import and 
relevance of our personal aims and preferences for a conception of justice, which must 
also be guided by social aims that cannot be reduced to the aims of any one person or 
set of individuals.133 Third, political philosophy should help us achieve a sort of 
reconciliation with our political situation as it actually is. For example, if we live in a 
democratic society whose laws are legitimately enacted and enforced but still less than 
perfectly just, political philosophy can help us view this as itself a remarkable 
collective achievement worthy of positive affirmation rather than despondent 
resignation.134 Finally, political philosophy should also be “realistically utopian” 
insofar as it “prob[es] the limits of practicable political possibility” while recognizing 
that “there is a question about how the limits of the practicable are discerned and what 
                                                 
132 Rawls (2001a), p. 1. 
133 Ibid., p. 2-3. 
134 Ibid., p. 3. 
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 the conditions of our social world in fact are; the problem here is that the limits of the 
possible are not given by the actual, for we can to a greater or lesser extent change 
political and social institutions, and much else.”135
 It is clear that in filling each role political philosophy is seen as responding, in 
a distinct way, to the fact of reasonable pluralism. Given reasonable disagreements 
here and now, we need to find a way to get along, to cooperate in ways we can all see 
makes our lives better (first role). In determining which personal and collective aims 
are relevant to a widely justifiable conception of justice, we must take care not to 
invoke sectarian aims that are recognized by only a few reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines (second role). Given the distance of our actual laws from perfect political 
justice, we should remind ourselves of the special achievement of an enduring, 
pluralistic democratic society whose members recognize the laws as legitimately 
binding even while they continue to advocate for their preferred conceptions of justice 
in a public sphere where principled persuasion is viewed as the proper mechanism for 
winning others over to one’s side (third role). And finally, since a political conception 
is a normative creature that offers practical guidance for those who are sensitive to the 
limits of human nature and the social world, we must recognize that the limits of the 
practicably possible “are not given by the actual,” and therefore that the criterion of 
adequacy for a realistically utopian conception of justice is not whether it could 
organize a society here and now, but rather whether it “may be supported by an 
enduring overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines, given good fortune and 
enough time to gain allegiance to itself”136—that is, whether “those who grow up 
under just basic institutions—institutions that [the candidate conception of justice] 
itself enjoins—acquire a reasoned and informed allegiance to those institutions 
                                                 
135 Ibid., p. 5. 
136 Ibid., p. 37; emphasis added. 
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 sufficient to render them stable”(forth role).137 By showing how it can fill each of 
these roles, one shows that a conception of justice is “acceptable to all reasonable 
persons”, and that the fact of reasonable pluralism can be responded to adequately. 
 Rawls clearly hopes that justice as fairness can fill all four roles at the same 
time. But it is extremely difficult to see how he could draw this conclusion. Isn’t it 
plausible, for example, to think that the argumentative resources licensed for use by 
the first, accommodative role of political philosophy will diverge from the 
argumentative resources licensed by the role of describing the basic structural features 
of a realistic utopia? Even Rawls seems to see that the answer is yes, for he sees that 
some reasonable comprehensive doctrines that exist now, and whose accommodation 
by us may be required to sustain social cooperation and political order, may not exist 
after justice as fairness has been implemented as a modus vivendi “over 
generations”—for justice as fairness may then have the good fortune to “slowly over 
time…shape[] comprehensive views to cohere with it” (193). And I have already, in 
Chapter 3, pointed to the unexplained and surely fallacious derivation of the demand 
that a political conception of justice be formulated in terms of ideas found implicit in 
our public culture here and now from what Rawls apparently regards as the more 
basic demand that a political conception satisfy the developmental criterion of 
stability. Here, a demand most plausibly imposed only by political philosophy’s first 
role is presented as derived from a standard that can be imposed only by its fourth. 
 Yet despite all of this, Rawls and his followers have found it natural to seek 
out the public basis of justification that alone constitutes the most reasonable response 
to the fact of reasonable pluralism, the way to show that a political conception of 
justice is acceptable to all reasonable persons.138 What they have missed is that in 
                                                 
137 Ibid., p. 185. 
138 For a recent Rawlsian treatment of these issues that seeks to draw on Rawls’s texts but which does 
not mention the tensions I’ve outlined here and in Chapter 3, see Freeman (2007). 
 114
 seeking to do justice to the several criteria of justifiability they emphasize, the middle 
way they have sought between emphasis on current political disagreements and 
realities and emphasis on the full and comprehensive demands of the art of the good 
life has turned treacherous. One is inclined to conclude that if Rawls failed so 
miserably—indeed if he failed even to see the glaring conflicts in his own view—then 
political liberalism must be a dead end. 
 Of course, we mustn’t draw this conclusion too quickly. Perhaps we can 
salvage both political liberalism and its reconciliation with perfectionism by 
developing one of the strands in Rawls’s political liberalism, while casting other 
conflicting strands aside. It is clear which strand must be retained if the reconciliation 
is to remain intact. Unfortunately, no true conception of justice can put so much 
weight on this strand, as I shall now show. 
 
Second Problem: Stability 
 
The time has come to admit that there are significant problems with the 
developmental notion of stability and its usefulness for liberal political theory. For it 
seems even more disrespectful to say to one’s fellow citizens “Don’t worry, you and 
yours will accept my preferred conception of justice after my coercive and inescapable 
laws have had their developmental affect on you over generations” than it does to say 
that they’d endorse it if they were moral experts. So the fear is that Rawls’s political 
liberalism can avoid the chauvinistic conception of reasonableness without accepting 
indeterminacy only if he employs an equally disrespectful—because manipulative—
developmental conception of liberal justifiability. 
I’m not sure which is more surprising: that so few critics highlighted Rawls’s 
developmental criterion and then criticized it as manipulative, or that the potentially 
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 manipulative developmental theme can be found in so many prominent conceptions of 
liberalism. Consider, for example, Rousseau’s theory of the social contract. Rousseau 
believed that as a corporate political body, the citizenry of a democracy, which has 
come together for a specific purpose, possesses a “general will [which] is always right 
and always tends toward the public utility.” Yet he also believed that the directives of 
that will are often not easily discerned by the individual members of society: “The 
public wills the good that it does not see…[and] must learn to know what it wants.”139 
The problem is that citizens will endorse and heed the requirements of the general will 
only if they have a commitment to the common good; but they will have a 
commitment to the common good only after just and well-ordered institutions have 
had their formative effects on them.140 This means that the existence of just citizens 
depends on the prior existence of just institutions; but the converse is also true, since 
just institutions will not be able to exert developmental influence unless they are stable 
and enduring, which in turn requires that a sizable segment of the citizenry is already 
strongly committed to upholding them. Rousseau’s solution to this problem lies in a 
figure he called the legislator or lawgiver. The legislator is a great scholar of politics 
and human nature who recognizes that a just democracy can be established neither by 
force (because that’s inherently unjust), nor by “reasoning” (because a people that is 
not already committed to the public good will not be able to appreciate the moral 
reasons in favor of pursuing it). So the legislator must “compel without violence and 
persuade without convincing,” and he does this by fooling the people into thinking 
that his political advice is heaven-sent. In this way he is able to “compel by divine 
authority those whom human prudence could not move.”141
More recently, both Thomas Nagel and Joshua Cohen have explicitly invoked 
                                                 
139 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1996), p. 476 (Bk. II, Ch. III), 482 (Bk. II, Ch. VI). 
140 Ibid., p. 483 (Bk. II, Ch. VII). 
141 Ibid., pp. 483-484 (Bk. II, Ch. VII). 
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 Rousseau’s idea of will formation (albeit not the specific tactics of Rousseau’s 
legislator) to argue for the possibility of securing the widespread support for a 
determinate conception of justice that is required for liberal justifiability.  According 
to Nagel, the only hope for securing the legitimating consent of citizens who 
inevitably endorse diverse worldviews is to “design…institutions which penetrate and 
in part reconstruct their individual members.”142 And Cohen claims that the political 
liberal insistence on limiting the legitimate resources of political justification stems 
from the fact that while we can countenance “a social or political process that might 
produce convergence on political values,” no such “mechanism” can “generate 
consensus on comprehensive moral values.”143
In light of these elements of prominent liberal views, one may well be inclined 
to adapt some of Elizabeth Anderson’s mordant rhetoric to ask: If much academic 
work defending political liberalism had been secretly penned by its opponents, could 
the result be any more embarrassing for political liberals?144
Despite these important worries, there may be a sensible, straightforwardly 
non-manipulative reason to think about the outer limits of liberal justifiability using 
something like Rawls’s developmental criterion. For surely one condition of 
ecumenical reasonableness will be admitting that a conception of justice is a 
normative doctrine, one that describes how things ought to be. It is unreasonable to 
reject a conception of justice simply because it articulates a view of proper civic 
relations that departs from the stock of currently widely held opinions about justice. 
Given this, and assuming that political liberalism is correct in its reluctance to rely on 
premises that will be endorsed only by moral experts, a political contractualism will 
look for a principled way to preserve normativity while at the same time ensuring that 
                                                 
142 See Nagel (1991), pp. 53f., 60. 
143 Cohen (1994), p. 1530; emphasis in original. 
144 See the memorable opening stab at “luck egalitarians” from Anderson (1999). 
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 fully responsible conduct is not beyond the reach of normal, conscientious human 
beings. Enter Rawls’s criterion of stability. When a normative conception satisfies that 
developmental criterion, Rawls claims, it shows that a suitably wide range of diverse 
individuals could accept it, and that it possesses a suitable fit with human nature (87-
88) and rational motivation (142-144). Thus the developmental criterion is designed to 
address an issue that arises for any conception of justice that satisfies two necessary 
conditions of reasonable public justification of moral ideals. Moreover, nothing 
precludes a contractualist from holding that there are virtually always significant 
moral costs involved in forcing others to do what they don’t want to do, and the fact 
that I could get others to agree with me if my political coalition subjected them for 
years to coercive political institutions is never itself a reason to support a policy. 
Rather, the strengths of my political reasons are always dependent upon the strengths 
of the reasons I have to support the policy as a plank in the most appropriate public 
charter for a society of equals. These reasons will ideally explain why the 
institutionalization of this charter secures fully adequate bases of loyalty for all who 
are related to me as citizen to citizen (including of course those whose relevant 
interests would be harmed by the policy my reasonable political opponent favors). The 
developmental stability criterion helps shed light on the outer limits of such loyalty, 
and this in turn sheds light on the outer limits of liberal justifiability.  
The stability test also appears suited to address one of the main theoretical 
problems facing political philosophy, namely the fact that our acceptance of political 
authority and its actual rationales cannot be considered fully free “in the sense that the 
bonds of society and culture, of history and social origin, begin so early to shape our 
life” (222). Indeed, given that our lives begin to take shape before we are in a position 
to shape them ourselves, there is the worry—independent of the content of any 
specific conception of justice—that past or current departures from justice will over 
 118
 time dull citizens’ sense of what the ideal of self-respectful loyalty for all requires.  
Perhaps we become convinced by prevailing orthodoxy that what seems to us just is 
simply not practically possible (“It’s not that I’m unfeeling, it’s just that the welfare 
state simply can’t do what it tries to do. The government should therefore not interfere 
with market processes.”); or perhaps we still believe in the possibility of a just society, 
but our sense of its importance to our lives diminishes in the face of the grave hardship 
we’d have to endure to make any progress toward it (“I’d prefer a union, but I fear my 
job would be headed overseas if we started down that road.”). In this sense, fairness 
between conceptions of justice is a bit like fairness between persons: we don’t want 
results in this area of inquiry to be determined by morally arbitrary factors. Thinking 
hypothetically about a conception’s ability to generate its own support within the 
context of free institutions is, therefore, a way to test its compellingness to human 
reason while controlling for the undue effects of past political contingencies. 
The normative relevance of historical contingencies is important to bear in 
mind when working out a conception of justice for free and equal citizens susceptible 
to the influences of past and current injustice (or lack of justice). Equally important, 
however, is the worry that many destabilizing forces will still inevitably exist under 
the favorable circumstances envisioned by any application of Rawls’s stability test. 
For example, assuming that the experience of the twentieth-century reveals that some 
form of capitalism is the best feasible economic arrangement for a free, democratic 
society, it is unwise to think that any adequate conception of justice could withstand 
all attempts by capitalists to change prevailing views of political morality, given the 
vast resources they could marshal for this project. And even if the power of capitalists 
could somehow be adequately restrained, it is not obvious that this is so—much more 
experimentation with social arrangements that are not remotely on current political 
horizons would be needed to make a reasonable determination. So it is not clear that 
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 we should be willing, at the rather abstract level of theorizing that Rawls calls home, 
to make a conception’s justifiability dependent on its ability to deliver a stable 
overlapping consensus on its details in the capitalist society it is to regulate. A related 
worry is that in order to apply the stability test, one needs extremely complicated, and 
possibly unattainable, subjunctive knowledge. So understood, while political 
liberalism refuses to expect citizens to be artists of the good life, it does seem to 
expect them to be artists of sociology. 
Some of these worries did not escape Rawls. He at one point suggests that 
inequalities permitted by his own theory of economic justice “are already too great for 
stability.”145 But Rawls never paused to address these worries, apparently preferring 
instead to assume that stability is likely to be exemplified by some attractive 
democratic conception of justice, so long as we make “acceptable changes” to achieve 
it (66). 
Here Rawls seems to forget that the criterion of stability is not an unmoved 
mover in political liberalism. He forgets that it stems from the more central goal of 
seeking terms of shared coercive governance that all could loyally uphold without 
sacrificing their inalienable status as free and equal citizens. When there is good 
reason to believe that a society governed by any determinate democratic conception of 
justice will permit the emergence of forces that could lead the populace to repudiate 
valid ideals, we will want a theory of justice whose justifiability is not dependent upon 
its capacity to deliver stability year after year, election after election. But this is 
precisely what the developmental version of political liberalism cannot provide, since 
that theory purports to justify arrangements whose liberal credentials are determined 
by the satisfaction of the stability criterion itself. So we should reject Rawls’s 
developmental criterion as a criterion of liberal justifiability. 
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 If political liberalism is going to survive the criticisms I’ve offered here, it will 
have to so by abandoning the developmental criterion of stability. In taking this route, 
however, any hope to reconcile it with perfectionism is lost. Still, political liberalism 
continues to have our intuitions concerning neutrality on religion behind it, and we 
have yet fully to sketch the political liberalism that so many thought Rawls had 
defended on the basis of these and similar intuitions.  
 
III. Orthodox Political Liberalism 
 
For the orthodox political liberal (which I will for now on mostly call the 
“political liberal”), the content of political morality, from which we derive principles 
of justice, is shaped by a commitment to refrain from forcing one’s free and morally 
equal compatriots to abide by laws whose justification depends essentially upon 
controversial premises they may conscientiously reject. Political liberalism, so 
understood, is fully coherent because its concern with stability is not the 
developmental concern we find emphasized again and again in Rawls’s major treatise 
on the doctrine, but rather the concern that “stable social cooperation rest[] on the fact 
that most citizens accept the political order as legitimate,”146 that is, that they accept 
the state’s authority to coerce them because they accept the reasons that justify that 
coercion.  
It is what I have called the “populist” understanding of political liberalism that 
has become orthodoxy. To review, citizens are reasonable when they are willing to 
offer fair terms of social cooperation and willing to recognize the burdens of judgment 
and their implications for the fully legitimate employment of state power, which is “a 
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 power in which citizens have an equal share” (138). The fact of reasonable pluralism, 
generated by the burdens of judgment, combines with this corporate view of state 
political power to impose a duty to use such power only in ways that one’s fellow 
citizens can accept. Since asking for complete agreement between citizens on all 
details of a conception of justice would result it undesirable gridlock, a more limited 
attempt to secure agreement is acceptable to all. Instead of demanding consensus on a 
determinate conception of justice, reasonable citizens require only (1) consensus on 
the vague and basic values, principles, and ideals from which a conception of justice is 
to be derived, and (2) a reciprocal willingness to avoid arguments that draw upon 
materials lying outside the consensus. In order to meet the first requirement, citizens 
construct political conceptions of justice on the basis of fundamental ideas that can be 
found implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society (13). Orthodox 
political liberals assume, with Rawls, that there are ideas in the public culture 
sufficient for this task.147 In order to meet the second requirement, citizens first 
attempt to work out what they take to be the most reasonable148 interpretation of the 
shared political values, and then they engage in civil political dialogue with their 
fellow citizens in order to submit their favored conceptions to public scrutiny. 
According to orthodox political liberalism, it is quite alright if there is no 
consensus on what constitutes the most reasonable political conception of justice. 
Again: 
 
Of course, we may find that actually others fail to endorse the 
principles and guidelines our criterion selects. That is to be 
expected…It is inevitable and often desirable that citizens have 
different views as to the most appropriate political conception…An 
orderly context between them over time is a reliable way to find which 
one, if any, is most reasonable. (227) 
                                                 
147 Rawls (2001a), p. 27. 
148 Recall here the discussion at the end of Chapter 3, Section II. 
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Although orthodox political liberals believe that many disagreements between 
reasonable citizens should lead them to search for shareable justifications, it is surely 
unreasonable to insist that citizens restrict their political advocacy to the vague values 
they share, or which can at least be found in their shared public culture. To put it 
another way, if one restricts oneself to advancing interpretations of the shared political 
values, then it is just not possible to show one’s compatriots the sort disrespect that is 
shown when one goes beyond the shared public culture to construct justifications 
incorporating extra-political values. The first route to political justifications is a 
necessary step in the pursuit of reasonable and respectful citizenship; the second route, 
the orthodox political liberal argues, is avoidable and disrespectful of the reasonable 
citizens who cannot be expected to endorse the extra political values. 
Note that existence within the public political culture is not a sufficient 
condition for admissibility into legitimate orthodox political liberal justification. 
Coercion-justifying reasons must be appropriately shared or shareable by all who will 
be subject to the coercion. After all, it is the existence of large majorities that endorse 
the same religion that gives rise to an especially intense need to inculcate the 
commitment to neutrality on religion that we think befits the outlook of liberal 
citizenship. So in this way, “Moral doctrines are on a level with religion.”149 Since it 
is possible reasonably and conscientiously to reject any particular religion or 
irreligion, no stance on this issue will be generally and appropriately shared, and so no 
attempt to use the apparatus of the state to promote one stance will be justified. The 
state should therefore remain neutral. Likewise, the state should remain neutral on the 
value of moral autonomy, which recommends a life in which we critically examine 
our deepest ends and personal ideals, for “many citizens, for example, those holding 
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 certain religious doctrines, may reject it.”150
 That the state cannot take a position on debates about certain sorts of values 
does not mean that it cannot seek to accommodate those values and the citizens who 
are committed to them, for example by identifying a suitably abstract notion of 
advantage (e.g. money) and ensuring that each citizen has a minimally adequate 
bundle of goods and opportunities with which to pursue the good life as she sees it. In 
identifying the proper strategy of accommodation, the political liberal refrains from 
judging the intrinsic merits of citizens’ more comprehensive outlooks. She admits that 
for the purposes of political justice, lives dedicated to religious contemplation, moral 
autonomy, or physical exercise are equally “fully worthy of citizens’ devoted 
allegiance.”151 Of course, not all ways of life will warrant public respect. We must not 
admit into the class of fully legitimate outlooks the outlook of someone who takes the 
enslavement and domination of others to play a major role in determining a good life 
for her. 
 So the orthodox political liberal, guided in part by the lessen she draws from 
the case of religion as well as by the discriminations she is entitled to make between 
legitimate and patently illegitimate conceptions of the good, seeks a framework of 
reasoning that deploys concepts and categories that can be used to settle political 
disagreements between those who nevertheless disagree on so much already. As 
Scanlon puts it in an early description of his own political contractualism: 
 
[L]iberal morality…equate[s], for the purposes of moral argument, 
beliefs and practices which have a similar importance in the lives of 
different people but which are, from the point of any one such person, 
of very different value. The moral aim of finding forms of justification 
which others can also accept pushes us to develop such categories and 
to give them a central role in our thinking.”152
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152 Scanlon (1993), p. 185; emphasis added. 
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In addition to the shareable categories of advantage that normatively assimilate 
values that, from the point of view of a true comprehensive outlook, have very 
different value, the orthodox political liberal allows into public justification 
considerations that can be found in their shared public culture and that all take to bear 
heavily on the adequacy of a regime concerned to respect the autonomy and self-
determination of all. Rawls lists a few such considerations: “a more perfect union, 
justice, domestic tranquility, the common defense, the general welfare, and the 
blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.”153 While these purely political 
ideas will be further specified and refined by individuals in light of their full moral 
and religious outlooks, the political liberal warns against the political use of 
interpretations that are “improperly specified”.154 For example, while the state does 
have an interest in the internal nature and quality of family life, it does so only under 
the interpretation of a purely political concern with “the orderly reproduction of 
society over time. Thus, appeals to monogamy as such, or against same-sex 
marriages…would reflect religious or comprehensive values.”155 So long as open 
marriages and homosexual unions do not threaten the state’s legitimate—because 
publicly shared—political interest in orderly reproduction, there is no political liberal 
basis for criticizing the different forms of family that different citizens may choose. 
Any attempt so to criticize fails to respond to the liberal imperative to assimilate the 
specific value of conflicting non-dominating personal outlooks. 
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 IV. Conclusion 
 
 Thus, for all my earlier exegetic stress on the developmental notion of stability, 
the orthodox political liberal easily does without it, since she is concerned to construct 
a political morality that respects her fellow citizens in light of their actual legitimate 
comprehensive religious, moral, and philosophical views. She of course must count as 
illegitimate currently controversial premises that would be widely shared after a 
certain conception of justice had its developmental affect on a given society, but this 
doesn’t bother her. Not only does she have the compelling analogy with religious 
neutrality on her side, but she also would never dream of physically dragging a 
demurring friend into her favorite Thai restaurant, even if she knew that her friend 
would develop a postprandial passion for Sawadte’s Drunken Noodles. Respect for her 
friend’s autonomy enjoins seeking a reconciliation of interests, which cannot happen if 
she insists on the privileged status of her own tastes and values. 
 If all we had to go on was the doctrine set out in Political Liberalism, I would 
be hesitant to say that Rawls is an orthodox political liberal. The developmental strand 
is simply too entrenched in the edifice of that treatise to ignore it. Still, I have been 
arguing that Rawls’s view has serious internal tensions, that there are some serious 
problems with the use of developmental stability in a theory of liberal justifiability, 
and that Rawls continued to stress the importance of drawing upon only ideas that are 
implicit in the public cultures of democratic societies here and now. And as we can 
see from Rawls’s last major statement of political liberalism (from which I have been 
quoting in my account of orthodox political liberalism, and which he said was “by far 
the best statement I have written on the ideas of public reason and political 
liberalism”156), the argument from analogy with neutrality on religion plays a crucial 
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 role in motivating and supporting the view. Given that many of us are quite happy to 
retreat to neutral—or, as Rawls preferred to say, common—ground when it comes to 
the role of religion in state affairs, much of the foregoing suggests that if political 
liberalism is false, so too is the traditional liberal view of neutrality on religion. For if 
there is reason to abandon neutrality on controversial moral values that informed 
others can conscientiously reject, why should we think that there are special reasons to 
retain neutrality in the case of religion? What could be the special difference? 
 I will address these questions further in Chapter 7. Before doing so, I want to 
ask, How much economic equality can an orthodox political liberal justifiably demand 
as a matter of justice? Answering this question, of course, depends in part on what 
conception of citizens’ wellbeing a political liberal theory is entitled to work with. For 
example, the injustice of a given deprivation on the part of a citizen must be assessed 
on the basis of a view of human wellbeing that determines the moral urgency of the 
deprivation in question. Yet considerations of wellbeing and the depths of deprivation 
do not exhaust the moral considerations bearing on the justice of a situation. 
Controversial questions concerning the social division of responsibility also arise. If it 
turns out that some form of egalitarianism is desirable but unjustifiable within the 
framework of orthodox political liberalism because of the overly controversial nature 
of essential egalitarian premises, then we have at least some reason to consider 
rejecting political liberalism. But given political liberalism’s close connection to the 
ideal of religious neutrality, a conflict between political liberalism and egalitarianism 
could well force a choice between egalitarianism, on the one hand, and religious 
neutrality, on the other. Since this is a choice many of us would like to avoid, it 
becomes especially urgent finally to confront the question I have until now been 
preparing to answer: are political liberalism and egalitarianism compatible? 
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 CHAPTER 6 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF EGALITARIANISM 
 
In order to know whether orthodox political liberalism, as I have described it, 
is consistent with egalitarian theories of distributive justice, we must first gain a sense 
of what egalitarianism is. This, however, is a difficult task to pursue. For it may be 
impossible to say in suitably general terms what egalitarianism is. Many quite diverse 
theories have been offered up as tokens of that general type. This fact might suggest 
the folly of asking whether egalitarianism is consistent with political liberalism. But in 
fact it usefully serves to highlight the very problem I will press against political 
liberalism, namely that political liberalism appears unable to recommend any of the 
more plausible versions of egalitarianism. If political liberalism rules out all but the 
most implausible versions of egalitarianism, then holding onto the former means 
abandoning egalitarianism altogether. And if we have reason to reject the alternatives 
to the family of plausible egalitarianisms, this suggests that we have reason to reject 
political liberalism, as well. 
 
I. Troubles with Libertarianism 
 While no sane egalitarianism would demand that citizens be made equal in all 
respects, there is certainly no point in appropriating the term unless it is held to be 
citizens’ responsibility, acting collectively through the agency of the state, to redress 
or compensate for some of the main inequalities that emerge in free market 
economies. With little government intervention, free market arrangements will, over 
time, generate inequalities resulting from market luck and the consequent differential 
abilities to translate such luck into (among other things) resources for establishing 
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 economies of scale and cushions against future market downturns. Such inequalities 
are likely to be compounded over generations, as some are able to enhance their 
wealth simply because they have it, while many others find themselves without 
savings and reliant on market forces that do a good job of entrenching their weak 
bargaining power vis-à-vis capitalist investors and managers. This is a familiar story 
that I merely assume here. 
 Libertarian proponents of such “small government” arrangements do not mind 
admitting that some form of government is required to protect against force and fraud. 
And this government will have to be funded through mandatory taxes whose 
imposition is backed up by coercive penalties if they are not paid. But, libertarians will 
insist, further government sanctioned measures to improve the welfare of those least 
well-off are unjustified: free market arrangements facilitate voluntary exchanges of 
goods and services interference with which constitutes and unjust intrusion into 
citizens’ private lives. 
 Contrary to this libertarian outlook, I think it is not difficult to explain why 
justice demands more than the minimal “night watchman” state. For even if all were to 
agree that government’s main role is to protect the workings of free market 
arrangements, not all will agree on precisely which terms are most appropriate. For 
example, some will wish to impose criminal penalties for false advertising (of 
prevailing mortgage interest rates, say), while others will insist that it is each 
contractor’s responsibility to read the contract before signing and that false advertising 
ought to be no more justiciable than telling a carpenter that you fully expect to 
contract with him to build your house and then deciding to go with someone else 
who’ll do the job for less. Decisions of this kind are seemingly mundane but actually 
profound in their collective ramifications. They are decisions to employ the coercive 
apparatus of the state in ways that will inevitably shape the lives of all citizens, 
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 determining which avenues are open for economic betterment and to whom, and at 
what risk. 
Surely the form of control over others’ lives that citizens of even the minimal 
state invoke raises the question of how it can be justified to exercise this kind of 
control at all. One plausible answer cites democracy as a condition on the legitimacy 
of employing state coercion in this way. But while democracy provides an important 
avenue through which citizens can decide for themselves how state coercion may be 
exercised over them, it is doubtful that choices made in that system confer legitimacy 
when they are made on the basis of the kinds of ignorance and unreason that we might 
expect to arise within segments of the population that lack access to basic education. A 
proper concern not to coercively shape the life of another without his or her 
adequately informed consent is hardly consistent with a scheme that secures 
legitimizing consent from those who are unable to assess relevant empirical facts and 
form a cogent conception of their own most fundamental interests. So even within a 
so-called minimal state, it is a duty to provide adequate education for citizenship. This 
is a duty that each citizen owes not only to his or her fellow citizens, but also to his- or 
her-self. For adequate education is a precondition for the self-respectful acceptance of 
the coercive apparatus of the state that dominates one’s life, and it is equally necessary 
in order to foreclose the possibility that in being on the winning side of a political 
debate, one has taken undue advantage of compatriots who are unable properly to 
evaluate the life-shaping measure at issue. The universal provision of (at least) basic 
education gives partial expression to the fact that the fundamental domestic political 
relation must be one of ultimate cooperation, if typical state coercion is to be justified. 
Free market arrangements that make no provision for such education are, therefore, 
unjust. 
This line of thinking suggests that we should investigate whether there are 
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 additional conditions for self-respectful citizenship. The dual character of political 
institutions as coercively-imposed and life-shaping makes this an all-important 
question, and the result that emerged in the case of education should lead us to look 
closer at the economic arrangements that influence so many aspects of citizens’ lives. 
Indeed, in this case we do well to move beyond the requirement that citizens should be 
able adequately to consider and evaluate various institutional schemes to the 
substantive issue of what those schemes must be like if they are to be capable of 
eliciting legitimacy-conferring consent and compliance from the citizenry. Numerous 
questions arise in turn. Which interests should be brought to bear in such an 
evaluation? Which features of citizens’ overall situations must we attend to to gauge 
whether citizens’ relevant interests are being adequately met? And how must society-
wide institutions be structured so as to fairly accommodate the relevant interests of 
all? 
 
II. Rawls’s Criterion of Distributive Justice 
 
Rawls’s answer to this last question—before, during, and after the 
development of political liberalism—is embodied in his two principles of justice.157 
They are: 
 
Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme 
of equal political liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme of liberties for all; and 
 
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, 
they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to 
                                                 
157 The main changes over the years to these two principles were located in the first principle. Since I’m 
about to set this principle aside, I ignore these changes here. 
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 the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the 
difference principle). 
 
 
Setting (a) aside and focusing for now on the criterion of distributive justice expressed 
by (b), we can note straightaway that we are unable to assess the full requirements of 
this principle without knowing what aspects of citizens’ situations we are to look at to 
tell whether they have “fair equality of opportunity” or whether the “least-advantaged” 
members of society receive more (or as much) “benefit” as they would receive under 
any alternative scheme of institutions. Are citizens equally benefited when they are 
equally happy? When they have equal income and wealth? When they have equal 
income and wealth and have equal abilities to translate these resources into happiness 
should they make responsible choices? As we shall see in more detail below, Rawls 
for the most part assesses social positions in terms of what he calls “social primary 
goods,” which are “objective features of citizens’ social circumstances open to view” 
such as their reasonable expectations of income and wealth.158 Features that are more 
subjective, or not amenable to full public assessment, such as felt happiness, are not 
included in Rawls’s measure of citizens’ wellbeing. 
 Rawls’s second principle of justice is split into two sub-principles. The fair 
equality of opportunity principle is held to be lexically prior to the difference 
principle. This means that when fair equality of opportunity is not fully established, 
the implementation of the opportunity principle is given absolute priority over 
measures that would implement the difference principle. What does Rawls mean by 
fair equality of opportunity? Here’s what he says: 
 
Supposing that there is a distribution of native endowments, those who 
have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use 
                                                 
158 Rawls (1996), p. 181. 
 132
 these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their 
social class of origin, the class into which they are born and develop 
until the age of reason.159
 
Thus, if there are economic inequalities whose existence would (by their incentivizing 
effects) enhance efforts and raise productivity and hence increase the bundle of social 
primary goods that the worst-off socioeconomic group can expect, then justice 
requires these inequalities…unless they somehow interrupt fair equality of 
opportunity. In that case, the inequalities are absolutely forbidden by justice. 
 With this rough sketch of Rawls’s favored distributive principles and 
conception of the “metric” by which we are to judge citizens’ absolute and relative 
distributive shares (social primary goods), we can now ask how Rawls derives these 
requirements within his political liberalism. The first step is familiar from the anti-
libertarian story I told earlier. According to Rawls, the most fundamental idea required 
for working out an adequate theory of distributive justice “is the idea of society as a 
fair system of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next.”160 This 
idea involves the companion “idea of citizens…as free and equal persons.”161 In 
saying that citizens are free and equal, Rawls claims to be drawing upon “the tradition 
of democratic thought” and thus safely staying within the limits of a political 
conception of justice. As he puts it,  
 
The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for 
a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of 
reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected with these 
powers) persons are free. Their having these powers to the requisite 
minimum degree to be fully cooperating members of society makes 
persons equal.162
 
                                                 
159 Rawls (2001a), p. 44. 
160 Ibid., p. 5.  
161 Ibid. 
162 Rawls (1996), p. 19. 
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 These two moral powers ground the three “higher-order” interests from which Rawls’s 
distributive principles are derived. As beings with the two moral powers, citizens have 
higher-order interests in their development and exercise. A third higher-order interest 
stems from the fact that at any given time citizens will have a determinate conception 
of the good whose satisfaction is among their most important ends. From the fact that 
society is to be conceived as a fair scheme of social cooperation, and the fact that 
“someone who has not developed and cannot exercise the moral powers to the 
minimum requisite degree cannot be a normal and fully cooperating member of 
society,” it follows that we as citizens should seek to adopt “principles that guarantee 
conditions securing for those powers their adequate development and full exercise.”163  
 By now it should be clear that Rawls opts for an argument on the basis of the 
higher-order interests in large part because of their suitability within a political 
conception of justice. Since no fully determinate conception of the good will pass 
political liberal muster, Rawls seeks a more abstract, “shared idea of citizens’ good 
appropriate for political purposes.”164 And since all reasonable persons will be 
concerned to develop a secure sense of political justice and to form, revise, and 
rationally pursue a determinate conception of the good, Rawls believes that all citizens 
can embrace the higher-order interests as the proper basis upon which to argue for 
coercively imposed distributive institutions that can draw forth the willing cooperation 
of all. Reliance on any more determinate interests will be disrespectful to one’s fellow 
citizens, whose willing compliance depends upon a scheme justified by reasons they 
can accept in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Whether it is citizens 
deliberating amongst themselves or the parties to the original position seeking to 
secure the fundamental interests of the persons they represent, “we expect and indeed 
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 want people to care about their liberties and opportunities so that they can achieve 
their good. We think they would show a lack of self-respect and weakness of character 
in not doing so.”165
 
III. Problems with Rawls’s Criterion 
 
I want now to argue that a number of well-known concerns about Rawls’s 
second principle of justice and his reliance on the social primary goods metric of 
advantage take on new significance when these features are embedded within the 
orthodox political liberal framework. Consider first the priority of fair equality of 
opportunity (FEO). As I noted before, this priority means that even if it is possible to 
raise the life prospects of the least advantaged by permitting inequalities that upset 
FEO, this is strictly prohibited by justice. In cases where implementation of the 
difference principle (DP) would conflict with FEO, FEO wins out. But why would free 
and equal citizens (as Rawls characterizes them) be so concerned with securing FEO 
that they would preemptively rule out any FEO-upsetting inequalities that could 
nevertheless raise their income and wealth? This question becomes all the more 
pressing in light of the following puzzle: the ideal of equality of opportunity has its 
relevance only when there exists a hierarchy of socioeconomic positions for which 
citizens compete; but what justifies permitting a hierarchy in the first place? Certainly 
not any strictly egalitarian ideal, since that would be better secured with the 
prohibition of such hierarchies. The answer, of course, is that hierarchies increase 
work effort and social productivity, thereby making everyone better-off. But this 
presents itself as a justification more in line with the best rationale for the DP. So how 
                                                 
165 Rawls (2001a), p. 85. 
 135
 can FEO have priority over DP when FEO gets its very relevance within an economic 
scheme grounded in DP-like considerations?166
 Rawls’s main answer to these questions is brief and unsatisfying. Here’s what 
he says informally on behalf of FEO, which he stresses goes beyond the requirement 
of “careers open to talents”, which forbids discrimination and secures for all the same 
legal rights to be considered for all advantaged social positions167: 
 
First, though, I should note that the reasons for requiring open positions 
[i.e., FEO] are not solely, or even primarily, those of efficiency…For it 
may be possible to improve everyone’s situation by assigning certain 
powers and benefits to positions despite the fact that certain groups are 
excluded from them. Although access is restricted, perhaps these 
offices can still attract superior talent and encourage better 
performance. But the principle [of FEO] forbids this. It expresses the 
conviction that if some places were not open on a basis fair to all, those 
kept out would be right in feeling unjustly treated even though they 
benefited from the greater efforts of those who were allowed to hold 
them. They would be justified in their complaint not only because they 
were excluded from certain external rewards of office but because they 
were debarred from experiencing the realization of self which comes 
from a skillful and devoted exercise of social duties.168
 
The first thing to notice about this argument is its reliance on what Rawls calls the 
good of self-realization. He probably has in mind here the idea of self-realization as 
realized capacities that featured in the argument for justice as fairness as a social union 
of social unions. In Chapter 2 I noted that this idea is carried over by Rawls into 
political liberalism, and I offered this as one reason to think that Rawls saw less 
problem with Theory’s congruence argument than some have thought (given the 
weight Rawls’s places on the idea of social union within that argument). But this was 
noted in an interpretive argument, and it was left open for us to say that this 
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 conception of self-realization is not in fact admissible within a political conception of 
justice. Indeed, Matthew Clayton has recently argued that this argument for FEO fails 
precisely because it cannot be marshaled within the framework of political 
liberalism.169 I am not so sure. The interests Rawls has in mind when he speaks of 
self-realization appear to be rather common interests in the exercise of one’s rational 
capacities, at least to a degree necessary to prevent the lives of most people from 
becoming “dully and empty.”170 I do not, then, say that political liberalism must be 
false if self-realization as Rawls characterizes turns out to play an indispensable role in 
the most plausible conception of justice. Perhaps it will. But it would be good to have 
a stronger argument than Clayton’s in favor of rejecting political liberalism, and I 
think there is a more promising line one could take. 
 This line depends on pointing out that the positions in the hierarchy, whose 
distribution is to be regulated by FEO, are not “all or nothing” affairs. They would be 
all or nothing if FEO were a principle having application solely when there is an 
indivisible bundle of goods to be distributed and the only fair means for distributing it 
is to draw lots or flip a coin. In this case, the “loser” gets nothing. But the environment 
in which FEO has purchase is not like this.  For it is not improper to view a 
socioeconomic position as itself a bundle of real opportunities, that is, a collection of 
possible achievements, experiences, goods, etc., to which one has genuine access by 
virtue of the rewards that attach to that position.171 So it is not so clear that citizens 
would be “debarred” from realizing self-realization (or wellbeing or whatever) in the 
absence of FEO. Indeed, as Rawls himself notes, it may be possible to enhance the 
quality of the bundle of real opportunities constituting the lowest socioeconomic 
position by permitting deviations from FEO.172 When this can be done, what is to say 
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170 Rawls (1999a), p. 377. 
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 that citizens fail to respect themselves if they choose to enhance the worst bundle of 
real opportunities by permitting decreases in their chances to achieve the best bundle 
of real opportunities? 
 Rawls might answer this question by pointing back to beginning: citizens are 
to be viewed as ultimate cooperators, and only proximately as (market) competitors. 
Yet within a socioeconomic environment in which markets play such a large role in 
efficiently coordinating self-disciplined striving, it is easy to lose sight of the 
fundamental political relationship. This is all the more easy when membership in a 
certain group or class becomes associated with middle-of-the-road life prospects (or 
worse). Members of this group may come to be viewed by those with better life 
prospects solely through a socioeconomic lens, resulting in stigmatization that has its 
origin in the dominating economic scheme rather than in any qualities intrinsic to 
members of that group. This may lead to a belief that they are quite properly 
advantaged less by social cooperation because they contribute less, which in turn 
might induce the better-off, who are likely to have more political influence, to rethink 
the terms of a social contract which appears to cater to the demands of those who 
dispositionally contribute less. In any event, it seems clear that permitting large 
inequalities in life prospects could lead to a social world correctly judged to be 
objectionable by those whose real opportunities were in fact enhanced by those very 
inequalities. 
 I find this a plausible line to take. But it is not at all clear how we are to go 
about deciding when an inequality in life prospects is permissible and when it is not. 
Presumably perfectly implemented FEO would be objectionable from the standpoint 
of all, including those who would have less-than-equal chances for the most 
                                                                                                                                            
with the lesser opportunity.” As Pogge (1989) points out, Rawls must here be conceiving of 
“opportunities” as bundles of real opportunities, rather than chances at the best life prospects. For it is 
logically impossible to increase the worst opportunities in the latter sense by permitting inequalities in 
them. See especially pp. 161-173.  
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 advantaged positions in a regime that deviated somewhat from FEO. Yet Rawls’s 
intuitive support for FEO is surely sensible: important harms to citizens’ self-respect 
can certainly be generated by regimes that deviate drastically from FEO in order better 
to fulfill DP. This is therefore one difficult issue that no plausible egalitarianism can 
fail to address. 
Note next that when the issue of self-respectful FEO/DP tradeoffs is put to one 
side, it is equally unclear how Rawls can argue for yet another form of priority that 
FEO incorporates. To see this, recall in what way FEO is an egalitarian principle of 
justice: it mandates that those who are equally talented and motivated should have the 
same life prospects, regardless of their socioeconomic class of origin. FEO seeks, 
then, to remove certain social determinants of inequalities in life prospects, while 
making no effort to nullify inequalities that stem from natural variations between 
persons (variations in talents and native ambitions, e.g.).  
Now Rawls does of course recognize that when FEO is fully implemented and 
the influence of social contingencies is wholly removed, distributive shares will still 
be determined by the distribution of natural features. In response he claims that if we 
are troubled by the effects of social contingencies, then “we are bound, on reflection, 
to be bothered by the influence” of natural contingencies as well. Hence the 
introduction of DP.173 But as I have noted, in cases where the DP conflicts with FEO, 
FEO wins out. It is not hard to think of cases in which this might happen. In fact, 
Rawls himself notes that FEO “can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as 
some form of the family exists.”174 And when economically important skills and 
dispositions are transmitted through the family, as they appear to be, any society that 
permits incentivizing inequalities such as (e.g.) exist between workers and managers 
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 will entrench conditions that conflict with FEO. Somewhat surprisingly, Rawls says in 
response that it’s DP’s job both to make up for the fact that FEO cannot be perfectly 
implemented and also to “mitigate” the effects of the morally arbitrary natural lottery. 
Ignoring for now the fact that FEO cannot be fully implemented, why does 
Rawls give any priority to a principle of justice that addresses the effects of social 
contingencies but wholly ignores the effects of natural ones? It is, after all, his view 
that “From a moral standpoint the two seem equally arbitrary.” It moreover is clear 
that citizens’ ability to satisfy their fundamental interests can be seriously impaired by 
both social and natural factors. On what basis, then, can the asymmetry be defended? 
Second, even if we do admit that social and natural determinants of inequality are 
equally arbitrary and equally proper targets of distributive policies, how are we to 
determine whether overall inequalities satisfy Rawls’s criterion of distributive justice? 
Now that the DP is motivated in part to do the work FEO is designed to do but cannot 
(in light of the family) and in part to “mitigate” the arbitrary effects of the natural 
lottery, it is not at all clear what guidance Rawls’s criterion gives us in determining the 
acceptability of different economic schemes to self-respectful citizens concerned to 
secure the fulfillment of their higher-order interests. 
Rawls’s apparent rationale for using social primary goods to account for 
citizens’ distributive shares goes some distance toward answering the question 
concerning the priority of nullifying social contingencies. Commenting on the fact that 
social primary goods such as income and wealth will be of differential use to different 
persons with different talents, abilities, and determinate conceptions of the good, 
Rawls notes that the social primary goods system of interpersonal comparisons 
“includes what we may call a social division of responsibility.”175 Thus, when one’s 
ambitions and aspirations make it more difficult to translate a certain share of social 
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 primary goods into higher-order interest satisfaction than it is for someone with less 
expensive ambitions, this is irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. Such differences 
among citizens do not give rise to different claims on social resources. Instead, 
appropriate claims are generated by a generalized conception of “citizens’ needs” 
which are “objective in a way that desires are not.”176 Appropriate claims on social 
resources are thus generated by this conception of standard needs, and not any 
individuals’ particular desires, wants, ambitions, or even special needs (—at least, this 
response to special needs, such as those that require expensive healthcare, appears to 
be entailed by Rawls’s rationale for using social primary goods. Rawls offers a twist 
on this view of just healthcare later, and I discuss this further below). In this way, the 
determination of fair shares of social resources are not held hostage to “the 
unreasonable demands of others.”177 Here I take Rawls to refer not only to demands 
whose unreasonableness stems from the unreasonableness of the desires that generate 
them, but also from a tendency to demand more than one’s fair share even when such 
demands stem from one’s concern to fulfill perfectly reasonable aims and interests 
(such as the higher-order interests). It is up to citizens to adjust their ends and aims to 
fit with the share of social resources to which they are entitled; and when no such 
adjustment is forthcoming, the propriety of a social division of responsibility kicks in, 
protecting others from receiving fewer resources needed to satisfy those with 
expensive needs, ambitions, and tastes. 
It is probably this idea of a social division of responsibility that is at work in 
Rawls’s flirtation with the lexical FEO principle. For how else could it be the case that 
while social and natural inequalities are “equally arbitrary from a moral standpoint,” 
justice nevertheless enjoins citizens to support the uncompromising evening out of 
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 certain socially generated inequalities (FEO), but refuses to view DP as a “principle of 
redress”—that is, it “does not require society to try to even out handicaps”?178  
The idea of a social division of responsibility is familiar from those who have 
in recent years rejected various forms of “luck egalitarianism,” the view that citizens 
should be protected from disadvantages stemming from sources other than their 
choices. There are strong objections to luck egalitarianism grounded in the view’s 
need to gather quite inaccessible (and often quite personal179) information about the 
sources of certain inequalities, and in the difficulty of comparing individuals’ overall 
situations when the overall wellbeing of each is a function of different unchosen 
features. But an independent and quite compelling objection lies in the idea that there 
are many types of unchosen natural disadvantages that one’s fellow citizens are simply 
not responsible for redressing. As Timothy Hinton has put it, “[I]t is by no means 
obvious that those who are more glum than others have a claim in justice against the 
rest of us for extra resources. Perhaps we are under some duty to help cheer them up, 
but why should that be counted as a duty in justice?”180
Again, those who reject luck egalitarianism and hold that distributive shares of 
social primary goods can be just even if differentially useful to those receiving them 
believe that appropriate claims are determined on the basis of an objective and 
standard conception of human needs or interests. As Rawls puts it, “Desires and 
wants, however intense, are not by themselves reasons in matters of justice.”181 Even 
more starkly, Thomas Pogge, defending a non-luck egalitarian conception of just 
healthcare, writes: “As far as justice is concerned, need as such does not then support a 
valid claim to medical care.”182 For “if more is required on behalf of those who, 
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 through no fault of their own, are genetically handicapped, then why should not more 
be required also on behalf of those who, through no fault of their own, have run out of 
health protection.?”183 The point here is that we have to draw the line somewhere, and 
in doing so we must be guided by what we think citizens are entitled to claim from one 
another. Insofar as the distributable resources in question are generated by compatriots 
engaged in cooperative and self-disciplined striving for self-betterment on terms that 
are fair to all, it seems intuitively unfair to allow claims to these resources to be 
supported by such disadvantages as glumness, or even to hold that all genuine needs 
(such as healthcare needs) always ground prima facie claims to the collectively 
produced social product. A prima facie right to resources should be accompanied by a 
prima facie duty to provide them, but when resources are depleted after society justly 
compensates those who contributed to their production, no such duty of justice can 
exist. 
In light of all this, it is interesting to note that in Rawls’s last phase he came to 
hold that the provision of medical care needed to restore normal human functioning is 
a requirement of justice generated by the demands of FEO. “Such care falls under the 
general means necessary to underwrite fair equality of opportunity and our capacity to 
take advantage of our basic rights and liberties, and thus to be a normal and fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life.”184 The natural question here is 
of course: if society is not required by FEO to even out the life prospects of those with 
differential talents and native ambitions, then why is it required by FEO to even out 
the life prospects of those with differential health needs? What could possibly account 
for the difference? Surely nothing stemming from a coherent theory of the division of 
social responsibility. If inequalities in life prospects generated by unequal health are 
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 always sources of claims on the social product, then it is hard to see how a similar 
conclusion can be avoided for the talentless. But this is just the principle of redress, 
which Rawls disavows. 
The push toward the principle of redress is not avoided if the answer is held to 
lie less in ill-health’s effects on securing fair equality of opportunity  than in its effects 
on one’s ability to be a normal and fully cooperating member of society. For in 
Rawls’s view, one is not to be considered a normal and fully cooperating member of 
society simply because one is willing to follow the laws and go about one’s life in 
peace. Rather, the goal is to ensure that “the situation of the least advantaged does not 
prevent them from being drawn into the public world and seeing themselves as full 
members of it.”185 Yet there are plenty of natural disadvantages that without redress in 
the form of more resources could lead us “to grow distant from political society and 
retreat into our social world.”186 As Pogge notes, “In fact, being excluded from 
education on the ground that one’s talents aren’t worth developing may well be more 
devastating to one’s self-respect than exclusion on the ground that one’s parents 
cannot afford to pay tuition.”187 But it is the latter barrier that is of most concern to a 
conception of justice that accepts anything like FEO and finds the principle of redress 
problematic. 
 
 
IV. The Dangers of Unstable Egalitarianism 
 
I have not attempted here to contribute anything substantial to the resolution of 
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 these difficult issues. My goal has been to identify questions that egalitarians must 
answer in order to arrive at a determinate and workable criterion of distributive justice. 
It is not enough to have a good hunch that there is too much inequality and not have a 
defensible view as to which determinants of inequality are of importance to justice, 
and which are not. If it is, as I believe, right to follow Rawls in his attempts to answer 
this question by asking which demands would emanate from a proper sense of self-
respect within the context of ultimate democratic cooperation, then the conception of 
self-respect required to answer the questions I have identified will evidently be quite 
complicated, and probably quite controversial. It seems certain that the three higher-
order interests are far too abstract to guide well-motivated choices from the egalitarian 
menu I have constructed. Not only are they unable to provide guidance on the issue of 
FEO versus DP, but they seem heavily to favor the principle of redress. For, those 
concerned to secure the conditions of the public, confident, and successful pursuit of 
their conception of the good have little reason to differentiate between impediments 
that stem from social arrangements and impediments arising from the natural lottery 
(which is, without question, properly viewed as arbitrary from the moral point of 
view). 
The subtle and difficult problem of specifying a plausible division of social 
responsibility, which must be undergirded by a suitably detailed conception of what 
self-respect requires in the political context, appears to cause major problems for 
political liberalism. Because of the profound effects that any egalitarian regime will 
produce, it is especially important to understand when citizens “show a lack of self-
respect and weakness of character” in not demanding redress from society for a given 
natural disadvantage that itself has a profound impact on a person’s ability 
successfully to fulfill her higher-order interests. If we think that it is sometimes 
permissible for society to ignore some demands—including those stemming from 
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 perfectly legitimate interests—because there is no other cooperator whose share could 
be legitimately lessened, then it is insufficient to evaluate regimes solely on the basis 
of how well citizens’ higher-order interests are fulfilled.188 But the more determinate 
we make the interests informing our operative conception of self-respect and the 
conception of the division of social responsibility that informs our conception of self-
respectful cooperation, the further away from political liberalism we travel. It was one 
thing for Rawls to say that while his principles of justice are extremely controversial, 
the materials and form of argument he used to arrive at those principles were not, and 
therefore that his conception of distributive justice has a suitably ecumenical pedigree. 
It is quite another to admit that no acceptable argument can get off the ground without 
committing first to a conception of self-respect on which it is (a) self-alienating to be 
concerned with one’s relative position to the detriment of one’s absolute bundle of real 
opportunities or (b) petty to be so concerned with one’s absolute consumption-level to 
the exclusion of concern with the evils of low social status or (c) infantilizing to 
expect society to recognize claims grounded in need as such or (d) self-effacingly 
deferent to an arbitrary natural meritocracy to refrain from demanding continuous 
special concern for one’s natural disadvantages or… If any form of egalitarianism is to 
be justified, some such conception of self-respect will be needed, and it will be 
disingenuous at best to insist that it is the most reasonable interpretation of the vague 
moral ideas that can be found in the public political culture, or at which we arrive 
when engage in the process of assimilation that political liberal morality seems to 
require. 
In light of these difficulties, it is open to the political liberal to hold that any 
form of egalitarianism would be legitimate, so long as it has the support of a 
sufficiently large majority of the citizenry. This is not, I think, a wise move. For self-
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 respectful citizens are quite rightly concerned to define social duties and expectations, 
and to ensure that their self-disciplined striving will not be rendered pointless by 
prevailing social rules.189 Yet this is precisely the threat imposed by a criterion of 
distributive justice that incorporates the principle of redress. Under such a regime, 
social expectations can change extremely quickly and drastically to keep up with 
changes in the distribution and severity of various needs. And even where expectations 
can be made stable, significant strains of commitment may well be generated by the 
knowledge that one’s fair share is determined less by what one has done than by what 
one, working with others, can do for another.  This focus on ensuring that others get 
what they need, no matter what the costs to those who produced the goods needed, is 
in tension with the thought that those who engage in cooperative, self-disciplined 
striving are entitled to a social benefit that reflects the nature of this contribution. It is 
hard to see how citizens will be able to sustain this striving when rewards to 
contribution, and thus the point of cooperative self-discipline, are so heavily affected 
by the depth and distribution of natural needs for which one bears no responsibility. 
I hasten to add that social contributions come in many forms, and not all of 
which involve working for a wage or salary. Nor is it plausible to hold that the relative 
size of one’s contribution is roughly proportional the relative size one’s wage or 
salary. Indeed, one chief—perhaps the chief—social contribution is one’s very 
willingness to engage in loyal social cooperation to the extent that one can.190 This 
contribution increases in importance in light of the fact that in the real world citizens 
have the opportunity to show loyalty only to quite imperfect social institutions. In his 
or her willingness to abide by and uphold institutions that likely depart both from what 
they think is just and from what is in fact just, each citizen makes a contribution to his 
                                                 
189 I’m indebted to Miller (2002) for this way of putting the point. 
190 This form of contribution is a major theme in Chapter 2 of Miller (Forthcoming). 
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 or her compatriots that appears impossible to quantify. And for the most part, each 
citizen makes an equal contribution of this sort. From these facts it arguably follows 
that this contribution is morally so special that it by and large swamps the specific 
contribution each makes in their particular occupation, and hence entitles all to a 
roughly equal benefit. I cannot, however, argue fully for this view here. What can be 
said, I think, is that “roughly equal benefit” had better mean “roughly equal bundle of 
resources/social primary goods” if this view is to underlie an acceptable 
egalitarianism. For if “equal benefit” means “equal happiness” or “equal satisfaction 
of one’s higher-order interests” or even “equal health,” then we run into the problems 
identified in the previous paragraph. 
If, therefore, political liberalism is unable to choose between conceptions of 
egalitarianism and leaves it up to a majority to choose, then political liberals must be 
prepared for a libertarian backlash. For many may reasonably prefer to strive, 
cooperatively and with self-discipline, within a framework of institutions that prize 
governmental non-interference and that guard against the strong and uncertain 
demands imposed by a luck egalitarian regime. They may judge that while some 
egalitarian regimes better honor the importance of contribution and preconditions for 
self-disciplined striving than do more libertarian regimes, this is not so clearly the case 
when the latter are compared with luck egalitarian regimes. This may lead them to 
avoid making egalitarian arguments lest their efforts have the unintended consequence 
of pushing society closer to the luck egalitarian ideal. Or they may conclude that 
egalitarianism is too unstable a view to succeed, thus leaving intact the more coherent 
libertarian program associated with the values of independence, non-interference, and 
self-reliance (suitably modified, of course, to provide a basic education for citizenship 
to all). Those who take this line but who are still concerned with the probable fate of 
the least advantaged under a largely libertarian regime can recognize a strong moral 
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 duty to aid them, as opposed to a strict duty of justice. This way, a coherent, 
determinate, and satiable criterion of justice replaces the incoherent, indeterminate, 
and possibly insatiable criteria that may well emerge from egalitarian thinking within 
the framework of political liberalism.191
  Now I do not mean to say that this libertarian backlash will occur—only that it 
could occur, and that if it did, political liberal egalitarians should be embarrassed by 
how little cogent argumentation in support of their alternative they can offer. Within 
their framework, egalitarianism as such can win out over educationally-adequate 
libertarianism only by pointing to the evils likely to be generated by the latter (some 
dire poverty, e.g.). But then libertarians can point to virtues of their own doctrine, 
especially those of determinacy, coherence, and satiability. They can, moreover, point 
out that while arguments for the intuitively more plausible versions of egalitarianism 
build upon too controversial a conception of self-respect to be privileged within a 
political liberal framework, these versions would (if implemented) allow many 
important interests stemming from natural variations to go unsatisfied. For as we have 
seen those who reject luck egalitarianism refuse to see individuals’ needs as such as 
grounds for claims on social resources. Thus can the libertarian mitigate the force of 
the argument that any version of egalitarianism is preferable to broad libertarianism 
simply because the former leaves fewer needs unmet and fewer interests unsatisfied. 
What is required instead is an argument to the effect that something more than 
educationally-adequate libertarianism is needed before citizens can uphold social 
institutions self-respectfully. And, again, in light of the difficulties of establishing 
plausible and coherent requirements of self-respect with the political liberal 
framework, it is extremely difficult to make the case that egalitarianism as such scores 
                                                 
191 The term “satiable” comes from Raz (1986) and is used by Pogge (1989) to refer to criteria of justice 
whose demands can be fully met even when many morally important interests go unsatisfied. 
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 a philosophical victory over libertarianism as such. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Of course, the existence of poverty and unmet needs is a grave misfortune, and 
we should be absolutely sure that there is no requirement of justice to meet (at least 
some of) them before we embrace a moderate libertarianism. And while sensible 
egalitarians cannot impugn non-egalitarian regimes of justice for leaving some needs 
unmet, they would be able to object to them if egalitarians could show that more needs 
go unmet than necessary to adequately honor self-disciplined cooperative striving. Yet 
I have argued that in order to do this, egalitarians will have to embrace a rather 
complex conception of self-respect that has no chance of satisfying the requirements 
of the liberal morality of assimilation that I have associated with orthodox political 
liberalism. Therefore, those who seek a different social path from the one offered by 
moderate libertarianism have reason to question their commitment to political 
liberalism. One way to do this would be to articulate and argue directly for the 
conception of self-respect that appears to ground the most plausible conception of 
egalitarianism (perhaps pursuing reflective equilibrium by moving back-and-forth 
starting with the initially most plausible understanding of social responsibility). But 
given the inevitable complexity of this task, the inevitably controversial substantive 
moves such a procedure would entail, and the plausibility political liberalism still 
retains due to its resemblance to our secure conviction regarding religious neutrality, it 
will be difficult to offer what we in the end take to be the most compelling conception 
of self-respect as the counterexample that discredits political liberalism. Just as 
egalitarians cannot point to unmet needs to discredit libertarianism, so too is it 
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 insufficient to point to a morally compelling notion to disprove political liberalism. In 
neither case is the phenomenon pointed to a clear reductio of the rival doctrine, as 
opposed to merely a mundane entailment of it. 
There is, of course, nothing to stop a dedicated egalitarian from rejecting 
political liberalism out of her unwavering commitment to this or that complex 
conception of self-respect. But this is not a costless move given the intuitive 
attractions of political liberalism. What we egalitarians should ideally want is to 
identify extra-political liberal values or disvalues that are so simple, compelling, and 
supportive of determinate and coherent public policies that they rationally force the 
abandonment of political liberalism, thereby opening up the argumentative door to 
important values and moral ideas that cannot so convincingly play this discrediting 
role. But this is only half the battle. Next we must confront head-on the theoretical and 
moral costs that accompany this stance, since they are not to be taken lightly. The next 
two chapters constitute my effort to set out this sort of sympathetic rejection of 
political liberalism. 
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 CHAPTER 7 
NEUTRALITY ON RELIGION AND NEUTRALITY ON THE GOOD 
 
In Chapter 5 I highlighted the major role that the argument from analogy with 
neutrality on religion plays in motivating and supporting political liberalism’s policy 
of equating, for the purposes of political argument, interests that will be weighted 
quite unequally within a sound private morality. I also noted that if political liberalism 
turns out to be false, this should lead us to ask whether the reasons for rejecting 
political liberalism are also reasons to reject neutrality on religion (which includes 
neutrality on irreligion). 
 Of course, we are forced to address this question only if we think there are 
controversial moral values that are legitimately adducible in political arguments, and 
which could underwrite state coercion even against those who conscientiously reject 
them. And for those of us who feel the force of the argument from analogy with 
religion, and who are attracted to political liberalism on this basis, it will not do 
simply to point to a controversial value that we correctly see to be of special moral 
importance; for in embracing neutrality on religion, we are admitting that even if 
commitment to a specific religion (or irreligion) has the transcendental moral 
importance that its adherents believe it has, that still would not be enough to license its 
advocacy in support of political policies. So what we need is a controversial value 
that, unlike religious values, strongly appears to those who are adequately sensitive to 
the reasons for neutrality on religion to wear its political legitimacy on its sleeve. 
 
I. Candidates for Non-Assimilation 
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  The special good(s) of education is commonly adduced to play this role.192 
Although there may be some who believe that the sort of education that most 
American schoolchildren receive is not necessary for a good life, or even that it starkly 
interferes with forms of cultural continuity and deference to tradition that are of great 
value, most of us are not as troubled by requirements of mandatory education as we 
would be if (say) that education included special emphasis on the case against  
religious worldviews that is built upon the amount of suffering in the world and the 
increasing ability of science to explain all there is to explain. But if not, then this 
suggests that the arguments in favor of religious neutrality do not generalize into 
secular morality as easily as the political liberal thought. Perhaps, then, there is 
nothing wrong with looking for other controversial values that we think important 
enough to allow to slip through the net of liberal neutrality. 
 We have already encountered what might be a problem with this argument. In 
our discussion of libertarianism, we saw that there are good reasons to think that some 
sort of relatively robust education is required by any minimally reasonable account of 
the legitimacy of state coercion. For if universal suffrage is a minimal requirement of 
legitimate government, as it appears to be, so too must be the provision of a minimally 
adequate education. Each of these conditions must be met for citizens to show 
minimally adequate respect for others’ rational agency and to show minimally 
adequate disvaluing of the manipulation and exploitation of others’ ignorance. And 
given that state coercion is deployed in ways that pervasively and profoundly shape 
and control one’s life, compatriots of all philosophical stripes who express what 
Robert Audi calls fidelity to the essential premises of the general liberal sociopolitical 
vision will endorse some form of robust mandatory education.193 But if it is possible 
                                                 
192 See Miller (2002), p. 278,  and Audi (2000), p. 60f. 
193 Audi (2000), p. 63. 
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 to satisfy the requirements of the fidelity constraint in a curriculum that is neutral with 
respect to the (putative) special values of art or nature or monogamous relationships, 
etc., as it may well be, then admitting the value of education into ambit of legitimate 
political justification might not entail rejecting the brand of liberal neutrality on the 
nature of the human good characteristic of orthodox political liberalism. If not, then it 
will be difficult to point to the special importance and rational compellingness of 
education in order to block the generalized demands of liberal neutrality. For it will 
remain an open question whether those controversial elements of a “good” education 
that are not required by the fidelity constraint are in fact legitimate elements of a state-
mandated curriculum. 
 What we need, then, is a value or principle or policy (1) whose force cannot be 
derived from the essential premises of liberal democracy to which all minimally 
respectful persons are committed, (2) whose admissibility into political argument 
appears to be ruled out by the considerations supporting neutrality on religion, but (3) 
whose admissibility into political argument nevertheless seems as intuitively 
compelling as the general case for religious neutrality itself. Policies that seem to me 
to fill this bill include: prohibiting acts of consensual, loving sex in public spaces;194 
prohibiting sex (public or private) with dead persons and animals (whether dead or 
alive); and prohibiting the public or private eating of the (human) dead.195 I will refer 
to these collectively as “the prohibitions”. As unpleasant as it may be to contemplate 
some of these acts even in the course of theorizing, our intuitions regarding them pose 
important problems for the political liberal’s proposed natural extension of the 
rationale for state neutrality on religion. 
 It is important to my case that the prohibitions cannot be justified by reference 
                                                 
194 This example is suggested in Miller (1981), p. 389. 
195 This last policy was pressed upon me by Thomas Pogge (in conversation) as a candidate to serve the 
purpose it serves in the text. 
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 to values or principles required by a fidelity to the essential premises of a broadly 
liberal outlook. None of the prohibited acts involve dominating or manipulating other 
rational agents, and none seems to constitute a special threat to the daily workings of 
liberal democracy, an efficient political economy, or “the orderly reproduction of 
society over time.” In any case, they certainly don’t pose any more of a threat to these 
things than many of the forms of religious expression and political speech that are 
traditionally protected by liberalism’s basic liberties.196
 
II. Problems for Neutrality 
 
 It seems, then, that we can construct a head-on clash between our intuitions 
about proper liberal protections of peaceful public religious expression and the 
protections of the peaceful exercise of the acts ruled out by the prohibitions. The most 
natural reasons that come to mind when we seek to explain our intuitive support of the 
prohibitions is that the relevant acts are disgusting, patently offensive, self-degrading, 
or inconsistent with a proper valuing of human life, rational agency, and healthy 
interpersonal relationships. But of course such labels have frequently (and correctly) 
been applied to various public expressions of religions that condemn homosexuality, 
impugn the equal status of women, treat persons of color as inhuman, hold that 
nonbelievers are destined to burn in hell alongside Hitler197, and insist that evolution 
is a hoax perpetrated by the scientific community. Even those eminently decent 
                                                 
196 Moreover, the case for the prohibitions shouldn’t be thought to rely such practical concerns as 
worries about future contact with others’ bodily fluids, etc: we can imagine a world where persons have 
no more reason to be generally concerned with coming into contact with others’ bodily fluids as a result 
of the rejection of the prohibitions as they have when two sweaty college students are playing Frisbee 
on the quad on a hot day. (We can think of equally benign analogies to neutralize similar concerns with 
the byproducts of ceremonial eating of the dead, etc.) 
197 A close paraphrase from a recent family gathering of mine. 
 155
 religions that reject these and other disturbing outlooks have been held to “thwart 
people’s development” by perpetuating silly “superstitious beliefs” revealed to be 
false by science and the existence of genocide.198 If our reasons for being attracted to 
the prohibitions are that the related acts are offensive to others, self-degrading, and 
likely to harm or intrusively offend those who witness and engage in them, then we 
have reason to ask ourselves whether such reasons do not also justify prohibitions 
against public and private expressions religious belief that may have similar effects.  
 It is tempting here to say that the way out is to explicitly denounce the acts 
precluded by the prohibitions as self-degrading and intrinsically worthless and then to 
admit that religious commitment, even if it should turn out false or misguided in its 
details, is nonetheless of some important value. Yet this position on religion seems 
ruled out by the neutrality principle, since it offends against the deeply held 
convictions of those atheists who view religion as mere superstition. So it is only if the 
neutrality principle is rejected that we can appeal to the special value of religion as 
such. But, as we have seen, the neutrality principle is deeply compelling, and our 
intuitive attraction to it seems no more or less strong than our intuitive endorsement of 
the prohibitions. So the question remains: can we fit these two intuitions into a 
coherent theory of liberal justifiability? And if so, what other potentially deeply 
controversial and rationally rejectible values might be allowed in to political 
justification, a commitment to religious neutrality notwithstanding? 
 Perhaps the predicament that seems ostensibly entailed by the two conflicting 
intuitions should be resolved by preserving neutrality, rejecting the prohibitions, and 
resigning ourselves to a social world in which the acts precluded by the prohibitions 
are accorded the same respect and protection by the law as any other peaceful, 
nonlethal, non-physically injurious religious practice that also cannot reasonably be 
                                                 
198 Gaus (2003), p. 149. 
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 said to cause especially serious mental or psychological harm. But if so, we should 
want a compelling account of why this should be the route out of the predicament. 
Such an account should draw on compelling premises and be able to explain that 
which needs explaining. Yet no adequate account can simply defer to our intuitions 
regarding neutrality on religion, since such an account would conflict with equally 
compelling intuitions without being able to explain why there should be any such 
intuitions that nevertheless do not prove fatal for the chosen reconciliation. As long as 
we are willing to admit to feeling the soundness and legitimacy of the prohibitions, we 
are not entitled to invoke the principle of state neutrality on religion to rule out the 
justifications for them; for what may of us take to be the correct response to the 
prohibitions calls that neutrality into question, so long as we continue to lack a special 
reason to distinguish, morally, the public expression of a religion or irreligion from the 
public expression of (e.g.) marital sexual love. Since there seems to me to be no way 
to account for my and others’ intuitive and resilient embrace of the prohibitions by a 
theory of political morality that privileges the principle of neutrality on religion, I 
think we should explore routes out of the predicament that countenance rejecting that 
principle. 
 
III. Problems with Audi’s Criterion of Justifiability 
 
 Somewhat surprisingly, the natural first steps along such a route are indicated 
by a philosopher who endorses a principle of neutrality on religion largely on the basis 
that “we may coerce people to do only—but not all—things that they would 
autonomously do if adequately informed and fully rational.”199 Since his neutrality 
                                                 
199 Audi (2000), p. 67. 
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 principle enjoins neutrality on both religion and irreligion, Robert Audi clearly holds 
that there are important truths that can be rejected by “informed and fully rational” 
persons (since either some religious outlook is true or none is). Thus, even if a “deed 
in fact is my obligation, where only esoteric knowledge—say, through revelation that 
only initiated people experience—can show that it is, I will tend to resent the coercion. 
This kind of basis of coercion breeds alienation” and disrespects those who 
conscientiously reject it.200 But despite adhering to this “surrogacy conception of 
justified coercion” that closely resembles the political liberal conception of political 
justifiability, Audi rejects the assimilation of interests and strong form of neutrality 
concerning the human good associated with political liberalism. Yet this appears to be 
the very double-standard that political liberals decry, and whose rejection should lead 
to the only resolution consistent with the strong intuitions in favor of neutrality on 
religion, that is, orthodox political liberalism.  
Audi’s response is that even if many citizens in fact reject the substantive view 
of the human good presupposed by the educational curriculum, that state’s reliance on 
this view may nonetheless be fully legitimate, since an equal likelihood of inciting 
conscientious disagreement among those with peaceful, non-dominating interests does 
not entail an underlying “epistemic parity” between two kinds of consideration.201 
And it is the latter that determines the political justifiability of a (kind of) 
consideration. Justifiable secular reasons, unlike unjustifiable (but still potentially 
sound) religious or secular reasons, “are such that it is appropriate to expect all 
rational persons to recognize them…Indeed, these reasons are such that, apart from a 
normal responsiveness to them…people need medical or remedial assistance.”202 
Presumably, Audi would not wish to say that those who explicitly reject the 
                                                 
200 Ibid. 
201 Audi (2005), p. 218n. 
202 Ibid. 
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 substantive goods he associates with sound moral education require hospitalization. 
Rather, he seems to hold that reasonably sane persons do in fact accept the reasons 
generated by these goods, at least insofar as their acceptance of them is implicated in 
the variety of commitments and choices they make in their daily lives, if not in their 
explicitly formulated moral theories. As Audi puts it, there can be “agreement in 
reasons,” which is “a practical kind of agreement,” without there being “agreement on 
reasons,” which is “a higher-order, theoretical kind of agreement.”203
But I see no plausibility in the claim that those who do not see the validity of 
the rationales underlying the prohibitions are perforce mentally defective, nor in the 
claim that these persons’ operative conceptions of the good are consistent with these 
rationales.  Indeed, those who think eating the dead is a perfectly appropriate tribute to 
them may well be quite normal in all other respects, and they may well be accurate 
assessors of their own view when they announce that their outlook rejects the 
proposition that eating the dead is self-degrading, disrespectful of human life, or 
simply of no significant value at all. If we can “coerce people to do only—but not 
all—things they would autonomously do if adequately informed and fully rational,” as 
Audi claims, and if one can meet this threshold of competence even while rejecting 
some important moral truths, then it is not at all clear that we may permissibly prohibit 
public sex and eating the dead. But if we continue to think that this would not be 
wrong, this suggests that the outer limits of the politically justifiable extend somewhat 
beyond Audi’s boundary of the admissibly secular.  It suggests that some coercive 
laws are justifiable even if some rational and informed persons would not 
autonomously accept them. But this conclusion causes significant problems for Audi’s 
attempt to formulate a criterion of demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable 
reasons. For can we really say that there is some momentous and workable epistemic 
                                                 
203 Ibid., 202. 
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 difference between the truths underlying the rationales for the prohibitions, which 
some may rationally, reasonably, reflectively, and conscientiously reject, and all truths 
about (ir)religion? I cannot see that there is. Even if there are strong reasons to refuse 
to count as politically justifiable religious reasons that are wholly grounded non-
rationally in scripture, faith, or revelation, since there are strong doubts about the 
general reliability of the associated modes of belief-formation, not all religious reasons 
are of these sorts. Many persons embrace a theistic outlook on the basis of what have 
come to be known as cosmological and teleological arguments, which point to various 
natural phenomena, including the very existence of anything rather than nothing (in 
the case of cosmological arguments), and claim that the best explanation for these 
phenomena must include a divine being with special powers. Whatever their ultimate 
cogency, it is very difficult to point to a sharp difference between these sorts of 
arguments, which lead many to embrace religiously-based moral conclusions, and the 
sorts of arguments that the political liberal or the proponent of the surrogacy 
conception of justified coercion is quite willing to allow into political justification. 
And it is all the harder to distinguish them from the kinds of considerations and 
arguments underlying the rationales for the prohibitions, which I have argued force us 
to expand the scope of political justifiability behind what the political liberal allows. 
But we must believe in such a distinction if we are willing to base coercive laws on 
the prohibitions’ rationales while at the same time preemptively ruling out any law 
whose sufficient justification must invoke a truth-claim regarding religion. 
 
IV. Enter Pragmatism? 
 
 Surprisingly, Audi himself hints at how we might reject such a strong  form of 
 160
 preemption while maintaining something like the old stance on religion in the public 
square. Although it is easy to miss in a discussion that so emphasizes the principled 
case for neutrality supported by the surrogacy conception of justified coercion, Audi 
adds to the case for the neutrality principle the empirical observation that nonpublic 
religious considerations—i.e. religious considerations that the relevant public does not 
completely understand or does not actually embrace—tend to threaten important 
liberties, especially religious freedoms, “more than non-public influences in 
general.”204 Audi explains why this might be so: 
 
[T]he authority structure common in many religions can make a desire 
to dominate other groups natural and can provide a rationale for it…To 
save their souls people must not only cease evil deeds but also worship 
appropriately…But not every non-public source of views and 
preferences poses the authority problem raised by many religions, or 
the special threat to religious freedom that can arise from certain kinds 
of unconstrained religious convictions. Particularly when people 
believe that extreme measures, such as bravely fighting a holy war, 
carry an eternal reward, they tend to be ready to take them. Being ready 
to die, they may find it much easier to kill.205
 
Thus, although Audi, like the political liberal, is especially keen to stress the moral 
issues raised in the context where coercion is contemplated against those who 
rationally and conscientiously reject its basis, his acceptance of the principle of 
neutrality on religion appears to have a partially pragmatic basis. According to him, 
well-grounded legislation that nonetheless alienates some who rationally resent its 
basis is, by and large, much less of a threat to important and fundamental human 
liberties—including religious liberties—when it is based in (non-atheistic) secular 
values and principles than when it is based in religious or irreligious outlooks. 
Liberal political philosophers typically shy away from reliance on such 
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205 Ibid.; emphasis added. 
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 pragmatic considerations, especially since their ultimate goal is often to articulate and 
defend the principled, foundational moral framework from which determinate policies 
can derived once supplementing empirical facts are added into the mix. But the goal of 
this chapter has been to argue that despite strong intuitions to the contrary, there may 
be no such case for some of the foundational positions that have often appeared a 
priori and self-evident to liberal political theorists. Audi’s willingness to introduce 
empirical observations to provide necessary supplementation to foundational moral 
premises that alone could not establish the neutrality principle is rare and refreshing 
among liberal philosophers. Yet it is also somewhat dangerous, for familiar reasons. 
For we are forced to develop answers to very difficult questions if we accept it. For 
example: if wariness about potential threats to important freedoms underlies our 
differential reactions to policies prohibiting public expression of offensive religious 
outlooks, on the one hand, and to “the prohibitions” proffered earlier as 
counterexamples to political liberalism, on the other, must we conclude that the truth 
about religion, whatever it should turn out to be, is in principle admissible into 
political justification?  And if so, does the resulting outlook entail that the pragmatic 
concerns about the effects of promulgating a certain basis of justification should lead 
us to pretend to believe in an uncompromising neutrality principle? If so, our 
intuitions about the propriety of neutrality on religion, which have all along been hard 
data that any adequate theory must explain (or explain away), may in the end make 
endorsement of the pragmatic conception of liberalism unstable: it will be felt to be a 
sort of shameful wizard-behind-the-curtain deception designed to keep potentially 
unruly sectarian factions in check. But whether this is so depends upon the outcome of 
the reexamination suggested in Audi’s reliance on empirical observations to establish 
the sort of liberal neutrality that Rawls, for example, treated as derivable from purely a 
priori reflections on what proper respect for others entails. 
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 Ironically, an important model for this project of reexamining the hitherto 
unquestioned intuitive foundations of liberal morality can be found in some work of 
Scanlon’s. When analyzing more concrete questions of political justifiability, Scanlon 
seems to have had doubts about the cogency of the abstract moral demands of liberal 
morality that he endorsed precisely because it was the morality of duly impartial 
assimilation of controversial interests. Scanlon’s doubts about the seemingly 
“fundamental…impermissibility of content regulation” by governments in matters of 
public speech and expression are, like my doubts about a fundamental principle of 
neutrality on religion and the human good, motivated by a concern to reconcile the 
(now largely uncritically) received “‘lessons’ of particular historical examples” with 
conflicting yet secure convictions about particular cases. For Scanlon, such intuitions 
force us to ask whether what we thought was fundamental is in fact a partially 
pragmatic response to the special risks involved with a failure to sustain the 
appearance of fundamental principle “on the ‘surface’ of freedom of expression (i.e. 
in the constraints that make up the practical content of that right.”206
While our shared history involving gross excesses of (sometimes secret) 
governmental exercises of power lends support to the stance that government 
censorship of speech based on its content is impermissible, Scanlon notes that “some 
content-based restrictions, such as restrictions on libel and false advertising, seem 
clearly permissible.”207 In earlier work, Scanlon invoked the special importance of a 
citizen’s autonomy—by which he meant her sovereign right to determine what she 
believes and how this affects what she sees as her reasons for action—in order to draw 
limits to governmental restrictions on expression.208 The value of autonomy so 
understood seemed to him capable both of explaining our intuitions that appear to 
                                                 
206 Scanlon (1990), p. 161. 
207 Ibid., p. 161. 
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 support restrictions on the right of governments to place content-specific regulations 
on speech and expression, and of permitting eminently legitimate regulation designed 
to guard against libel and false advertising. Yet Scanlon gradually came think that his 
earlier theory was incomplete and “arbitrary”209, since the vague master value of 
autonomy isn’t fine-grained enough adequately to distinguish between harms it is 
legitimate for the state to guard against (e.g., harms to one’s reputation, in the case of 
libel) and harms he originally thought should be kept “out of the ‘scales of 
justification’” (e.g. harms to individuals that consist in coming to have false beliefs as 
a result of another’s act of free expression, or in the consequences of acting on those 
false beliefs).210
Because (as we have seen) possible harms to others are not the only 
considerations relevant to an appraisal of a proposed restriction on liberty designed to 
eliminate or mitigate harms or deprivations, an adequate justification of laws against 
libel will sometimes require the additional proposition that “the participant interest in 
having the opportunity to [libel] carries no value.”211 And complete justifications of 
restrictions on television advertising of liquor and tobacco, which Scanlon thinks 
justifiable, must be based upon the sound judgment that such forms of expression 
“degrade people.”212 (Context makes clear that Scanlon thinks such advertising 
threatens to degrade the audience—presumably in leading them to smoke—but in 
opening the door this far, and in permitting into political argument the judgment that 
the interest in libel “carries no value,” the way may be clear to discount the 
seriousness of complaints on the basis that promoting the “benefits” of cigarettes also 
degrades the advertiser.) Scanlon therefore concludes that “it is impossible to argue 
sensibly about freedom of expression without recognizing the fact that some forms of 
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 expression are of higher value than others.”213  
Thus, a more adequate theory will add to the generic demands of “autonomy” 
the following condition on any successful rationale for a content-specific regulation: 
such regulation must be supported by defensible, even if not universally endorsed, 
appraisals of “the different values [to be] attached to free public discussion of different 
topics.” So even if due respect for centrally important human interests enjoins us, “in 
the application of the right of freedom of expression,” to preclude content-specific 
judgments concerning the relative value of acts that such a right would permit, we 
should not “carr[y] this hostility toward [content-specific] balancing into the 
theoretical justification for these constraints themselves.”214 That is, given the various 
risks involved in authorizing the government to regulate the content of certain kinds of 
speech and expression for certain kinds of reasons, it is sometimes proper to maintain 
the old outward stance in favor of content-neutrality. Thus a third condition must be 
imposed: the proposed content-specific restriction must not pose significant risks of 
(leading to) significant damage to other important values, say by foreseeable inciting 
the on-balance unjust expansion of regulation into other areas of intimate importance 
to individuals’ lives.215  But once we have reached this point, as Scanlon did some 
time before he articulated what I have presented as a canonical description of the 
liberal morality that orthodox political liberalism embodies, we have good reason to 
doubt the soundness of a political morality that requires us “to equate, for the purposes 
of moral argument, beliefs and practices which have a similar importance in the lives 
of different people but which are, from the point of view of any one such person, of 
very different value.” The inadequacy of the autonomy-based argument for freedom of 
expression gives us, at the very least, reason to believe that there is no fundamental 
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 moral injunction so to assimilate. Rather, the full case for assimilation will rely in part 
on various empirical and pragmatic considerations, including the significant risks to 
other values and interests that we incur by rejecting this operative view of political 
morality in our civic lives. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 I am of course not invoking Scanlon’s implicit wavering on liberal morality as 
direct support for my analysis of the liberal principles of neutrality on religion and 
neutrality on the good. But as I have said, the willingness to reexamine certain 
“lessons of history” and so-called “fixed points” of the liberal outlook is both 
necessary and all too rare, and this development in Scanlon’s outlook serves as a good 
model for how to put this willingness to effective, and possibly radical, use.  If the 
argument of this chapter is right, this willingness is essential for making progress on 
the debate between political liberals and perfectionists. Still, important—and 
potentially fatal—questions remain, especially that which asks whether the full force 
of the empirical and pragmatic case for neutrality on religion requires us publicly to 
pretend to believe in a fundamental and uncompromising neutrality principle. I shall 
address this question in the next chapter by exploring the prospects for a form of 
principled pragmatic contextualism in which empirical premises concerning the likely 
effects of a policy play a role in establishing principled demarcations between public 
and private morality. Establishing the tenability of such a view seems to be the only 
way we could retain our support for the prohibitions while also retaining the 
intuitively compelling commitment to a principled neutrality on religion. 
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 CHAPTER 8 
PRAGMATIC CONTEXTUALISM? 
 
I ended the last chapter by asking whether the traditional liberal stance on 
(ir)religion’s place in the public forum, which remains intuitively compelling, can be 
maintained only through deception and dissembling by those who endorse as 
legitimate the restrictions embodied in what I labeled “the prohibitions.” This is an 
exceedingly important question to answer, since the possibility of legitimate 
movements toward greater economic egalitarianism seems to hang on being able to 
show either that such dissembling is not necessary, or that it is not in fact morally 
troublesome. If we are going to allow potentially controversial moral appraisals of our 
well-off compatriots’ interests and conceptions of the good into political justification, 
then we seemed forced to reject the basis of a liberal neutrality that alone could sustain 
a blanket prohibition of (ir)religious considerations. If we wish maintain the traditional 
liberal stance on religion while rejecting the liberal morality of assimilation of 
interests, then we must either have good reason to pretend that the traditional stance is 
still valid, or else explain why there is no need to pretend that this is so.  I quite doubt 
that the former route is viable. Even if the liberal theorist can get away, politically and 
without rocking the boat of neutrality on religion, with invoking the intuitive 
legitimacy of the prohibitions to open the door for the conceptions of self-respect 
required to defend egalitarian criteria of distributive justice, how could she in good 
conscience condemn much less intrusive Christian or atheistic policies as violating 
universal and authoritative moral standards of civic respect? What makes her favored 
policies and rationales so special? If it is because they are her policies, then her 
outlook is, in the final analysis, shameful and unsupported by good reasons. But if it is 
because her reasons, but not the religious or anti-religious reasons of Christians and 
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 atheists, are the sort of reason admissible into respectful political morality, she must 
be able explain why this is so. If, however, this cannot be done so long as she remains 
consistently committed to her own standards of success in respectful political 
argumentation, then her insistence on the distinction between acceptable secular 
reasons and unacceptable (anti-)religious reasons is equally problematic. Thus, in 
order to maintain the traditional outlook of the role of religious convictions in political 
morality while also opening up the possibility for a just egalitarianism, some rationale 
for excluding (ir)religious reasons must be found, and the liberal must be able to 
endorse it publicly, and without warranting shame and self-reproach. Otherwise we 
will have no alternative but to admit the controlling nature of our stance on religious 
conviction in the political forum and reassert the validity of the liberal morality that 
undergirds orthodox political liberalism. 
 
I. Pragmatic Contextualism 
 
The success of what I’m calling pragmatic contextualism depends on being 
able to show that a political morality’s counterproductive consequences or side-effects 
have an important bearing on its validity as a legitimate basis for principles of political 
justice. Consider a political morality that would weigh with and motivate only those 
who are already disposed to give their narrow self-interest more weight than it 
warrants. Then even if others saw some truth in the underlying moral conception, they 
may with good reason refuse to give it their public endorsement, fearing that in 
expressing their approval of that standard they’d be licensing as legitimate the rational 
actions of the overly self-indulgent: it would be more difficult, they might think, to 
convince those who overreach in pursuit of their self-interest that they overreach, than 
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 it would be to explain to them why there is, after all, no strong reason for grounding 
all of a person’s reasons of justice in his self-interest (however enlightened).  
The question now is whether this move should be viewed as strictly strategic, a 
way of hiding from the licentious the true license they have in justice to pursue their 
self-interest. Given our strong intuition that neutrality on religion doesn’t work like 
this, the success of pragmatic contextualism hinges on being able to argue that we 
cannot so easily say that a move like this is merely strategic, especially when it 
embodies a sensible theoretical response to foreseen and avoidable consequences and 
side-effects of a conception’s promulgation. Even if a responsible 16 year old violates 
no serious moral duty if she has a couple of glasses of wine at dinner when she’s left 
at home by vacationing parents, it is not so clear that when citizens choose to 
recognize a corresponding political right only for those 18 and older they are engaged 
in a strategic ruse designed to hide from teens the true rights afforded them by justice. 
Rather than being mere strategy, this seems a defensible, theoretically measured 
response to relevant normative considerations in light of equally relevant empirical 
facts, a response that determines what political morality is or requires in the case at 
hand. Thus, to develop a pragmatic contextualism, we’d need a principle to the effect 
that the categorical content of a moral conception can be determined contextually, in 
light of the difference the promulgation of that conception is likely to make in the real 
world. 
 
II. Pogge’s Moral Pragmatism 
 
Intuitions such at those just mentioned have indeed been held to the possibility 
of a more generalized pragmatic theory of moral justifiability. For example, Thomas 
 169
 Pogge has argued that moral philosophers (here he is ignoring political philosophy) 
should take more seriously than they typically do the consequences and side-effects 
that their preferred moral conceptions would have in the real world if agents came to 
believe in them and came to endorse the rights, duties, and permissions they 
incorporate. Since there seems to be something morally flawed about a two-level view 
that gives a moral elite a license to convince the general public of a false, “temporarily 
expedient use morality” whose expediency is judged against the elites’ “true, ultimate 
morality”, Pogge argues that we should take seriously a pragmatic response to likely 
negative consequences and side-effects. Such a response would reject the two-level 
view and would index an authoritative moral conception’s application to a specific 
“life context”. 
In defense of this contextualism, Pogge relies upon commonsense 
considerations of the following sort: 
 
Given that I am forced to living in America, unable to influence events 
in my homeland, it is better that I take an interest in developments here, 
so as to be able to lead an engaged and fulfilled life. Given that I have 
no talent for mathematics and end up in philosophy, it is best that I 
should develop into a real philosopher…216
 
There is no question that for Pogge there is an underlying moral framework 
that guides the pragmatic choices that result in the embrace of a determinate, yet 
contextually determined conception of well-being. But although the framework would 
dictate this or that moral conception in this or that life context different from ours, its 
“radical” pragmatic character lies, Pogge tells us, in the fact that it also dictates an 
indefinite suspension of judgment on its implications for these other times and places. 
Only in this way can we can find a “conception that works for us” without forcing 
                                                 
216 Pogge (1990), p. 661. 
 170
 upon ourselves the potentially debilitating cognitive dissonance arising, for example, 
from the belief that while abortion is not murder here and now (given the negative 
consequences for women that would stem from outlawing it), it might be murder in 
some other life context (where publicly so treating it does not have the negative 
consequences it would have here and now). If the resulting moral conception yields 
plausible guidance in our life context, then “What does it matter that our morality is 
inapplicable to the life context of fictitious Martians or of the ancient Egyptians, so 
long as it provides reasonable solutions to our problems?”217 Like the advice to 
develop one’s aims and pursuits in light of enduring realities, the higher-order 
decision to embrace the radical pragmatic element stems from the position that agents 
of goodwill, concerned to make moral progress here and now, are put in when they 
allow themselves to reflect upon the most reasonable moral framework for those living 
in a radically different life context. 
 This element of radical moral pragmatism is hard to swallow. How, one might 
ask, can it be a (higher-order, methodological) moral obligation to refrain from 
engaging in the kinds of hypothetical reasoning that so often contributes to moral 
progress by helping us get clear about the implications of various moral stances? As 
Pogge says, “The belief that, in another life context, abortion would be murder 
strongly suggests that abortion really is murder, and that only expediency keeps us 
from calling and punishing it as such.”218 Since we clearly cannot dispense with 
hypothetical reflection altogether, and since it is not clear how we could know which 
kinds of hypothetical reflection it is justifiable to employ at any given time, the 
pragmatic conception does not seem to offer us the useful framework of moral 
reasoning Pogge sought. 
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III. Pogge’s Political Progressivism 
 
 In later work Pogge appears to abandon (or at least put to one side) this radical 
moral pragmatism in favor of what we might call pragmatic political progressivism. 
Instead of focusing on the negative consequences or side-effects that widespread 
embrace of a given moral conception is likely to have, Pogge notes that in a world 
where moral disagreement still creates vast gulfs between those who share a stable 
commitment to the sorts of values that underlie our commitment to liberal democracy, 
an unwillingness to seek compromise with those whom one rightly believes to be 
morally misguided can lead to intolerable “moral waste” in politics: for example, 
“Most efforts devoted to the abortion battle simply cancel each other out. This waste is 
not merely temporary, because it is likely that neither side will be able to achieve a 
permanent victory.”219 So even if one is right to see abortion as a grave moral evil, the 
moral energy expended to make progress in the realm of abortion law could be better 
spent addressing other problems—Pogge points here to world hunger—progress on 
which is much more realistic given the further shared convictions held by those who 
share an allegiance to fundamental democratic values. 
 This form of progressivism differs from moral pragmatism insofar as it 
dispenses with the radical element—that is, it does not, in its quest to reorient moral 
priorities, seek to convince each party to the abortion battle to suspend judgment on 
whether abortion is in fact (or would at another time and place be) inconsistent with 
political morality.220 Instead, it points, first, to the forms of cooperation and deference 
to actual beliefs implied by their commitment to democratic self-government, and 
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 then, second, to the underlying logic of moral progress imposed by the combination of 
these commitments and the content of their more particular views about justice. So 
understood, progressivism does not necessarily support any form of neutrality or 
truncated liberalism. It passes no judgment on the public justifiability of the various 
(kinds of) considerations (religious and secular) that underlie the parties’ views on 
abortion. Instead, it helps them identify the aspects of political morality (as each party 
sees it) that it makes sense to devote their energies to in the vastly imperfect real 
world.  
 Pogge-style progressivism, therefore, is ill-equipped to save our intuitions 
regarding neutrality on religion. Still, it may be the best we can hope for and we may 
be able to learn to live with it. It usefully highlights forms of reasoning that are 
neglected by more utopian forms of political philosophy. And since important liberal 
democratic values and liberties are never out of sight, the strategic thinking it 
encourages needn’t swamp the political solidarity that could emerge from cooperation 
in the face of sharp disagreements about the legitimate contents of political morality. 
 There may, however, be another lessen we can draw from a progressivism of 
this sort. If one had to describe, in the broadest terms possible, the reason that all 
perfectionists rely on to reject a truncated political liberalism, it would be that the 
framework of reasoning enjoined by political liberalism significantly impedes 
important moral progress. (This is more or less meant as a tautology, albeit a 
suggestive one.) This may suggest a new reconciliation, since it is precisely when 
sustained public political advocacy of a controversial social or personal ideal impedes 
social progress—by drastically alienating others with whom we have good reason 
loyally to unite, say, or by inviting a flood of idiosyncratic personal demands—that we 
might expect a perfectionist to support a pragmatic trimming of the content political 
morality. 
 173
  
IV. Razian Contextualism 
 
 Ironically, despite being the standard-bearer for modern perfectionism, Joseph 
Raz has recently defended a pragmatic contextualism that seems grounded in the sorts 
of considerations I’ve been discussing. According to Raz’s Social Forms Thesis, a 
goal or life project can be of value to a person only if there are existing social practices 
that can sustain one’s pursuit of and engagement with the value realized in the goal or 
project. Raz points here to the “shared beliefs, folklore, high culture, collectively 
shared metaphors and imagination, and so on,” whose tacit embrace by participants 
realizes social conditions in which “partners hav[e] correct expectations concerning 
the meaning of other people’s behavior.”221 Because any worthwhile life-project has 
an essential social component, the scope of reasons relevant to a person’s rational 
action will be determined by the set of valuable goals that the practices of his 
society—or feasible variations thereon—leave open to him: “They can be valuable 
only if they can be his goals and they can be his goals only if they are founded in 
social forms.”222
 This last claim is an assertion concerning which goals can be of value to a 
given person at a given time. As such, it leaves open the possibility that while a certain 
way of life is always valuable, it is not always possible for a person to pursue it, and 
so there is a sense in which it cannot be a valuable pursuit for him. (Recall Pogge’s 
reflections on whether to become a philosopher or mathematician discussed earlier.) 
More recently, however, Raz has argued for a more radical metaphysical thesis 
claiming that a value does not exist until there are social practices sustaining the sort 
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 of conduct required for properly pursuing and engaging with it.223 To this Raz adds, 
“Once [certain values] come into being they remain in existence even if the sustaining 
practices die out…Once a value comes into being it bears on everything, without 
restriction.”224
 Raz’s argument for this later, more radical view has two main stages. The first 
is essentially argument for the Social Forms Thesis as laid out in The Morality of 
Freedom: something can be of value to me, or a valuable option for me, only if 
actually existing social practices and forms of behavior make the pursuit of it, as well 
as the (to some meaningful degree) successful engagement with it, a realistic 
possibility. In its later guise, this first stage argument is cast in terms of the “point” of 
value: 
 
Perhaps one way to put it is that values without valuers are 
pointless…The idea is that the point of values is realized when it is 
possible to appreciate them, and when it is possible to relate to objects 
of value in ways appropriate to their value. Absent that possibility the 
objects may exist, and they may be of value, but there is not much point 
to that.225
 
The second stage of Raz’s argument seeks to analyze the “temporal elements 
in our value concepts” in order to show that not only are the access to and point of 
values dependent upon social practices, but the values themselves are as well. 
 I am not much interested in the second stage, and the work it would take to 
evaluate it would take us too far afield. But Raz’s response to a challenge to his 
second-stage argument posed by Bernard Williams helps to shed more light on the 
kind of pragmatic contextualism that is embodied in the first stage. As we shall see, 
the idea that a value is of relevance, or is properly taken to bear on a given situation, 
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 only when the existence of social practices give that value a point in our lives by 
making our pursuit of it and our engagement with it a feasible option, is an idea that 
has quite Rawlsian implications within Raz’s framework. 
 
V. Razian Political Liberalism? 
 
Williams wonders whether Raz’s claim that “once a value exists it applies to 
everything, including to things which took place before it existed”226 is “reasonable or 
helpful…or rather gets in he way of…understanding how we differ from the past, and 
hence who we are.”227 For example, Williams worries that there are grave costs to 
self- and historical-understanding associated with playing “Kant at the Court of King 
Arthur”—that is, with claiming that now existing liberal values properly bear on the 
evaluation of the political arrangements prevalent in the Middle Ages (when, even 
according to Raz, those values did not exist). But rather than invoke the details of his 
metaphysical thesis concerning the existence of values in order to show why Williams 
is wrong to think that liberal values don’t apply to the Court of King Arthur, Raz says 
he can (and does) agree with Williams—not because currently valid liberal values lack 
the pantemporal universality Raz grants to all (currently) extant values, but because it 
is in the nature of these specific universal values that their application is doubly 
context-specific. According to Raz, liberal values 
 
apply only to advanced capitalist societies. To function well political 
arrangements, their institutions and principles alike, have to be suited to 
the social, cultural and economic conditions of the societies they 
govern. Otherwise they are liable to cause more harm than good. 
Liberal principles and institutional arrangements would have been as 
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 counter-productive as they are unimaginable in the Middle Ages.228  
 
In this, liberal responsibilities are akin to duties of parenthood: it is always true 
of one that if one has a child, then one must make certain sacrifices for it. But if the 
conditions specified in the antecedent do not obtain, neither does the duty specified in 
the consequent. Indeed, attempting to realize the values of parenthood in anything 
other than a parent-child relationship does violence not only to those values 
themselves, but to other important values too (such as the quality of the relationship 
between the genuine parent and the intruder). 
It would be nice to know more about the details of this value-specific 
contextualism, but Raz does not go into them. The important thing, however, is that 
his endorsement of this form of contextualism, which recommends sensitivity to the 
violence that can be done to both to the liberal political values as well as to other non-
political values, appears to commit him to a truncated political morality of the form he 
is most well-known for rejecting: 
 
This is not to say that the repression of gays, or racial discrimination, or 
female circumcision were ever other than morally abhorrent, but it is 
typical that we tend to regard values or principles whose application is 
not restricted to favourable social, cultural or economic conditions as 
moral rather than political.229  
 
Whatever the merits (or demerits) of this concrete suggestion (and I will come 
back to this), it has a clear basis in Raz’s more general reflection on the irrelevance or 
“pointlessness” (if not nonexistence) of values in social contexts where their pursuit is 
impossible or counter-productive. And this contextualist strategy of moral/political 
demarcation in terms of what is actually realistically feasible clearly has strong 
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 affinities with several of the aspects of Rawls’s political liberalism I have identified. 
Of course, I am not content to point out that Raz (or at least his view) is more 
sympathetic than he lets on to a truncated liberalism. Although this is indeed an 
important point that Raz’s perfectionist followers should address, more important for 
our purposes is Raz’s suggestion, first, that the content of political morality can 
change and widen on the basis of changing political realities, and second, that the key 
consideration bearing on this widening is the point that public advocacy of certain 
moral reasons would have given enduring political realities. 
 The Razian contextualist distinction between political morality and non-
political morality is not evident in his earlier defense of the perfectionist line of The 
Morality of Freedom. There, Raz tells us, perfectionism—“the natural position” in 
political theory—is interpreted as holding “that in principle all moral reasons are fair 
game for governmental action.”230 Raz claims that while there are no principled 
reasons for political liberal restraint on reasons, “there are many strategic inhibitions” 
that governments or citizens might have and that might lead them to restrain their 
advocacy of certain (sorts of) reasons.231 But nothing in Raz’s later account of the 
political/non-political demarcation suggests that the rationale underlying it involves a 
purely strategic roadmap to the political realization of the values that are ultimate 
placed in the non-political category. Instead, normative facts about the practical 
significance of any value at all, and enduring empirical facts about our social world, 
combine to determine the political validity, for us, of various moral values. 
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VI. Rebutting the Charge of  Instrumentalism 
 
 Worries about the cogency of these moves may reasonably remain. After all, 
Razian contextualism seems to say “Refrain from advancing valid moral reasons if 
doing so would be inimical to the values that generate those reasons, but advance them 
if doing so is, strategically speaking, ‘worth it’.”  Still, pragmatic contextualism can 
go some distance toward answering this charge of mere instrumentalism. To begin 
with, note that to a liberalism worthy of the name, it must take very seriously our 
convictions regarding the wrongness of slavery, oppression and domination, and about 
the great importance of various political and civil liberties, as well as our conviction 
that only democratic forms of political self-government can render our shared coercive 
institutions legitimate. These values and the duties they impose are, as Rawls says, 
“very great values and hence not easily overridden…”232 Yet unlike Rawls and his 
political liberal followers, we do not take from this the idea that a political conception 
can never justifiably go further to incorporate other controversial non-political and 
non-contractualist values. Although the liberal democratic values do enjoin various 
terms of political cooperation, Raz and the other perfectionists are correct: we have 
not yet encountered any satisfactory argument demonstrating the unconditional 
unjustifiability of relying upon values other than the “very great” values common to 
most liberal political outlooks. 
 Assume, then, that some supplemental consideration—the special and 
important value of interesting work, say—is a good candidate for inclusion in a true 
conception of political morality. Now, if I am part of a minority that believes in this 
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 value, and if I have a chance to get the majority to endorse this value by dropping a 
magic potion in the water supply that will harmlessly change its views on the matter, a 
purely instrumental outlook guided only by the moral value of interesting work may 
well recommend this tactic.233 But of course this would be wrong, and it would be 
wrong precisely because of the demands of respect for others imposed by the 
normative basis of liberalism which forbids our dominating and manipulating them. 
So while some quite effective and relatively harmless means for pursuing our moral 
ideals are ruled out from the start, it would be wrong to say that these restraints are 
merely strategic.  
Building on this liberal argument for certain non-instrumental restraints on the 
means for making progress, pragmatic contextualism’s rationale for its further restraint 
on reasons adds the suggestion that we should view the content of political morality as 
being determined, first, by the availability of worthwhile social ideals toward which 
fellow citizens can now make progress through cooperation, and second by a 
universally shareable (if largely formal) commitment to doing justice rather than 
wasting precious time and energy advancing controversial reasons in an unrealistic 
pursuit of a worthwhile end. If moral progress (as judged by one’s full moral view) is 
not reasonably practicable given the constraints imposed by the “very great” liberal 
values and given the realistic division of moral labor suggested by the existence of 
important goals shared by all and fully worthy of effective political pursuit here and 
now, then there are strong reasons to make the pragmatic decision to view as moral, 
rather than political, the reasons on which citizens continue to disagree. Yet rather 
than being grounded in any particular comprehensive moral view, the pragmatic 
limiting of the scope of justice is guided, first, by the non-instrumentally authoritative 
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 liberal political values that place constraints on the means for making progress; 
second, by the non-instrumentally valuable ends that we share with others and can 
work cooperatively toward; and, finally, by the Razian/Poggean thought that the 
structure of our practical thinking and normative prioritizing should reflect our need 
for ideals that we can see to have a point for our practical lives here and now. None of 
these considerations is plausibly thought of as merely strategic, or as manipulated 
from behind the scenes by one’s more comprehensive moral views.  Finally, once the 
scope of political morality has been so limited, there is nothing else for the pursuit of 
justice (so construed) to be instrumental for.  For we can now say that this is what 
justice is, and this is how justice is done in the real world. 
 
VII. A “Progressive” Political Liberalism? 
 
All of these considerations go a long way toward demonstrating that the charge 
of mere expediency can be met. If it can, then we are one step closer to a conception 
of political morality that can permit the progressive expansion of the scope of the 
content of political morality. Because the general structure of pragmatic contextualist 
thinking mirrors the division of moral labor that citizens ought to embrace in an 
imperfect world where liberal political values constrain viable routes to social change, 
a natural effect of the resulting genuine cooperation between those who still disagree 
will be less social mistrust and a greater willingness to engage in dialogue concerning 
controversial moral issues that would not have been possible before the enhancement 
of trust and respect through cooperation on shared ends. So citizens will be less likely 
to fear that others’ advocacy of ideals that they reject signals a renewed battle to win 
the whole world for the full moral truth. Indeed, it is possible that valuable social trust 
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 can actually be enhanced by the advocacy of controversial ideals within a pragmatic 
contextualist milieu. When others see that we are committed to social cooperation in 
pursuit of shared ends on a footing of mutual respect even when we disagree so 
strongly on other moral issues, the resulting reduction in hostility for us may lead to 
less hostility for the views we espouse. Such developments are precisely the sort of 
conditions that a pragmatic contextualism can allow to widen the scope of political 
morality. 
 Pragmatic contextualism is an attractive way to accommodate the various and 
seemingly conflicting strands in both Rawls’s political liberalism and in competing 
comprehensive liberalisms. It accommodates the “realistic” strands in Rawls’s theory 
that support a “populist” conception of liberal justifiability, as well as the “utopian” 
strands that permit the calibration of the content of justice to “another time and place” 
where the world is less “inhospitable to political justice and its good.”234 Moreover, it 
can incorporate a “pure” neutrality on religion, so long as there’s good reason to 
believe, as Audi plausibly does, that rejecting such neutrality would be dangerous and 
injurious to important human interests and liberties in our social world as we know it. 
It can do this all the while agreeing with the perfectionist complaint that no convincing 
argument has been given to reject the view that “in principle all moral reasons are fair 
game for governmental action,”235 and that no conclusive reasons have been given to 
think that the uniquely respectful way to respond to reasonable disagreement is to 
“retreat to neutral ground.”236
Although liberal neutralist Charles Larmore seems to agree with pragmatic 
contextualism in holding the concrete requirements of political neutrality are “a 
relative matter,” his contextualism admits into the ambit of political morality ideals 
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 that can be reasonably rejected only when those ideas are not in fact rejected by any 
reasonable person: “Where everyone agrees about some element of human flourishing, 
the liberal should have no reason to deny it a role in shaping political principles.”237 
The contextualism embodied in view I’ve been considering, by contrast, joins with 
perfectionism in refusing to give reasonable disagreement as such such a momentous 
role in determining the contours of liberal justifiability. For there will be times when a 
milieu of social trust and mutual respect make the public advocacy of reasonably 
rejectible moral ideals perfectly legitimate. While pragmatic contextualism holds that 
we can sometimes know with sufficient certainty that advocacy of certain ideals will 
do no good (and perhaps much harm) in our society as we find it, it can agree with 
perfectionists that there are times when voicing support for currently controversial 
ideals will not significantly damage the prospects of crucial social cooperation, and 
when the considerations that guide the central pragmatic decision allow us to say that 
advocacy of them is an essential component in a reasonably realistic plan to make 
important social progress.238 Pragmatic contextualism therefore agrees with Michael 
Sandel in holding that, sometimes, “Whether it is possible to reason our way to 
agreement on any given moral or political controversy is not something we can know 
until we try.”239 The only difference is that pragmatic contextualism recognizes that, 
sometimes, it is both clearly counterproductive and thus pointless so to try, and that 
this fact can ground the sound pragmatic choice to impose the very liberal “limits of 
justice” that Sandel repudiates. 
 
                                                 
237 Ibid., p. 67. 
238 Here pragmatic contextualism can accept much of Joseph Chan’s perfectionist response to the rigid 
restraint on reasons imposed by orthodox political liberalism. See Chan (2000). 
239 Sandel (1998), p. 210-11. 
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 VIII. Rejecting Pragmatic Contextualism 
 
I have tried to construct as strong a case as possible for what I think is the only 
hope of harmonizing the intuitions behind “the prohibitions” and a principled 
commitment to a principle of neutrality on religion. As is surely clear by now, I am 
not unimpressed by pragmatic contextualism’s power to accommodate and harmonize 
the diverse and conflicting theoretical considerations one finds on all sides of the 
debate between neutralists/political liberals and perfectionists. Nevertheless, I remain 
unconvinced that we can forge the demarcation between political morality and non-
political morality that the view promises to establish. 
The reasons for this are as straightforward and intuitive as were the reasons 
generated from reflection on “the prohibitions” in Chapter 7—but, again, I believe 
they are no less fundamental for that. For my part, no principle of morality is more 
secure than that homosexual relations between consenting adults are not only non-
degrading, but can be as fully a source of mutual love and personal enrichment as any 
counterpart heterosexual relationship. According to pragmatic contextualism, this 
outlook, if sound, is in principle a candidate for inclusion into a legitimate political 
morality. But now imagine that my country is such that my and others’ sustained 
advocacy on behalf of fairer treatment of homosexuals is likely to lead to widespread 
and potentially politically efficacious counterspeech by cultural conservatives that 
likens homosexual relations between consenting adults to incest involving minors and 
sex with animals.  Pragmatic contextualism seems to ask me to oust my outlook on 
homosexuality from my conception of political morality, because of the effect in 
increased persecution that its advocacy could have in my society. Despite my 
extensive attempt to sketch a sensible pragmatism that could accommodate my various 
intuitions and win my ultimate allegiance, I find this implication for political theory 
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 difficult to accept. While I can agree that there are times when advocacy on behalf of 
the rights of my homosexual compatriots is so politically dangerous that I ought, both 
strategically and morally, to refrain from engaging in it, I simply can’t see the case for 
removing it from the stock of considerations that are permanently at home in a sound 
political morality. The same goes for those other stances that Raz, surprisingly, was so 
willing to relegate to the confines of non-political morality when the prospects for 
their political acceptance were exceedingly dim—stances such as those against “racial 
discrimination, or female circumcision.” It seems clear that following Raz into the 
embrace of pragmatic contextualism amounts to mistakenly carrying that view’s 
proper hostility toward morally counterproductive actions into the realm of political 
justification itself. Like Scanlon’s early autonomy-based morality of freedom of 
expression, a pragmatism-based morality of politics must be rejected in favor of a 
theory that can both account for our considered intuitions, whatever their implications 
for the “settled lessons” of history, and at the same time help us deal with new 
difficulties generated by a new, more complex justificatory framework. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
When combined with the implications of what I take to be sound reactions to 
the prohibitions, my reluctance to accept Razian contextualism leads me to endorse the 
conclusions of the Raz of The Morality of Freedom: in principle all moral reasons are 
fair game for governmental action. This endorsement comes with a price I have been 
reluctant, but not totally unwilling, to pay: I must reject the principle of neutrality on 
religion. If there is no sound distinction in kind between the value judgments 
underlying our support of the prohibitions and (at least some of) our judgments 
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 regarding (ir)religion, then ruling the former into political morality requires ruling in 
the latter. And if we cannot rely on a pragmatic contextualism to discriminate further 
between kinds of reasons that remain in political morality and those that are, in light 
of supplementing empirical premises, ultimately pragmatically ruled out, then it seems 
we have no choice but admit (ir)religious reasons into the ambit of political morality. 
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 CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The arguments of the last chapter must not be taken to suggest that the kind of 
reasoning recommended by pragmatic contextualism has no place in a sound political 
morality. Surely it does. It simply means that at the level of theory of concern to 
Rawls and his perfectionist critics—as opposed to the level of advocacy by an 
empirically informed citizen acting with civic virtue and knowledge of the likely 
effects of courses of advocacy—some form of perfectionism is true, while all forms of 
political liberalism, including those that would result from the application of 
pragmatic contextualist reasoning, are false. 
 Although there are fatal problems with the developmental stability-oriented 
conception of political liberalism, and although orthodox political liberal distinctions 
between politically justifiable and unjustifiable reasons have no basis in a true political 
morality, there is certainly much truth in the claim that the protections of civil 
liberties—including religious liberties—afforded by political liberalism are strongly 
supported by the “very great” political values that comprise the normative basis of 
Rawls’s view. And nothing I have said casts any doubt on the central political liberal 
concern that it shows another disrespect when I am willing to use coercion to constrain 
action she would undertake on the basis of peaceful, non-contemptuous, and non-
dominating motivations. So even if the restrictions on moral and political justification 
that are characteristic of political liberalism and moral contractualism should be 
rejected in favor of a fully comprehensive political morality, proper concern for 
others’ autonomy and central and vitally important human interests may well 
encourage, as a matter of civic virtue, pragmatically crafted policies of political 
advocacy that mirror the policies that would be employed by an adherent of political 
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 liberalism. Nothing in my discussion of these issues suggests that if a (type of) reason 
belongs to a true political morality then it is morally licensed for advocacy in the 
political forum. The framework of thinking described in the last chapter can support 
the acceptance, as an operative stance, of something like the framework for civil 
political justification described by political liberalism. 
 This conclusion requires us to repudiate Rawls’s claim that there are just two 
sorts of liberal morality: the liberal political morality of the neutral assimilation of 
non-dominating interests, and the political morality of modus vivendi. The 
perfectionist stance on political morality and the pragmatic stance on civic virtue in 
advocacy that emerge from this study are inconsistent with each of these. Neutral 
assimilation of interests was rejected when orthodox political liberalism was rejected. 
And adherents of the pragmatic conception of civic virtue that can be educed from the 
last chapter would repudiate the model intimated by Rawls’s paradigmatic case of a 
modus vivendi: “should either party fully gain its way it would impose its own 
religious doctrine as the sole admissible faith.”240 Because the very great values of 
liberty, equality, freedom of conscience, and autonomy as well as the disvalues of 
manipulativeness, coercion, and social alienation can all play large and sometimes 
controlling roles in a perfectionist liberalism that includes an empirical sensitivity 
guiding political advocacy, an alternative to political liberalism need not advocate for 
religious or moral repression when the political tide permits this. In recognizing the 
ultimate validity and justifiability of various special, non-political values that would 
be ruled out by political liberalism, we needn’t be scared off by the great evils that are 
caused when partisans of special or sectarian values endorse their unconstrained 
promotion through governmental action. There is no basis for such an endorsement in 
the argument I have offered, although much more work would be required in order to 
                                                 
240 Rawls (1997), p. 149. 
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 construct a complete political morality that includes a conception of genuine values, 
articulates an order of priority among these, and offers a framework for political 
advocacy based on an accurate appraisal of enduring empirical realities. I have simply 
tried to clean up the mess left from past liberal false starts and to construct some of the 
groundwork for future projects of this much wider scope. 
 Obviously, I also have not attempted to articulate or defend a conception of 
economic egalitarianism that could draw upon this groundwork to begin answering the 
difficult questions discussed in Chapter 6. I have simply tried suggest that setting out 
some such argument would be worth the effort, and I have attempted to pry the door 
open for it. And while I agree with many of the early commentators on political 
liberalism that this door is effectively closed to those who endorse that framework of 
political justifiability, their arguments for this conclusion are quite incomplete, since 
they ignore the prospects for a controversial conception of justice located in the 
understanding of political liberalism set out in Chapters One and Two. 
 Finally, I admit to being uneasy about the conclusions I have drawn regarding 
the principle of neutrality on religion. I do not know how this conclusion would 
combine with a framework of measured, pragmatic political advocacy drawn from the 
last chapter to yield an operative stance on neutrality, especially for those who are 
very religious. Perhaps, though, my unorthodox conclusion would entail little change 
in how political argument is conducted and in the results of normal political activity 
and negotiations. It may well be that the persons who are likely to delight in the new 
political legitimacy conferred by my arguments on their religious rationales are 
precisely those who never endorsed or heeded liberal restrictions of neutrality in the 
first place. And perhaps those who are religious but who were ambivalent about the 
propriety of such neutrality will continue to advocate policies on the basis of purely 
secular values, since they view religion as a properly private affair, and worry that 
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 government action to “support” their religion will in fact be injurious to their now 
well-functioning religious institutions.  For there is little reason to think that religious 
institutions and rationales can avoid the mangling by political wrangling that so often 
afflicts secularly well-motivated policies, and there may be good reason for the 
religious to wish to insulate their religious institutions and public declarations from 
such influences. 
  For these and other reasons, the in-principle justifiability of the kinds of 
reasons that are traditionally barred from the political forum may not change much 
about how that forum operates now or in the future. Still, I am willing to admit that it 
might change a lot, and that the effects may be reason enough to rethink the theoretical 
conclusions reached here. For now, however, I have offered arguments to reject the 
assimilation of interests and the categories of justifiable political reasons that are 
embraced in full by political liberals, and accepted in part by most comprehensive 
liberals. If I am right, these arguments are helpful and perhaps crucial components of a 
successful defense of a strongly egalitarian criterion of distributive justice. 
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